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Abstract 
 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between absolutist thinking 
and wellbeing.  To accomplish this, we first outline the concept of absolutism, before 
examining how this concept relates to wellbeing.    
                In chapter 1 we present a literature review of absolutism as it relates to 
wellbeing, highlighting where there are points of contention or gaps in the research.  
In chapters 2 and 5, we define absolutism by establishing a distinction - empirically 
and theoretically - between the concepts of ‘absolute’ and ‘extreme’.  We argue that 
confounding these two concepts has consequential implication.  Chapters 2-5, present 
and validate a new text-analysis based method for measuring absolutism.  We discuss 
the limitations of the previous methods, and compare them to our alternative text-
analysis method.  In chapters 2-4, we use our text-analysis method to investigate the 
relationship between absolutist thinking and various mental health groups.  We find 
strong correlations between natural language markers of absolutist thinking and 
anxiety, depression and suicidal ideation.  We provide evidence that elevated use of 
absolutist words reflects absolutist thinking rather than psychological distress per se.  
We also present data that indicates absolutist thinking is a cognitive vulnerability for 
depression and suicidal ideation.  In chapter 3 we replicate these basic associations in 
four non-English languages (French, Spanish, German and Russian).  In chapter 2 and 
4, we also explore how prominent absolutist thinking is in a community sample, while 
comparing the relative impact of absolutist thinking and negative thinking to 
wellbeing.  We show that absolute words make up approximately 1% of natural 
language and are better markers for affective disorder than negative emotion words.  
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In chapter 6 we briefly investigate differences in absolutist words use between 
cultures.  In chapter 7-8, using a forced choice behavioral paradigm we ask 
participants to choose which is the “better way to think?”, between statements that 
are absolutely positivity, extremely positive and moderate negativity.  We find a high 
degree of variation in responses.  Finally, in chapter 9, we empirically demonstrate 
that absolutist thoughts are more cognitively rigid than non-absolute thoughts, even 
when they have the most reason to change.  
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Introduction 
 
What is absolutist thinking? 
This thesis is focussed on a cognitive style which is often referred to as ‘extreme 
thinking’ (e.g. Teasdale, 2001), but we have chosen to term ‘absolute’ or ‘absolutist’, 
as we deem that more appropriate.  Absolutist thoughts denote a state of 
uncompromising totality, independent of context and unqualified by nuance.  While 
absolutist thinking may manifest in a myriad of ways, it generally takes the form of 
either categorical imperatives or dichotomous expressions.  Categorical imperatives 
are absolute, unconditional demands, which apply to all circumstances within a remit.  
They are commonly expressed using obligatory modal terms like ‘have to’ and ‘must’.  
Quite often, categorical imperatives are used with reference to goals and behaviour.  
For example, “I have to get an A in English” or “you must not wear white after labour 
day”.  Dichotomous thinking (also known as “all-or-nothing thinking”, “black and white 
thinking”, “splitting” or “polarized thinking”) is the tendency to conceptualize things in 
absolute and dichotomous terms (see Neuringer, 1961).  This cognitive style is 
commonly expressed using absolutist words such as ‘completely’, ‘nothing’, ‘always’ 
or ‘never’.  Dichotomous thinking frequently applies to an individual’s understanding 
and perception of the world as well as their goals and desires.  Crucially, both 
categorical imperatives and dichotomous expressions are characterised by absolutism. 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 4 of 341 
 
Thesis Questions 
In principal, the concept of absolutist thinking is relevant to all cognition.  That is, if an 
individual is thinking, they are either thinking in an absolute or non-absolute fashion.  
This holds for any subject matter or content topic; as absolutism is a form of thought, 
not a topic of thought.  Understood in this way, the subject of this thesis would have 
the broadest possible remit, as it applies to any type of cognition. 
 Clearly therefore, this PhD cannot examine all aspects of absolutist thinking.  
We will set out specific aims, relating to absolutist thinking and psychological well-
being, that will focus the research.  However, readers should note, that due to the 
universal applicability of absolutism to cognition, many of the findings presented here 
will have relevance beyond the specific questions addressed. 
 
(1) The Distinction Between Absolute and Extreme  
First, we aim to better define absolutist thinking, by differentiating it from ‘extreme 
thinking’.  Extreme (but not absolute) thinking, relates to beliefs or thoughts that 
greatly deviate from accepted norms.  Specifically, the further a position is from the 
population ‘mean’, the more extreme.  In this way, extreme beliefs lie on a continuum 
and do not have the same categorical nature of absolute beliefs. 
As will be seen in the next chapter, the terms absolute and extreme are 
currently used interchangeably in the literature.  This is in large part due to their 
respective lack of moderation, as well as a failure to recognise the difference between 
holding fringe views which lie on a continuum, and absolute categorical beliefs.  
Moreover, absolutist beliefs are themselves often extreme since they usually greatly 
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deviate from accepted norms.   Note that while absolutist beliefs can often be 
extreme, extreme beliefs are quite often not absolutist.   
This has led to a large degree of confounding between the two concepts in the 
extant literature.  We argue that there is a consequential and qualitative difference 
between extreme and absolutist thinking.  Unlike absolute beliefs, extreme beliefs 
retain some degree of nuance and context dependence; they implicitly recognise the 
existence of an underlying continuum of possible alternative positions.  Conversely, 
absolute beliefs, do not acknowledge the possibility of any alternative.   
More importantly, absolute claims about the way the world is cannot be 
justified, while extremes potentially could.  Many beliefs which are commonplace 
today, had at one time been considered extreme.  Galileo was sent to the inquisitions 
for affirming that the earth was a sphere and not the centre of the universe, an 
extreme position at the time, but not irrational.   On the other hand, claims of 
absolute certainty or magnitude about the world, cannot be justified.  Given that we 
have to make allowances for the limitations of human knowledge and understanding, 
it is difficult to conceive of anything that can truly be said to be an absolute.  Even our 
most cherished and fundamental axioms about the world are not invulnerable to 
modification or rejection.  Note, we are not here referring to analytic propositions, as 
defined by Immanuel Kant in his ‘Critique of Pure Reasoning’ (Kant, translated by 
smith, 1934), where the “predicate concept is contained in its subject concept” (e.g. a 
square has four sides).  Analytic propositions can be absolutes, as their truth does not 
depend on any relation to the world.  We will not further indulge in a deeper 
philosophical discussion here; it is enough to say that for truth claims that relate to 
the world (synthetic propositions), absolutes cannot be justified. 
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(2) Measuring Absolutism  
I intend to develop a procedure for measuring absolutist thinking.  Naturally, this 
construct has previously been measured in different ways, chapter 2 will outline these 
existing methods.  We however, aim to develop a method that has more ecological 
validity than those previously employed.  This is predicated on measuring absolutism 
in the main form in which it is ordinarily expressed, namely natural language.  Our 
contention is that absolute thinking is signified through the use of absolutist words 
(i.e. always, never, completely etc.). 
 
(3) Absolutist Thinking and Wellbeing 
Using our more ecologically valid method for estimating absolutist thinking, we aim to 
establish links between an absolutist thinking style and wellbeing.  Specifically, 
affective disorders (anxiety, depression and suicidal ideation) which we expect to 
correlate positively with absolutist thinking styles.  This is largely based on the clinical 
practice literature where absolutist thinking is a recognised cognitive distortion in 
cognitive therapy (see Beck, 1991; Burns, 1989).  Although recognised, it is rarely 
specifically examined, separate from the other facets of cognitive therapy.  For 
instance, the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman, 1979) and the Attribution 
Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982) are among the most widely used 
subjective measures questionnaires designed to estimate cognitive biases for affective 
disorder.  While they both contain many items and responses which are relevant to 
absolutist thinking (e.g. “If I fail partly, it is as bad as being a complete failure”), they 
are not designed to specifically capture that construct.  The few – and rather flawed – 
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measures designed to estimate dichotomous thinking have not been applied to 
depression and anxiety (e.g. the Dichotomous Thinking Inventory (DTI); Oshio, 2009).  
Absolute responding as measured by summing the number of end-point responses 
(usually on the DAS and ASQ measures) has been linked to depressive relapse by some 
studies (Peterson et al., 2007), but not others (Ching and Dobson, 2009).  This 
methodology has serious shortcoming partly outlined by Forand and DeRubies (2014) 
and also in chapter 5 of this thesis.  Finally, there have also been a few attempts to 
measure absolutist thinking using natural language.  For example, articulated thoughts 
in simulated situations (ATSS) showed that depressed participants were deemed by 
coders to have used more dichotomous expressions in negative situations than non-
depressed participants (White, Davidson, Haaga & White, 1992). 
 
(4) Absolutist Thinking and Negativity 
I intend to compare the relative association between an absolutist thinking style and 
wellbeing, with that of a negativistic thinking style and wellbeing.  The association 
between negativity and well-being has long been established (Ehring & Watkins, 
2008), indeed for many, the two concepts are almost synonymous.  We intend to 
empirically demonstrate, that although less intuitive, absolutist thinking has an 
equally strong association with wellbeing to that of negativity.  This taps into an 
emerging debate in the field of mental health.  Namely, is affective disorder the result 
of content (negative thinking) or process (cognitive rigidity).  For this reason, in many 
parts of the thesis, we will not discuss absolutist thinking in isolation, but compare it 
to negative thinking. 
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(5) Absolutist Thinking and Cognitive Rigidity 
Finally, we will begin to demonstrate an association between absolutist thinking and 
cognitive rigidity.  These two concepts are often assumed to be linked (Pollock & 
Williams, 1998), however there is little empirical evidence demonstrating the 
association.  The link may be important in explaining the mechanism by which 
absolutist thinking could give rise to affective disorder. 
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Chapter One: Literature Review 
 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
The concept of absolutist thinking is not confined to any specific body of literature, 
rather, it spans large swathes of different disciplines.  In line with the research 
questions set out in the introduction, the review will focus on absolutist thinking in 
the field of mental health, psychometric methods of measuring absolutist thinking and 
the debate between content (negativity) and process (flexibility).  The structure of this 
literature review will be partly chronological, beginning with the cognitive revolution 
in the 1960’s.  Albert Ellis was one of the earliest to identify the maladaptive impact of 
absolutist thinking, as formulated in his psychotherapeutic practice ‘Rational Emotive 
Behavioural Therapy’ (REBT).  REBT was shortly followed by ‘Cognitive Therapy’ (CT) 
devised by Aaron Beck, and was greatly influenced by Ellis’ REBT.  While focussing on 
absolutist thinking, we discuss the similarities, differences and empirical status of both 
therapy models.  Arguing that while Ellis and REBT centred around combatting 
dogmatism, Beck and CT had a greater focus on negative thinking.  We will then 
review the existing literature associating absolutist thinking with a number of mental 
health conditions, highlighting the lack of empirical studies connecting absolutist 
thinking to depression and anxiety.  After reviewing the links between absolutism and 
mental health, we will briefly review the links between negativity and mental health, 
highlighting any shortcomings.  This will be done in service of the larger debate on 
content vs. process, leading to the ‘third wave’ psychotherapies, which have 
emphasized process models of depression and affective disorder.  Many of these 
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therapies (i.e. mindfulness) prioritize psychological flexibility, identifying absolutist 
categorical imperatives as antithetical to good mental health.  This therefore leads to 
a brief review of the association between psychological flexibility and both absolutist 
thinking and affective disorder.  This chapter ends with a detailed review of a seminal 
paper (Teasdale et al., 2001) which claims absolutist responding (on Likert type scale) 
is a cognitive vulnerability for depressive relapse.  We also review and discuss the 
multiple subsequent replication attempts. 
 
1.2 Absolutist Thinking and Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy 
Albert Ellis, a US clinical psychologist, founded the psychotherapeutic theory and 
practice of Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT).  In principle, the therapy is 
focused on challenging and disputing ‘irrational’ beliefs, which Ellis argues precipitate 
emotional disturbance.  In practice, the term ‘irrational’ has proven difficult to define, 
it currently almost exclusively equates to some form of absolutist thinking.   
This narrow definition of ‘irrational’ is a relatively recent development.  For 
many years, REBT courted controversy by effectively claiming that all irrationality 
resulted in emotional disturbance.  For instance, in a 1996 speech, Ellis stated that 
religion (which he deemed irrational) was “on almost every conceivable count, directly 
opposed to the goals of mental health”.   
While never fully abandoning the notion that all irrationality was mal-adaptive, 
Ellis did also outline 11 specific irrational beliefs.  These were then reduced into ‘four 
factors’, which make up the ‘four factor model’ that currently defines the term 
‘irrational beliefs’ within REBT.  The first of these is referred to as ‘demandingness’, 
and it signifies beliefs which impose rigid and absolutist demands (e.g. “things must 
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be…”, “I have to...”, “she should have…”).  Demandingness is also widely and 
humorously named ‘must-urbation’, both terms were coined by Ellis, to emphasize the 
association with the obligatory modal word “must”, in demanding that something 
must be a certain way.  It should be noted that demandingness is simply an alternative 
term for categorical imperatives (as defined in the introduction).  These lie at the core 
of REBT and are considered the primary irrational belief factor (Ellis, 1997).   
The remaining three factors in the four-factor model are ‘catastrophizing’, 
‘low-frustration tolerance’ and ‘global evaluations’.  These are somewhat self-
explanatory, they refer to imagining catastrophes, a lack of resilience to stressors and 
overgeneralizing, respectively.  Once again, it is argued that their maladaptive quality 
stems from their absolutistic nature.  For example, catastrophizing is defined as 
“dichotomous evaluation of a negative event as worse than it absolutely should be” 
(Szntagotai & Jones, 2010).  In this way, they are considered secondary irrational belief 
factors as, it is argued, they derive from the primary irrational belief factor 
demandingness (e.g. Ellis, 2003).  Indeed, Ellis has previously argued that all 
irrationality ultimately has ‘absolutism’ at its core, reasoning that in the absence of 
rigid demands, an individual would be free to choose other beliefs, and consequently 
maladaptive beliefs would be abandoned.  He went on to identify that the 
distinguishing feature between REBT and other psychotherapies, is its primary focus 
on “absolutistic, dogmatic shoulds, oughts, and musts”, maintaining that it is the 
inclusion of this form of irrationality which converts “appropriately sad, regretful, 
disappointed and annoyed” into “inappropriately depressed and self-hating” (Ellis, 
1987).  While never explicitly stated, it is nevertheless clear from the REBT literature, 
that the terms demandingness and absolutist thinking are synonymous.  For example, 
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Freeman (2006) writes “irrational or dysfunctional beliefs are absolutist evaluations or 
demandingness that past, present, or future life events should, ought or must be 
different from the way they are”.  Crucially, this means that where REBT argues that 
demandingness is the primary irrational belief, and that it gives rise to all other 
irrational beliefs; in this thesis we argue that absolutism fits that role better. 
Having only a single factor at its core (demandingness), has exposed REBT to 
criticism as an overly reductive therapy model.  Detractors argue that a multitude of 
different thoughts (irrational or otherwise) contribute to emotional distress.  This is 
evident in the psychopathology models of other psychotherapy disciplines, which 
almost always have a more complex multicomponent structure.  REBT counters, that 
while emotional distress is proximally induced by a multitude of different thoughts, 
they are all ultimately fostered by rigid absolutist thinking (DiLorenzo, David & 
Montgomery, 2007).  If this is so, it could be reasoned that even the REBT four-factor 
model is needlessly complex, and that just the single factor of demandingness (or 
rather absolutist thinking) would suffice.  Supporting this notion, Muran, Kassinove 
and Dill (1992) conducted a semantic analysis of 16 linguistic variants hypothesised to 
represent the four irrational belief factors (Ellis & Dryden, 1987).  They combined this 
with Likert type questionnaires and found that confirmatory factor analysis ‘generally 
failed’ to support the four-factor model.  They conclude that only a single factor of 
irrationality existed.   
REBT also outlines what it considers are rational beliefs; here the theory 
becomes more complicated.  In one respect, rational beliefs simply appear to be the 
non-absolutist versions of irrational beliefs.  They are therefore characterised as 
‘preferences’ and ‘desires’ as opposed to the ‘needs’ and ‘demands’ (Ellis, David & 
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Lynn, 2010).  However elsewhere, rational beliefs are also described as flexible, 
consistent with reality, logical and self-enhancing (Dryden, 2005; Szentagotai & Jones, 
2010).  This is a much broader conceptualisation, with only the first of these attributes 
actually directly linked to demandingness, or indeed, absolutist thinking.  This is 
consistent with the claim made by some REBT practitioner/researchers, that rational 
and irrational beliefs are orthogonal.  This means the absence of irrationality, is not in 
itself the presence of rationality (David & Szentagotai, 2006). 
In summary, the central goal of REBT is to combat absolutistic categorical 
imperatives termed ‘demandingness’.  While other psychotherapy models also 
recognise the maladaptive impact of absolutist thinking, only REBT recognises it as the 
sole core and source of downstream maladaptive cognitions. 
 
1.3 Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy &  
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
1.3.1 The Founding 
In many ways, REBT pioneered cognitive based therapies.  Founded in the mid-1950’s, 
at the height of the cognitive revolution, it placed psychotherapy on a cognitive path, 
and away from Freudian psychoanalysis and behaviourism.  It preceded its more 
influential offshoot ‘Cognitive Therapy’ (CT) by almost a decade.  Founded by Aaron 
Beck in the 1960’s, CT quickly gained prominence and overtook REBT as the leading 
cognitive behavioural therapy.  For this reason, it is Beck and not Ellis, who is credited 
as the “father of cognitive behavioural therapies” (e.g. Halter, Rolin-Kenny & Dzurec, 
2013).  Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) is the umbrella term which encompasses 
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REBT, CT and numerous other cognitive based therapies.  However, due to the 
predominance of Beck’s ideas and formulation, the terms CT and CBT are mostly 
interchangeable. 
Recently, there has been a growing consensus among REBT practitioners that 
there is no meaningful difference between the two therapy models.  David (2014) 
writes that “REBT is CBT”, and the Albert Ellis institute now refers to its psychotherapy 
as “RE & CBT”.  It’s difficult to determine whether this was merely an attempt to 
elevate the status of REBT by associating it more closely with CBT, or a sincere 
recognition of the similarities between REBT and CBT.  Nevertheless, while there are 
certainly similarities, there are also substantial and consequential differences. 
 
1.3.2 The Differences 
Beck (1972) proposed several ‘cognitive manifestations’, these were akin to irrational 
beliefs in that they were various maladaptive cognitive appraisals.  None of them 
however explicitly invoked any kind of absolutist thinking.  Later Burns (1989) 
converted these manifestations into what today are recognised as the ‘cognitive 
distortions’ of CBT.  They are ‘all-or-nothing thinking’, ‘overgeneralization’, ‘mental 
filter’ (negative), ‘discounting the positives’, ‘jumping to conclusions’, ‘magnification 
or minimisation’, ‘emotional reasoning’, ‘should statements’, ‘global labelling’, 
‘personalisation & blaming’, ‘always being right’ and the ‘fallacy of fairness’.  This list is 
not exhaustive, yet many of the distortions do indeed relate directly with the irrational 
beliefs of REBT.  They are however far less focused on absolutist thinking as the core 
dysfunctional distortion.  While they recognize the maladaptive impact of all-or-
nothing thinking, it is viewed as merely one distortion among many, and no 
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hierarchical model is proposed.  Ellis (1987) addressed this point, proposing that REBT 
uniquely recognizes the role of categorical imperatives (demandingness) in the 
development of depression.  In rebuttal, Brown and Beck (1988) argue that Ellis has 
ignored the presence of categorical imperatives in other forms of psychotherapy (i.e. 
CBT), refuting the notion that REBT ‘stands alone’ in this respect.  It should be noted 
that this exchange occurred in 1987-88, one year before Burns (1989) published the 
‘cognitive distortions’ which recognized the role of absolutist categorical imperatives.  
At the time of writing, Ellis was right to point out that although there may have been 
mention of categorical imperative in other psychological disciplines, only REBT had 
recognised them as the core maladaptive belief. 
 A difference in the prominence of absolutist thinking as a maladaptive force, is 
not the most consequential difference.  The sharpest distinction between REBT and 
CBT relates to their respective views on negative thinking.  Beck introduced into CBT 
the concept of the ‘negative triad’.  This refers to the tendency in depressed 
individuals to have negative views about themselves, the world, and the future.  This 
pessimistic style is suggested as a possible mediator or vulnerability factor for 
depression.  The negative triad is an intrinsic part of CBT theory and practice, even the 
cognitive distortions are to be understood from the perspective of a negative 
interpretive bias.  For example, overgeneralising would manifest itself as 
overgeneralising negatively, rather than simply overgeneralising in general (e.g. 
Thomas & Duke, 2007).  Interestingly, and in sharp contrast, the REBT literature makes 
almost no mention of positive or negative thinking.  Indeed, REBT practitioners 
explicitly clarify that as neither positive nor negative thinking is necessarily rational or 
irrational, the terms are not used (see David, 2010).  REBT is almost singular in this 
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respect; nearly all other psychotherapy models and practices designate some 
maladaptive role to negative thinking.  This sets up a long standing, and largely 
unspoken division, between process models for depression and content models for 
depression.  While most psychotherapies deal with a mixture (i.e. CBT), allowing 
practitioners to give different weightings to the process and content components of 
the psychotherapy model.  REBT strictly focusses on maladaptive processes and does 
not have a maladaptive content component. 
Beyond theory, there are also practical differences largely established by the 
radically different therapy styles of the founders.  Ellis believed that since irrational 
thoughts are held forcefully, a therapist must be equally forceful in challenging and 
disputing them (see Ellis & Harper, 1975; Alexander, 2018).  Conversely, the more 
congenial Beck preferred a gentler ‘listening’ approach, where patients are ‘guided’ 
towards more adaptive thinking (see Turkcapar, Kahraman, Sargin, 2015).  Finally, 
there is also a major difference in the empirical status of REBT and CBT. 
 
1.3.3 The Empirical Status 
There is an extremely large and still growing body of empirical evidence supporting 
the efficacy of cognitive behavioural therapy (e.g. Butler, Chapman, Forman & Beck, 
2005).  CBT has been empirically driven from its outset, and this contributed its rapid 
rise in popularity.  Most studies have been clinical randomized control trials, in which 
the efficacy of CBT was compared with a range of other control and/or treatment 
groups (e.g. Beck & Fernandez, 1998; Gloaguen et, al. 1998; Rector & Beck, 2001).  
Many reviews of meta-analyses have been conducted (see Hofmann, Asnaani, Vonk, 
Sawyer & Fang, 2012; Sztein, Koransky, Fegan & Himelhoch, 2017), collectively their 
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findings indicate that CBT is highly effective for depression and anxiety, as well as a 
range of other emotional disorders.  
 Sadly, the empirical status of REBT is not nearly as robust.  As Kendal et. al., 
(1995) points out, REBT has been dogged by ambiguities in the theory, remedial flaws 
in the design of studies and a lack of large scale randomized control clinical trials.  
Unlike CBT, for many years REBT practitioners did not recognize the value in 
hypothesis testing their clinical observations and practices.  REBT is not empirically 
driven, rather, many of its tenets are clinically derived.  In one of the few meta-
analyses conducted into REBT studies, MacInnes (2004) examined (1) the association 
between irrational beliefs and affective disorder and (2) the assertion that 
demandingness is the core irrational belief.  They found 18 studies which met their 
requirements, 6 were non-experimental survey studies; 9 were case-control cross-
sectional intervention studies, 1 was a prospective study and 3 specifically looked at 
the claim that demandingness is the core irrational belief.  They found the strength of 
the association between irrational beliefs and dysfunctional emotions to be small.  
They also found no evidence for demandingness as the core irrational belief.  They 
concluded that the evidence does not support the theories of REBT.  This conclusion is 
disputed by David, Szentagotai, Eva & Macavei (2005).  While they concede that more 
quality research is needed, they argue that ‘hundreds of research articles’ support 
REBT’s main basic theory and efficacy.  They acknowledge that the formulation of 
demandingness as the core irrational belief is based on Ellis’ clinical work and that 
there is no empirical evidence to support this theory.   
It is true that other larger meta-analyses have endorsed the efficacy of REBT.  
For example, Lyons & Woods (1991) included 70 REBT studies with 236 comparisons 
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into their meta-analysis.  REBT was compared with baseline, control group, cognitive 
behaviour modification, behaviour therapy and various other interventions.  It was 
found to produce a significant improvement over baseline and control, but not 
significantly different from cognitive behaviour modification and other psychotherapy 
methods examined.  Effect sizes correlated with therapist experience and the length 
of treatments; there was no difference between psychotherapy clients and students 
as subjects.  Interestingly, the studies that were rated highly in with respect to internal 
validity (random assignment, low attrition, and outcome measures low in reactivity) 
had significantly higher effect sizes than the medium validity studies.  The authors also 
highlight methodological flaws, including a lack of follow up data and information on 
attrition rates.   Later, Engles, Garnefski & Diekstra, (1993) also conducted a meta-
analysis of 28 controlled REBT studies, finding it was superior to placebo and equal to 
other combination therapies (including CBT) and systematic desensitization.   
 Overall, there appears to be empirical support for the efficacy of both REBT 
and CBT (although this is more comprehensive for CBT).  It is however unclear what 
factor(s) are mediating the positive outcomes.  As absolutist irrational beliefs (and 
cognitive distortions) are often correlated with negative thinking, it is difficult to parse 
out their respective contributions to dysfunctional mental health. 
 
1.4 Absolutist Thinking and Emotional Disorders 
I will situate this review of absolutist thinking and emotional disorders within the 
context of appraisal theories of emotion.  All the irrational beliefs and cognitive 
disorders previously discussed are appraisals, in that they are “evaluations” made 
about the self or environment (Yap & Tong, 2009).  Such appraisals are believed to 
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elicit emotions (Scherer, Schorr & Johnstone, 2001), especially where they relate to 
goals and resources. 
 
1.4.1 Absolutist Thinking and Suicidal Ideation 
Neuringer (1961; 1964) was among the first to identify the propensity for 
dichotomous thinking in suicidal ideation.  He observed that patients that had 
previously attempted suicide (and were currently hospitalized) made more extreme 
value judgements and ‘made greater differences among opposing concepts’ than did 
controls.  This led to the conclusion that “dichotomous evaluative thinking seems to 
be a common characteristic of emotionally disturbed persons”.  This was deduced 
from ‘semantic differential tests’ where patients were asked to make ratings on a 
seven-point Likert scale.  Although these are technically appraisals, in that they are 
evaluations, they lack the ecological validity of irrational beliefs or cognitive 
distortions as expressed in natural language.  Using the same methodology of extreme 
responding on Likert scales, Smith (1993) corroborated these findings by concluding 
that extreme ratings, both positive and negative, were linked to suicidal ideation.   
Later, cognitive rigidity was also associated with suicidal ideation.  Patsiokas, 
Clum and Luscomb (1979) administered the ‘embedded figures test’, ‘alternative uses 
test’ and the ‘matching familiar figures test’ and found that the suicide attempter 
group displayed significantly greater rigidity in a divergent thinking task and greater 
difficulty in generating alternative solutions.  This finding was endorsed by Keilp et al., 
(2001), who found executive function deficits in suicidal patients after running a 
battery of neuropsychological tests.  They argue that cognitive flexibility is the critical 
factor differentiating high vs. low lethality suicide attempters.  In another compelling 
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study, Marzuk, Hartwell, Leon and Portera (2005) hypothesised that suicidal subjects 
would perform more poorly on measures of executive functioning and mental 
flexibility, than non-suicidal depressed subjects.  They tested this using standardized 
measures for executive functioning, mental flexibility, problem solving and ability to 
generate multiple solutions.  For example, these included the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test (WCST), where participants must deduce the correct way to match cards.  They 
found that suicidal patients performed significantly worse on these measures.  Their 
findings were controlled for age, IQ, severity of depression and number of prior 
suicidal attempts.  This suggests that an absolutist and rigid perspective, is a 
distinguishing factor between depression and suicidal ideation.  It is generally 
understood that the cognitive rigidity observed in suicidal individuals is associated 
with the dichotomous thinking also observed in suicidal individuals (Ellis & Rutherford, 
2008).  Interestingly, Marzuk, Hartwell, Leon and Portera (2005) theorize that 
dichotomous thinking stems from cognitive rigidity.  This is counter to the ideas of 
REBT which postulate that cognitive rigidity is derived from absolutist irrational 
beliefs, such as dichotomous thinking (Turner, 2016).  
In a critical review of this emerging literature, Arffa (1983) writes “cognitive–
rigidity (whether it is termed dogmatism, dichotomizing, hopelessness, or whatever) is 
patently implicated in suicide”.  Hopelessness has repeatedly been found to be the 
most reliable feature in suicidal ideation (e.g. Minkoff, Bergman, and Beck, 1973; 
Steer, Kumar, & Beck, 1993; Beck, Brown, & Steer, 1989; Stewart et al., 2005; 
Thompson, Mazza, Herting, Randell, & Eggert, 2005).  Many have linked hopelessness 
to both dichotomous thinking and cognitive rigidity (Weishaar & Beck, 1992).  Indeed, 
a state of hopelessness is commonly characterised as absolutist, inflexible and 
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insensitive to new or conflicting information.  Hopelessness however, is also clearly 
negatively valenced; in this way it differs from dichotomous thinking and cognitive 
rigidity, which in principal have no valence.  Finally, suicidal ideation has also been 
linked with poor problem-solving skills.  This is also believed to be linked to cognitive 
rigidity and dichotomous thinking (Ellis & Rutherford, 2008).  For example, Schotte 
and Clum (1982), tested 65 undergraduate students that self-reported suicidal 
ideation on the ‘scale for suicidal ideators’.  They looked at negative life stress, 
cognitive rigidity, poor problem-solving skills, hopelessness and suicidal ideation.  
They predicted that a deficit in the capacity for divergent thinking would lead to a 
‘cognitive unpreparedness’ to cope with the high levels of life stress, which would 
produce a state of hopelessness.  The authors administered a battery of tests which 
include ‘Self-rating Depression Scale’, ‘Life Experiences Survey’ and ‘Hopelessness 
Scale’.  While they found no relationship between cognitive rigidity and suicidal 
ideation, they did find poorer problem-solving skills among those with suicidal intent.  
In fact, suicidal subjects were only able to provide half as many potential solutions as 
non-suicidal patients.   
In a series of studies, Pollock and Williams have investigated the problem-
solving capacity of suicidal individuals.  They hypothesized that problem-solving 
deficits are linked to greater cognitive rigidity and dichotomous thinking (Pollock & 
Williams, 1998).  They also argued that dichotomous thinking, cognitive rigidity and 
problem-solving deficits all lead to a state of hopelessness.  In an intervention study, 
they taught suicidal individuals how to be flexible with respect to new and future goals 
and the outcomes.  The results revealed that the intervention group showed 
significantly better overall results in identifying problems, arranging priorities and 
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generating a wide range of solutions compared with the control group.  This work was 
extended (Pollock & Williams, 2001) to reveal that suicide attempters were more 
over-general in autobiographical memory and displayed poorer problem solving than 
the control group.  Finally, Pollock and Williams (2004) found suicidal individuals to be 
passive problem solvers, not able to spontaneously generate alternative solutions.  
Their work has been endorsed by Bartfai, WinBorg, Nordstrom & Asberg (1990), who 
found suicidal inpatients had a decreased ability to generate new ideas when no 
alternatives are provided. 
The work reviewed so far has mostly relied on questionnaires, executive 
functioning tasks and extreme responding on Likert type scales.  These methods are 
less than ideal in studying irrational beliefs/ cognitive distortions, in the context of 
appraisal theory. Because appraisals are more naturally expressed in natural language, 
an ecologically valid study would examine natural language.  In one such study, 
Litinsky & Haslam (1998) applied the ‘thematic apperception test’ (TAT) to verbal 
productions to refine the concept of dichotomous thinking.  Patients and controls 
were both asked to interpret ambiguous pictures.  The scoring system was based on 
instances of complete polarity in the narrative, “two coders demonstrated high levels 
of agreement”.  Results showed that there were more than twice as many instances of 
complete polarity from the suicidal ideation group relative to the control group.  
Specifically, they found that suicidal patients had a significantly elevated rate of 
narrowly defined dichotomous thinking, “involving diametric or polarized 
possibilities”.  Interestingly, there was no difference with respect to ‘weaker forms’ of 
dichotomous thinking, which involved non-binary extremes.  They also found that 
suicidal patients produced shorter TAT narratives, supporting the hypothesis that they 
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were cognitively and affectively “shutdown”.  In another example of natural language 
analysis, Wedding (2000) identified salient examples of dichotomous thinking in the 
confessional poetry of the late Anne Sexton.  Anne Sexton, suffered from severe 
mental ill-health, and eventually committed suicide via carbon monoxide poisoning. 
 In summary, dichotomous thinking, cognitive rigidity and problem-solving 
deficits have been found to be strongly correlated with each other, as well as with 
hopelessness and suicidal intent.  While the specific nature of the associations remains 
to be established,  it is believed that a binary and rigid outlook hinders problem 
solving skills and characterizes a state of hopelessness which is ubiquitous among 
suicidal individuals. 
 
1.4.2 Absolutist thinking and Borderline Personality Disorder 
In their seminal paper on the subject, Veen and Arntz (2000) were among the first to 
empirically associate Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) with dichotomous 
thinking.  They tested a BPD group (n=16), a control cluster C personality disorder 
group (n=12) and a no disorder control group (n=15).  Participants were shown 10-
minute film clips portraying positive and negative situations, some of the negative 
situation specifically targeted common BPD concerns (i.e. mistreatment of children).  
Participants were requested to evaluate 6 characters, on a structured response 
format.  They were asked about a number of bipolar trait descriptions (i.e. honest or 
dishonest etc.), presented on visual analogue scales.  The extent of dichotomous 
thinking among the individuals tested was inferred from extremity of their responses 
on these scales.  Importantly, these were fully continuous analogue scales, rather than 
Likert.  The BPD group was found to make more extreme response for both positive 
 
 
Page 24 of 341 
 
and negative characters, but there was no difference for neutral characters.  The 
authors note that these extreme responses were ‘multidimensional’ – in that BPD 
participants did not rate characters as “all good” or “all bad”; but rather, absolutely 
good in some respects and absolutely bad in others.  In this way, the authors 
distinguish between unidimensional and multidimensional dichotomous thinking.  The 
key methodological problem with this study relates to its ecological validity.  The 
stimuli were not personally relevant to participants (famous film clips) and their 
responses are structured and not expressed through the more natural medium of 
natural language. 
Using the same sample and similar methodology, Arntz and Veen (2001) 
conducted a follow-on study, in which they collected written spontaneous reactions 
instead of visual analogue responses.  These were independently coded on two 
dimensions; ‘affect/tone’ and complexity of the evaluation.   They found that the BPD 
group and cluster C personality disorder group, both demonstrated “poorly 
differentiated evaluations”.  Although somewhat limited, this finding supports their 
earlier work and utilizes a more ecologically valid method (natural language).  As with 
their previous study, the findings are reliant on a small number of observations in 
each group (N = 12-16), so such results should be treated with caution. 
 Arntz and Haaf (2012) investigated whether BPD individuals (n=18) have a less 
complex understanding of others compared with controls (cluster C personality 
disorder, n=18; and no disorder, n=18), comparing the relative contribution of 
dichotomous thinking and negative thinking.  Participants discussed problems with 
three mental health trainees.  Each trainee occupied a different role: rejecting, 
accepting and neutral.  Participants were asked to evaluate trainees in a structured 
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response format (visual analogue scale) and a semi-structured interview.  The 
interviews were scored by independent raters on affect/tone, differentiation and 
complexity of attributions.  In all conditions and all formats, the BPD group displayed 
more dichotomous thinking.  More negativity in BPD was only found in the structured 
responses of the rejecting condition.  The authors therefore concluded that 
dichotomous thinking, more than negativity, is central to the interpretation of others 
by BPD patients.   
This finding was corroborated by Moritz et al., (2011). They found that on a 
range of standard neuropsychological tests, BPD patients (n=20) performed similarly 
to controls (n=20), except that the BDP patients showed greater use of a one-sided 
attribution style.   
Finally, Napolitano and Mckay (2007), conducted a replication study of Veen 
and Arntz (2000), using the same methodology and sample groups.  They were 
specifically interested in tested the latter’s finding that BPD patients displayed 
multidimensional dichotomous thinking.  In support of Veen and Arntz (2000), they 
found that the BPD group (n=16) made more dichotomous evaluations than controls.  
Consistent with the multidimensional hypothesis, BPD evaluations reflected a mixture 
of positive and negative attributes.  They also found that dichotomous thinking was 
not solely confined to negative stimuli, but was also evident in response to nonspecific 
and emotionally positive stimuli. 
Other studies have resulted in slightly different conclusions.  Sieswerda, Arntz 
and Wolfis (2005) investigated whether BPD patients also made more extreme 
judgements in non-interpersonal situations.  Participants were asked to play computer 
games, some designed to be rewarding and others frustrating, after which participants 
 
 
Page 26 of 341 
 
evaluated themselves and the games.  The BPD group (n=24) made more extreme 
evaluations about the game than controls (n=25), cluster C personality disorder (n=10) 
and antisocial personality disorder (n=16).  Nevertheless, the authors conclude that 
BPD was actually characterized more by negativity than by dichotomous thinking.   
Similarly, Sieswerda, Barnow, Verheul and Arntz (2013) also investigated 
whether dichotomous and or negative thinking in BPD patients is limited to 
interpersonal situations.  Once again participants were asked to rate characters in film 
clips on visual analogue scales, across a range of valence conditions.  Here, no 
evidence was found for dichotomous thinking in the BPD group.  The BPD group 
(n=18) did however make more negativistic responses when compared to the cluster C 
personality disorder group (n=16) and no disorder controls (n=17).   
It is difficult to determine the source of the discrepancy in these findings, 
especially as the methodologies are often very similar, and in many instances the 
same authors reported different results.  The most plausible rationalisation centres 
around sample size; most studies have fewer than 20 subjects in each group 
(especially those that failed to reject the null).  It may therefore be that they were 
underpowered. 
 
1.4.3 Absolutist thinking and Eating Disorders 
1.4.3.1 Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa 
Apart from suicidal ideation and BPD, absolutist thinking is most commonly connected 
with eating disorders.  Here, we review its association with anorexia nervosa and 
bulimia nervosa. 
On the treatment of patients with anorexia nervosa, Garner, Garfinkel and 
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Bemis (1982) write that the “anorexic patients often think in absolute terms”.  They go 
on to observe that in anorexia nervosa, rigid absolutist thinking is not limited to 
weight or interpersonal issues, rather, “careers, studying and sports are also pursued 
fanatically”.   They suggest that this dichotomous thinking tendency is trait-like, and 
linked to a need for certainty and control.  Their findings appear to be primarily 
derived from clinical observations rather than experimental results.  For instance, they 
cite the vacillation between over-compliance and stubbornness as evidence of a 
dichotomous cognitive style. 
 A cognitive factor often associated with eating disorders and absolutist 
thinking is perfectionism.  Lethbridge, Watson, Egan, Street and Nathan (2011) 
empirically validate this link.  They hypothesised that perfectionism serves as a 
maintaining mechanism for eating disorder psychopathology.  They also argue that 
perfectionism leads to dichotomous thinking.  Their sample included women with 
DSM-IV eating disorders (N= 238) and women in the general community (N= 248).  
They found that in a hierarchical regression analysis predicting for eating disorder 
psychopathology, dichotomous thinking significantly improved model fit beyond 
perfectionism alone.  This was the case for both groups and reveals that dichotomous 
thinking explains some of the variation in eating disorder psychopathology, over and 
above perfectionism.  Fairburn, Cooper and Shafran (2003) also contend that clinical 
perfectionism is a maintaining mechanism in bulimia nervosa and anorexia nervosa.  
They advocate its addition to CBT for eating disorders, however their recommendation 
also appears to be based mostly on clinical observations.  Their view is however 
endorsed by Mitzman, Slade and Dewey (1994) who have developed an instrument to 
measure “neurotic perfectionism” and eating disorders. 
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 Zotter and Crowther (1991) investigated various cognitive characteristics 
among 15 bulimic patients, 15 ‘repetitive dieters’, and 15 non-bulimic and non-dieting 
controls.  They used thought sampling procedures which were independently rated on 
content, affective tone, accuracy and adherence to a dichotomous thinking style.  
They found that bulimics reported significantly more dichotomous and distorted 
weight-related thoughts than either of the other groups.  This finding was supported 
by Thompson, Berg and Shatford (1987), who examined 19 women who fulfilled DSM-
III diagnostic criteria for bulimia, 35 women who were symptom free and 41 women 
who fulfilled some of the bulimic criteria.  All three groups differed in dichotomous 
thinking, in line with their intensity of bulimic symptoms.  The bulimic and bulimic-like 
group also displayed greater perfectionism than the non-bulimic control group. 
Feixas et al., (2010) hypothesized and found that bulimia nervosa patients 
displayed greater discrepancies between imagined self and ideal self (self-
discrepancy), higher polarization and greater cognitive rigidity.  Their work was based 
on a sample of 64 women (50% bulimic, 50% control).   
Finally, Johnson and Holloway (1988), examined conceptual simplicity and high 
level of ‘obsessionality’ in bulimia nervosa patients.  They examined 54 college 
women, using structured interviews and the eating attitudes test.  Results indicated 
that participants with higher bulimic scores exhibited significantly lower levels of 
conceptual functioning and significantly higher levels of obsessional traits.  The 
conceptual simplicity they refer to means that women with obsessional traits are less 
able to add complexity and nuance to their conceptual thinking.  While not necessarily 
absolutist, this deficit of nuance relates to absolutist thinking. 
Overall, studies have repeatedly found associations between anorexia nervosa 
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and bulimia nervosa, and absolutist perfectionism and dichotomous thinking.  The 
absolutism here appears to be particularly self-focused and connected with a 
misguided sense of attaining control. 
 
1.4.3.2 Obesity 
Most studies relating to obesity and absolutist thinking have identified it as a factor in 
hindering sustained weight loss.    
 In developing the ‘Dichotomous thinking in eating disorder scale’ (DTEDS), 
Byrne, Allen, Dove, Watt and Nathan (2008) tested a sample of treatment seeking 
eating disorder (N=87) and overweight/obese (N=111) women.  They found that 
DTEDS captures both eating specific and more general dichotomous thinking.  The 
DTEDS was developed to measure “rigid, black and white cognitive thinking” in weight 
gain and obesity.   
This measure was used by Dove, Byrne and Bruce (2009) to test whether 
dichotomous thinking moderates the association between depression and body mass.  
Interestingly, in those with low dichotomous thinking, it was found that depression 
positively correlated with BMI.  However, in those with high dichotomous thinking 
there was no relationship.  The authors contend that this is because females in the 
high dichotomous group, who view their weight as unacceptably high, may experience 
high levels of depression irrespective of their actual weight, while those who are less 
dichotomous, are distressed proportionate to the degree of their obesity.  This is 
consistent with the notion that absolutist thinking is independent of context.   
Recently, Antoniou, Bongers and Jansen (2016) also used the DTEDS to find 
that dichotomous thinking, emotional eating, BMI and depression are all positively 
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correlated with one another.  They also found that dichotomous thinking and 
emotional eating may mediate depression.  This was supported by Ramacciotti, et al., 
(2008), who found the same connection through the use of subjective measures 
questionnaires.  The DTEDS was also used by Palascha, van Kleef and van Trijp (2015) 
in a web-based survey of 241 adults.  They found that eating specific dichotomous 
thinking “mediates the association between restraint and weight gain”. 
In two separate reviews of the literature Ohsiek and Williams (2010) and 
Williams (2011) found that avoiding absolutist dichotomous thinking is critical to 
weight loss maintenance.  This is consistent with Byrne, Cooper and Fairburn (2003), 
who reported that among the psychological factors most strongly associated with 
maintaining successful weight loss is dichotomous thinking.  Likewise, in a later 
prospective study the same authors identified dichotomous thinking as the best 
cognitive predictor of weight regain (Byrne, Cooper & Fairburn, 2004).  Moreover, 
using qualitative data, Seamoore, Buckroyd and Stott (2006), found that in 
thematically analysed interviews, a reduction in dichotomous thinking was associated 
with reduced binge eating.  Finally, mindfulness-based intervention, designed to 
engender greater flexibility among those with problematic eating behaviour; found 
decreases in food cravings, dichotomous thinking, body image concern, emotional 
eating and external eating (Alberts, Thewissen & Raes, 2012) 
Overall, the evidence consistently finds that greater dichotomous thinking is 
associated with obesity, depression due to obesity and weight regain.  Prospective 
studies, find that greater dichotomous thinking strongly predicts future weight regain.  
For both anoxia/bulimia nervosa and obesity, there appears to be strong consensus in 
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the literature.  This may be because most of the studies conducted in this field have 
large sample sizes and follow established clinical designs. 
 
1.4.4 Absolutist thinking and other maladaptive consequences  
1.4.4.1 Teaching 
There have been a few studies conducted on the impact of absolutist thinking in the 
teaching profession.  For example, Ostell (1999) investigated the relationship between 
absolutist thinking with coping behaviour and health in a cohort of head teachers.  
Head teachers were assessed on the way they handled work problems, with either 
successful or unsuccessful outcomes. Some were classified as absolutist (N=49) and 
others as non-absolutist (N=31).  Ostell found that head teachers deemed absolutist 
“experienced their job demands as less pleasant and perceived themselves to be less 
effective at managing their emotions for both problems; they perceived themselves as 
producing less ‘successful’ outcomes for the successful problem, as handling this 
problem less effectively, and as having poorer psychological and physical health.”.  In a 
separate study, Evers, Tomic, and Brouwers (2005) examined the causes of ‘burnout’ 
among secondary school teachers.  They found dichotomous thinking to be a 
significant predictor of teacher burnout.  They add that dichotomous thinking 
provided no practical benefit to the teaching of pupils. 
 
1.4.4.2 Substance abuse 
Several articles have also linked absolutist thinking with substance abuse issues.  Most 
notably, in a paper entitled “Absolutist thinking and alcoholism”, Wormer (1988) 
contends that alcoholics are characterized by an absolutist thinking style.  Her thesis 
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was based predominantly on clinical observations and case studies.  For example, 
Wormer recalls an AA meeting where one client said, "What's the point of drinking, if 
you're not going to get completely, 100 percent drunk?” she relates that this 
sentiment was shared by all others in the room.  Wormer goes on to argue that 
absolutism mediates alcoholism in two ways; (1) the all-or-nothing attitude mandates 
excess, (2) it compromises individuals coping mechanisms, they then resort to alcohol, 
which further compromises their coping mechanism.  Remaining intellectually 
consistent, Wormer is also critical of absolute abstinence.  Citing that the Mormon 
religion forbids the consumption of mind altering substances, and consequently 
alcohol consumption is low among Mormons, paradoxically, alcoholism is high.  This is 
indeed the case, although the state of Utah – where 60% of the residents are 
Mormons – has the lowest levels of alcohol consumption and binge drinking in the US, 
they also have the 7th highest levels of alcohol poisoning deaths according to the US 
National Vital Statistics System 2010-2012 records (Canham, 2015).  This implies that 
an all-or-nothing view of alcohol is engendered in Mormon culture, therefore where 
consumption occurs, it more readily leads to alcoholism.  Wormers clinical 
observations have received support from Ammerman, Lynch, Donovan, Martin and 
Maisto (2001).  They investigated 551 adolescents, using the ‘Constructive Thinking 
Inventory’ and its clinical correlates.  They found that categorical thinking 
distinguished adolescents with substance use disorder from those without substance 
use disorder.  Categorical thinking with two categories is essentially dichotomous 
thinking, and with more categories, it is an extension of dichotomous thinking.  
Essentially, it drastically simplifies the world in a way that is prone to absolutism.  
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Finally, in conducting a confirmatory factor analysis on the ‘Addiction Belief Scale’,  
Schaler (2009) confirmed the presence of a dichotomous thinking subscale. 
 
1.4.4.3 Personality Disorder 
There has been little research into absolutist thinking and personality disorders.  The 
first connection was made by Eysenck (1947) who argued that introverted neurotics 
where behaviourally rigid.  He subsequently attempted to clarify the term rigid as 
distinct from dogmatic (1960), claiming that rigidity is the inability to generate novel 
responses, while dogmatic individuals refused to use novel responses, although they 
could generate them.  Later, Watson (1967) corroborated this claim by finding no 
difference between neurotics and non-neurotics in their ability to produce novel 
responses, only neurotics generally failed to utilize such responses.  Secondly, this 
behaviour was limited to introverted (not extroverted) neurotics; consistent with 
Eysenck (1947).  More recently, Oshio (2009) developed the dichotomous thinking 
inventory, a self-report measure of ‘preference for dichotomy’, ‘dichotomous beliefs’ 
and ‘profit and loss thinking’.  Oshio, (2012) found the dichotomous beliefs subscale, 
significantly correlated with all cluster A, B and C personality disorders.  Given the 
strength of this finding, it is strange that very little research has been done 
subsequently on this topic. 
 
1.4.4.4 Perfectionism 
A large body of literature has examined perfectionism and its consequences.  
However, there is an ongoing debate into what constitutes perfectionism.  Hewitt and 
Flett (1991) conducted some of the earliest work on this topic.  They developed the 
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“Multidimensional Perfection Scale”, an influential measure in the field.  The scale is 
composed of three separate subscales; ‘self-oriented perfectionism’, ‘other-oriented 
perfectionism’, and ‘socially prescribed perfectionism’.  This instrument has 
repeatedly shown links between perfectionism (and its subscales) with eating 
disorders, depression, anxiety, rumination and other types of psychological distress 
(Hewitt & Flett, 1991; Hewitt & Flett, 1993; Hewitt, Ediger & Flett, 1996; Flett, Besser, 
Hewitt & Davis, 2007; Nepon, Flett, Molnar & Hewitt, 2011; Flett, Galfi-Pechenkov, 
Molnar, Hewitt & Goldstein, 2011).  In a review of the literature, Shafran and Mansell 
(2001), conclude that the current measure of perfectionism (the Multidimensional 
Perfection Scale), does not reflect the original construct.  They contend that 
perfectionism is the holding of “excessively high personal standards and rigid 
adherence to them”.  They maintain that the inclusion of ‘other-oriented 
perfectionism’, and ‘socially prescribed perfectionism’ confounds ‘associated 
variables’ with the definition of perfectionism.   
The confusion regarding the proper definition continues with the proposition 
of “positive perfectionism” and “negative perfectionism”.  For example, Andrews, 
Burns and Dueling (2004), find that positive perfectionism is related to optimism and 
conscientiousness, while negative perfectionism is related to pessimism and 
neuroticism.  A closer inspection clarifies how they make this distinction between 
positive and negative perfectionism.  While negative perfectionism describes those 
who strive for perfection, positive perfectionism is simply holding non-absolutist high 
standards.  As the authors explain “normal perfectionism, where the individual is able 
to set high goals and standards…when the situation changes, individuals have the 
ability to modify their previous standards”.  It is needlessly confusing to term high 
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standards as perfectionism; the essence of perfectionism is its absolutist nature.  
Simply holding non-absolutist high standards could be more accurately described as 
“not perfectionism” than “positive perfectionism”.  This is evident in the work of Egan, 
Piek, Dyck and Rees (2007), who found dichotomous thinking as the variable most 
predictive of “negative perfectionism” and was not connected with “positive 
perfectionism”. 
 
1.4.4.5 Absolutist thinking and Depression 
As outlined, there is a wealth of literature associating absolutist thinking with suicidal 
ideation, borderline personality disorder, eating disorders and various other 
maladaptive consequences.  Strangely, empirical studies directly linking depression 
with absolutist thinking are few and far between.  This is particularly curious as both 
dichotomous thinking and categorical imperatives are readily recognised as 
vulnerability factors for depression and anxiety by the clinical field (i.e. within REBT 
and CBT).  There is, as has already been reviewed, empirical evidence to support the 
clinical efficacy of CBT and REBT.  While it might be reasonable to assume that in the 
case of REBT, the benefits are due in large part to combatting absolutist thinking, due 
to the central role that demandingness plays in the therapy model, no such 
assumption can be attempted for the more prevalent CBT, which has many other 
possible mediators.   
There have been a small number of studies that have linked dichotomous 
thinking with bipolar depression.  For example, Dodd, Mansell, Morrison and Tai 
(2011) found that extreme, personalized, positive and negative appraisals were 
associated with bipolar symptomatology.  This is consistent with the positive and 
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negative mood swings which characterize bipolar depression.  Additionally, Kelly et al., 
(2011) examined a sample of bipolar disorder (N =171), unipolar depression (N =42) 
and controls (N = 64).  They found extreme positive appraisals only related to a 
greater probability of bipolar disorder if extreme negative appraisals were also high.  
Individuals were most likely to have bipolar disorder, as opposed to unipolar 
depression or control when appraisals were both extremely positive and negative.   
There have been a series of studies which suggest that a greater tendency for 
making absolute end-point responses on Likert scales is a cognitive vulnerability for 
depression.  These will be examined in detail later in this chapter, however an 
overview is relevant here.  These studies started with Teasdale et al., (2001), who 
found that on the ASQ and DAS subjective measures questionnaires, extreme 
responses (ER; both positive and negative) were the best predictor for depressive 
relapse.  They argued, that the ER reflect and extreme absolutist thinking style, and 
that this was a cognitive vulnerability for depression.  Subsequently, using the same 
measures, a number of studies have attempted to replicate these findings.  Most have 
only produced partial replications with qualified results.  Beevers, Miller, Keitner & 
Ryan (2003) found that ER did not decrease with decreasing depression symptoms, 
and only the ER change score (taken at the start and end of treatment) predicted 
relapse, not the absolute levels.  Peterson et al., (2007) did find that ER predicted 
acute phase outcomes, and non-responders to treatment had greater ER scores, 
however ER was not predictive in the continuation phase.  De Graaf, Huibers, Cuijpers 
& Arntz (2010) found that ER increased across categories of depression (mild -> 
major), however while negative ER increases from mild to major, positive ER was 
found to show the opposite association.  Strange et al., (2013) showed that more ER 
 
 
Page 37 of 341 
 
was retrospectively associated with more lifetime episodes of depression.  Forand and 
DeRubies (2014) found that no ER variable predicted depressive relapse, however they 
raised serious criticism of this methodology, pointing out that the content of the items 
compromises whether or not an extreme response is actually extreme/irrational.  That 
is, an extreme response to a moderate item should not be combined with an extreme 
response to an extreme item.  When accounting for this with a style vs content 
indexed, they found ER did significantly predict relapse.  The methodological flaws 
they identify may explain why Ching and Dobson (2009) and Jacobs et al., (2010) both 
failed to find a link between ER and depression or relapse. 
There have also been a few attempts to measure absolutist thinking using 
natural language.  For example, articulated thoughts in simulated situations (ATSS) 
showed that depressed participants were deemed by coders to have used more 
dichotomous expressions in negative situations than non-depressed participants 
(White, Davidson, Haaga & White, 1992).  Later, Fekete (2002) used an adapted 
Weintraub text analysis method on four Internet forums (suicide, depression, anxiety, 
and a journalism control). They found significant results for 13 language variables 
including negations and dichotomous expressions.  Finally, Cohen (2012) measured 
“cognitive rigidity” in the “spontaneous autobiographical narratives” of undergraduate 
students and found correlations with negative emotionality. Unlike structured 
response formats and ER, these natural language text analysis studies have more 
ecological validity.   
 
1.4.4.6 Absolutist thinking and Anxiety 
As with depression, there is an even greater lack of empirical studies directly linking 
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absolutist thinking with anxiety.  Once again, clinical models for anxiety include 
absolutist thinking as a vulnerability factor (Williams and Garland, 2002), however 
other than empirical evidence for the efficacy for REBT and CBT in anxiety, there has 
been little research conducted.  Perfectionism, is the closest construct to absolutist 
thinking empirically linked to anxiety in the literature (Frost & DiBartolo, 2002).  To the 
best of my knowledge no study has specifically linked dichotomous thinking or 
categorical imperatives with anxiety.  
 
1.5 Negative Content vs. Dysfunctional Processes 
1.5.1 What is mediating positive outcomes?  
As already outlined, there is a large body of empirical data supporting the efficacy of 
CBT.  It is difficult to determine however, which aspects of CBT mediate improved 
emotional outcomes in those that undergo the therapy.  It may be that a reduction in 
depressive symptoms is brought about by addressing the negative interpretive bias.  
This involves reducing negative thinking and restructuring negative schemas in a 
patient’s cognitive architecture, resulting in a less pessimistic outlook.  Alternatively, it 
may be that a reduction in depressive symptoms is brought about by challenging 
cognitive distortions like all-or-nothing thinking.  Specifically, this would increase 
appraisal flexibility, either positive or negative, by countering absolutism.  Most 
practitioners would venture that a combination of both reduced negative thinking and 
increased flexibility are needed to bring about positive clinical outcomes for 
depression.  Yet, studies which have addressed this topic have struggled to parse the 
content-focussed (i.e. negative thinking) and process-focussed (i.e. flexibility) aspects 
of cognitive therapies. 
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This division has already been discussed with respect to CBT, so we will 
introduce a second highly influential cognitive theory for depression, namely, 
“Hopelessness theory”.  First formulated by Abramson, Metalsky and Alloy (1989), 
hopelessness theory built on “helplessness theory” (Seligman, 1972), which found that 
dogs exposed to uncontrollable electric shocks would no longer attempt to escape, 
even when that become possible.  Originally it was felt that this could describe the 
aetiology for depression, however it fails to explain why in the face of negative life 
events, some become helpless and not others.  This led to the addition of an 
attributional component in the reformulated helplessness theory (hopelessness).  
Here, it is postulated that individuals make causal attributions along three dimensions; 
‘internal’ or ‘external’, ‘stable’ or ‘unstable’ and ‘global’ or ‘specific’.  According to 
hopelessness theory, those who make internal, stable and global negative attributions 
are at greater risk of depressive symptoms.  The concept of ‘negative inferential style’ 
was soon added to the attributional component of hopelessness theory.  This stated 
that where negative early life experiences occur, children will look to find causal 
explanations.  If they assign global and stable causes (as opposed to specific and 
unstable) this makes it more likely that the negative life experience will impact them 
in adulthood and manifest in depressive symptoms.  As with CBT, we now have both 
content (negative inferential style) and process (causal attribution dimensions) in the 
hopelessness model.  This separation was confirmed by Hankin, Lakdawalla, Carter, 
Abela and Adams (2007), who found support in an exploratory and confirmatory 
factor analysis for the separation between negative inferential styles and cognitive 
distortions.  What remains unclear is the extent to which the separate components 
contribute to symptoms of depression. 
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 Many studies have found a positive relationship between depression and the 
negative inferential style in non-selected samples (e.g. Barnum, Woody, & Gibb, 2013; 
Haeffel, 2011, Zhou, Chen, Liu, Lu, & Su, 2013 etc.) and in clinical populations (Abela, 
Stolow, Zhang, & McWhinnie, 2012; Rose, Abramson, Hodulik, Halberstadt, & Leff, 
1994; Haeffel et al., 2005).   
 To establish causality, Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) introduced the 
‘interpretive bias training’ method.  The basic procedure involves exposing subjects to 
social stories, where the emotional valence remains ambiguous until the final 
sentence is revealed.  The final sentence then disambiguates the story in either a 
positive or negative way.  Often the final sentence is presented in some fragmented 
form, requiring subjects to actively engage in the narrative to disambiguate the 
valence.  There is also occasionally a comprehension question which helps to reinforce 
the interpretation and ensure compliance.  Since its introduction, variations of this 
basic method have proliferated, but all adhere to the basic principle of forcing 
subjects to resolve ambiguity either positively or negatively.  Interpretive bias training 
has been applied to anxiety and depression with generally positive outcomes (i.e. 
Holmes, Lang and Shah, 2009; Yiend, et al., 2009; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012; Wilson, 
Macleod, Mathews and Rutherford, 2006).  However, in a recent meta-analysis of 45 
studies (N = 2,591), Hallion and Ruscio assessed the effect of negative cognitive bias 
modification (CBM; similar to negative interpretive bias training) on depression and 
anxiety.  They found a strong effect of CBM on interpretation (g = 0.81).  Yet, CBM had 
a small effect on anxiety and depression (g = 0.13).  This effect was only reliable when 
a stressor preceded the assessment of symptoms (g = 0.23).  Finally, assessing anxiety 
and depression separately, revealed that CBM only significantly modified anxiety, not 
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depression.  The authors acknowledge that the small effect sizes exposed by the meta-
analysis were inconsistent with their expectations.  Their findings are partly supported 
by a second meta-analysis (Menne-Lothmann et al., 2014), which included 42 articles 
examining the effect of CBM on positive and negative interpretation bias, as well as 
emotional reactivity.  They found an increase in positive interpretation bias and a 
decrease in negative mood state, but no effect on affect emotional reactivity.  The 
authors conclude that under certain conditions, CBM could be a useful 
complementary treatment to usual psychotherapies.  In the most recent and 
comprehensive meta-analysis of CBM on depression and anxiety. Cristea, Kok and 
Cuijpers (2015) included 92 CBM articles (97 randomised control trials).  They took 
into account the quality of journals and risk of publication bias, as well as identifying 
outliers and examining both clinical and subclinical populations.  They found that “For 
clinical samples, the effects of CBM interventions on anxiety and depression outcomes 
were small and, in most cases, non-significant; in the cases where they were 
significant, such as for depression, it seems to have been as a result of the presence of 
outliers and/or publication bias”. 
It therefore remains unclear whether CBM effectively produces better 
outcomes, with respect to depression and anxiety, by overcoming the negative 
interpretative bias.  It could also be argued that a depressed patient, presented with 
positive alternatives to their usual negative interpretations, also becomes more 
flexible.  As stated by Barber and DeRubies (1989) "cognitive therapy does not reduce 
the tendency for depressives to generate negative thoughts in distressing situations, 
but rather it inculcates a set of skills that helps them deal with these thoughts when 
they do occur".  This means that training patients in positive interpretations or 
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reappraisals, increases their appraisal options (more flexibility) as well as makes them 
more positive.  There is currently no study which determines the effects of increasing 
flexibility without altering valence; or to alter valence without increasing flexibility.  It 
may be that the latter is impossible to empirically test.   
 
1.5.2 Growing Focus on Dysfunctional Processes 
Recently, within the science of well-being, there has been a growing shift in focus 
away from content and towards process.  For example, Maor, Ben-Itzhak  and 
Bluvstein (2014) write “the concept of psychological flexibility signals a move from 
simple, universal accounts or theories of positive versus negative emotions to a more 
contextual assessment of the functionality of a specific emotion or coping style”.  This 
sentiment is further endorsed by Kashdan and Rottentberg (2010), who argue for the 
benefits of psychological flexibility and are sceptical about prescribing positive 
thinking.  For instance, they question the wisdom of the recommendation by 
Fredrickson and Losada (2005) that for every 1 negative thought, there should be 3 
positive ones.  They point out that people think negatively, and feel negative 
emotions, because they can be more useful than positive thoughts and emotions, 
especially with respect to making progress towards valued goals.  Indeed, Gruber 
(2011) argues that positive emotion persistence (positive emotion that is independent 
of context) is a marker of bipolar disorder.  This theory was based on earlier work 
(Gruber, Oveis, Keltner & Johnson, 2008) which tested 90 participants, in high and low 
mania risk groups.  Through subjective, expressive, and physiological emotional 
responses, they found that participants at high risk for mania reported elevated 
positive emotions, more irritability and exhibited elevated cardiac vagal tone across 
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positive, negative, and neutral films.  This demonstrates how inflexible positivity – just 
like inflexible negativity – can also be detrimental. 
 
1.6 Absolutist thinking and Third Wave Therapies 
There have been three waves of psychotherapy.  The first wave was typified by 
Freudian psychoanalysis; it was past focussed, theory driven and placed a great 
importance on unconscious forces.  The second wave, as we have already covered, 
was ushered in by the cognitive revolution of the late 1950’s, and it included the 
cognitive therapies REBT and CBT.  These are present oriented, empirically driven 
(particularly CBT) and place a great emphasis on explicit conscious thoughts and 
appraisals.  With the exception of REBT, the second wave also therapies also target 
the ‘contents’ of patients thinking (i.e. the negative interpretive bias).  Most recently, 
there has been a third wave of psychotherapies.  These are increasingly focussed on 
addressing the processes of thoughts, rather than their content.  They almost 
universally encourage greater metacognitive awareness, psychological flexibility and 
acceptance. 
 
1.6.1 Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy 
Mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT) was a pioneering practice which in many 
ways begat the third wave psychotherapy movement.   Originally developed in the 
early 1990’s by Philip Barnard and John Teasdale, it was designed to decrease 
depressive relapse.  MBCT borrows from the second wave cognitive therapies and 
combines them with eastern meditation and mindfulness practices.  Despite deriving 
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inspiration from ancient and spiritual practices, practitioners are quick to differentiate 
the scientific MBCT psychotherapy from religious and pseudoscience alternatives.   
The central component of MBCT is the elimination of categorical imperatives, 
or what Ellis had termed ‘demandingness’ in REBT.  The underlying theory is that 
categorical imperatives (demands made for things to be a certain way) command our 
attention, which results in rumination, and induce strong emotional reactions (stress, 
anger, depression etc.; Lee & Orsillo, 2013).  The goal of guided meditation is to 
increase ‘awareness’ of thoughts and feelings (meta-cognition) and then to accept 
them as they are.  This was described by its early proponents Segal, Williams and 
Teasdale (2002, p.73) as “accepting and allowing what is”.  Meditators are encouraged 
to simply be aware of their thoughts without reacting to them or becoming attached.  
They are asked to cultivate an attitude of ‘open curiosity’ and ‘compassion’.  The drive 
to increase awareness is also said to disrupt maladaptive automatic thoughts. 
Many literature reviews and meta-analyses have empirically demonstrated the 
clinical efficacy of MBCT.  For example, Kuyken et al., (2016) conducted an individual 
patient data meta-analysis from randomized control trials for patients receiving MBCT.  
From 1258 patients included in the meta-analysis, they found a reduced risk of 
depression relapse within a 60-week follow-up period compared with those who did 
not receive MBCT (hazard ratio, 0.69; 95% CI, 0.58-0.82).  There was also a reduced 
risk of depressive relapse within a 60-week follow-up period when compared with 
active treatments (hazard ratio, 0.79; 95% CI, 0.64-0.97).  The authors also present 
some evidence that a greater severity of depressive symptoms prior to treatment 
produced larger effects of MBCT compared to other treatments. 
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In another meta-analysis, which focussed on the reduction in relapse rates 
after MBCT treatment.  Piet and Hougaard (2011) found that in six randomised control 
trials (N = 60-145; total of 593), MBCT significantly reduced the risk of relapse by 34%.  
With a risk ratio of 0.66 for MBCT compared with either treatment as usual or placebo 
controls.  Interestingly, with those that had suffered three or more depressive 
episodes, the risk reduction was 43%, however there was no risk reduction for those 
with less than three depressive episodes.  MBCT was also found to be at least as 
effective as antidepressant medication in preventing depressive relapse.  Importantly, 
the focus on relapse prevention, indicates that mindfulness is interacting with 
etiological factors of depression.  Although, Chiesa and Serretti (2011) also point out 
that many studies included small sample sizes, non-randomized designs and the 
absence of comparisons between MBCT and control groups designed to specify 
underlying mediators. While most aim to eliminate categorical imperatives, MBCT has 
also been used to diminish dichotomous thinking (Alberts and Raes, 2012). 
 
1.6.2 Acceptance and commitment therapy 
Another prominent ‘third wave’ therapy is acceptance and commitment therapy 
(ACT).  While in many ways related to mindfulness, it has a greater focus on 
acceptance and increasing ‘psychological flexibility’.  The theory behind ACT states 
that cognitive entanglement (akin to attachment in MBCT) creates rigidity, which leads 
to emotional disorders.  Specifically, this cognitive entanglement is described as a 
“fusion with your thoughts”.  To increase psychological flexibility, ACT advocates 
observance and acceptance (like MBCT), this allows individuals to see themselves as 
distinct from their thoughts (termed “decentring”).   
 
 
Page 46 of 341 
 
As with MBCT, ACT discourages adherents from making judgements or 
evaluations of their thoughts; it is believed that this only increases cognitive 
entanglement and reduced flexibility.  In a sense, both MBCT and ACT discourage 
appraisals, while REBT advocates disputing absolutist appraisals and instituting 
healthy non-absolutist alternatives.  MBCT and ACT are so concerned about absolutist 
appraisals that they either discourage all appraisals, or permit only a select subset.  
For example, “loving-kindness” (or something similar) is promoted by third-wave 
therapies, where individuals adopt positive loving and kind appraisals.  This seems too 
limiting, given that appraisals are an intrinsic part of our ability to regulate our 
behaviour and emotions.  We require the ability to form adaptive negative appraisals, 
and third wave therapies appear to mostly ignore this important facet of emotion 
regulation. 
 Individual studies have shown that ACT has similar efficacy to CBT (Forman et 
al., 2007; Zettle & Rains, 1989).  Indeed, some studies even show greater efficacy for 
ACT (Branstetter et al., 2004; Hernández López et al., 2009; Lappalainen et al., 2006; 
Zettle & Hayes, 1986).  In a systematic meta-analysis, Powers, Vording and 
Emmelkamp (2009) combined the data from 18 randomized control trials (n = 917).  
These studies compared ACT with waiting lists, psychological placebos, treatment as 
usual, and established therapies.  They found that ACT was superior to control 
conditions (effect size = 0.42) with ACT participants more improved than 66% of 
control conditions.  ACT was also superior to treatment as usual (effect size = 0.42), 
but not significantly more effective than established treatments (effect size = 0.18, p = 
0.13).   
 
 
 
Page 47 of 341 
 
1.6.3 Dialectical Behaviour Therapy 
Dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT) was developed for the treatment of borderline 
personality disorder, currently it is used for all mood disorders.  It has many points of 
overlap with both MBCT and ACT.  It also advocates awareness, acceptance and being 
non-judgemental about thoughts and feelings.  While there are differences in practice, 
the meaningful difference in theory is the incorporation of dialectics.  Here, clients are 
taught to reality test their thoughts by resolving a thesis and an antithesis through 
synthesis.  Studies have also supported the efficacy of DBT (i.e. Kliem, Kroger & 
Kossfelder, 2010). 
 Fundamentally, all the various ‘third wave’ psychotherapy models promote 
increased psychological flexibility (Curtiss & Klemanski, 2014).  They achieve this 
through the elimination of categorical imperatives by encouraging acceptance and 
promoting non-judgemental awareness of thoughts and feelings.  As most third wave 
psychotherapies discourage evaluative thoughts, they in effect discourage appraisals.  
While eventually positive appraisals are promoted, the third-wave therapies provide 
little guidance on adaptive negative appraisals. 
 
1.7 Absolutist thinking and Psychological Flexibility 
1.7.1 Appraisal Flexibility Model 
There has been growing interest in the study of psychological flexibility and mental 
well-being.  Research in this area has been divided into multiple domains, these 
include emotion regulation flexibility, attentional flexibility, coping flexibility and 
explanatory flexibility.  To the best of my knowledge, there is currently only one model 
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representing appraisal flexibility, that is the ‘Appraisal Bias Model’ as outlined by 
Mehu and Scherer (2015).  Simply, this model sets out the importance of generating 
and utilizing different appraisals to suit different situations.  An ‘appraisal bias’ refers 
to the tendency to appraise situations in the same habitual way, regardless of the 
context. 
The authors identify two factors which hamper flexible and adaptive appraisal 
selection.  The first is context related flexibility; this involves recognizing nuances in 
different situations and factoring them into appraisal generation.  The second refers 
to appraisal ‘extremeness’, here the authors argue that extreme appraisals result in 
disproportionate emotional responses.  The maladaptive character of inflexible and 
extreme appraisal, the authors argue, results in dysfunctional behavior and negative 
affect.  They note that this model does not prescribe content (i.e. positive or negative 
thinking), rather its focus is on the ‘modes of processing’. 
 
1.7.2 Emotion Regulation Flexibility 
Perhaps the largest field of psychological flexibility research concerns emotion 
regulation flexibility (ER-F).  This refers to the ability of an individual to flexibly use 
multiple emotion regulation strategies.  ER-F seems to be limited to between strategy 
flexibility and does not address within strategy flexibility (i.e. having strategies which 
are more or less flexible than each other).   
There have been several review articles addressing the topic of ER-F (Kashdan 
& Rottenberg, 2010; Hollenstein et al. 2013, Bonanno & Burton 2014).  The authors 
commonly argue that no one emotion regulation strategy is appropriate in all 
situations. This concept is termed the “fallacy of uniform efficacy” by Bonanno and 
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Burton (2014), who outline that adaptive emotion regulation flexibility involves (1) 
sensitivity to context, (2) the availability of a diverse repertoire of regulatory strategies 
and (3) responsiveness to feedback.  Emotion regulation strategies include, but are 
not limited to, ‘reappraisal’, ‘suppression’, ‘distraction’ and ‘disengagement’.  There is 
also a separate class of coping strategies, these include ‘problem focused coping’, 
‘emotion-focused coping’ and ‘loss-oriented coping’.  In a recent meta-analysis, Webb, 
Miles, and Sheeran (2012) found that there were only modest overall differences 
between emotion regulation strategies in their effectiveness for modifying emotional 
outcomes as indexed by experimental, behavioural and physiological measures. 
It is argued that the efficacy of any one emotion regulation strategy is 
dependent on the situation. For example, Troy, Wilhelm, Shallcross, and Mauss (2010) 
found reappraisal was only effective in managing uncontrollable stressors, and 
paradoxically led to greater depression for people who experienced controllable 
stress.  Similarly, Cheng and Cheung (2005) investigated coping flexibility among 27 
undergraduate students.  They found that those who cope more flexibly exhibited 
greater ability to differentiate (recognize multiple aspects in a ‘perceived domain’) and 
integrate (make connections between differentiated aspects of a ‘perceived domain’).  
This was measured using the authors own Differentiation of Stress Situations (DSS) 
questionnaire, where participants are asked to rate the uncontrollable and 
unpredictable nature of different stressful situations.  They argue that, more flexible 
participants could differentiate between controllable and uncontrollable situations.  
This resulted in flexible participants deploying greater monitoring strategies 
(attending to threat) in controllable situations and fewer monitoring strategies in 
uncontrollable situations.  By contrast, those with lower coping flexibility deployed 
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more monitoring, irrespective of whether the situation was controllable or otherwise.  
Finally, countering the popular belief that some emotion regulation strategies are 
adaptive (i.e. reappraisal) and other are maladaptive (i.e. suppression), Aldao and 
Nolen-Hoeksema (2012) found that when different emotion regulation strategies 
were adopted across different situations, this was linked with lower psychopathology.  
This was not the case when they were adopted without context sensitivity. 
 
1.7.3 Explanatory Flexibility 
Where ‘explanatory style’ (measured using the attribution style questionnaire; ASQ) 
refers to the causes people assign to events in their lives, specifically how global and 
stable they believe those causes are, explanatory flexibility is concerned only with the 
amount of variability in explanatory style.  Also measured using the ASQ, it does not 
report the mean (explanatory style) but rather, the intra-individual standard deviation 
for both global and stable items.  In this way, explanatory flexibility is said to capture 
flexibility through variance and ignores content.  Moore and Fresco (2007) set out to 
establish discriminant validity between explanatory style and explanatory flexibility 
through psychometric non-equivalence.  As both constructs are measured using the 
same instrument (ASQ), there could potentially be some correlation between the 
cognitive content of responses (explanatory style) and the cognitive processes of 
responses (explanatory flexibility).  The authors used two samples of undergraduate 
students to replicate their results.  In the first sample, they found no correlation 
between explanatory style and flexibility (r (729) = .02, p = ns).  In the second sample, 
they found a small to medium significant correlation (r (444) = − .18, p < .001).  Overall 
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the data suggests that explanatory style and flexibility are distinct, albeit somewhat 
related constructs.   
In a parallel study, Fresco, Rytwinski and Craighead (2007) found that 
explanatory flexibility interacted with negative life events, to predict depression 
symptoms.  In a sample of undergraduates (N=78), experimenters administered the 
ASQ, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and the Life Experiences Survey (LES), at two 
time points separated by 8-weeks.  Findings revealed some overlap between low 
flexibility and a pessimistic explanatory style (r = −.27).  Notably, time 2 depression 
was predicted by explanatory flexibility but not explanatory style, even after 
controlling for time 1 depression and explanatory style.  The authors propose that 
explanatory flexibility moderates the relationship between negative life evens and 
depression.  This was supported by the finding that for those high in explanatory 
flexibility, there was little association between negative life events and Time 2 
depression scores.  For those with low explanatory flexibility, on the other hand, there 
was a strong positive association between the number of negative life events and 
Time 2 depression scores.  This may indicate that a lack of explanatory flexibility 
makes individuals fragile and overly vulnerable to life’s stresses.  Finally, the authors 
also highlight that there was a significant correlation between explanatory flexibility 
and extreme responding on the ASQ (r = .39).  While the two variables are different 
constructs, they are related, in that extreme responders also tend to be more rigid.  
This finding was attenuated by the fact that most subjects did not choose extreme 
responses.  Consequently, it was found that rigidity (explanatory flexibility), and not 
extremity, was predictive of time 2 depression.   
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 A related construct to explanatory flexibility is ‘coping flexibility’.  A measure 
for this was developed by Williams (2002) and termed the “Coping Styles and 
Flexibility Inventory” (CSFI).  This instrument calculates the mean and standard 
deviation of coping styles across 12 situations.  Fresco, Williams and Nugent (2006) 
hypothesized that coping flexibility may mediate the protective effect of explanatory 
flexibility.  They reasoned that those able to generate more explanations of situations, 
could also generate more solutions or ways to cope.  A sample of undergraduate 
students (N=263), were administered the ASQ, CSFI, BDI and the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (BAI).  Structural equation modelling revealed that explanatory flexibility 
and coping flexibility were significantly correlated with one another, and they both 
add to the prediction of self-reported depression and anxiety symptoms.  There was 
mixed support for the notion that coping flexibility mediates the effect of explanatory 
flexibility.  The authors propose that these two variables represent ‘two pathways’ 
that directly connect to negative emotions.   
Fresco, Heimberg, Abramowitz and Bertram (2006) were interested in the 
effect of negative mood priming on explanatory flexibility.  This aimed to address the 
question of whether explanatory flexibility is the result of positive mood (lack of 
negative mood) or the cause of improved mood outcomes.  The BDI, ASQ and several 
other questionnaires were administered to 97 participants.  Subsequently, 
participants were asked to listen to sad music and think about upsetting times in their 
lives, they then completed the ASQ again.  The diathesis-stress model argues that 
individuals vulnerable to depression have latent vulnerability factors that are only 
expressed in the presence of a negative stressor.  We know that euthymic participants 
with a history of depression are vulnerable to depression.  Therefore, when the results 
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showed that only euthymic participants with a history of depression evidenced a drop 
in explanatory flexibility.  The authors concluded that explanatory flexibility is a 
vulnerability factor which is only expressed in the presence of a negative stressor 
consistent with the diathesis-stress model.  There was no effect on never depressed 
and currently depressed participants because either they do not have the 
vulnerability, or because it is not latent. 
The relevance of the cognitive diathesis-stress model to explanatory flexibility 
and its relationship with depression was examined by Lackner, Moore, Minerovic and 
Fresco (2015).  The sample in this study was made up of 171 treatment-seeking 
patients, clinically diagnosed with Axis we psychopathology, in contrast to all previous 
studies which had used undergraduate samples.  Baseline levels of explanatory 
flexibility and style were collected from patients with either major depressive disorder 
(MDD), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), and other Axis we disorders.  The results 
reveal that both MDD and GAD exhibited lower levels of explanatory flexibility relative 
to patients with other Axis we disorders.  This supports the hypothesis that 
explanatory flexibility is a distinguishing factor between mood disorders and other 
Axis we disorders, as well as its role in the etiology of emotional disorders.  
In summary, the construct of explanatory flexibility is consistent with a recent 
shift of focus away from the content and towards the process of thinking.  It is 
proposed that the ability to generate multiple explanations for life events allows 
individuals to deal with stresses more adaptively.  This is best demonstrated by 
evidence showing that those with high explanatory frequency were less likely to 
become depressed after negative life events in comparison to those with low 
explanatory flexibility.  Explanatory flexibility was also linked to extreme responding 
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(both measured using ASQ), suggesting that both portray different aspects of an 
underlying cognitive rigidity.  Finally, this construct was not related to all types of 
psychopathology (i.e., schizophrenia), but specifically and repeatedly linked to MDD 
and GAD. 
 
1.7.4 Variance is Not Flexibility – A Widespread Mistake 
There is a consistent mistake that permeates throughout all of the psychological 
flexibility literature - namely, the conceptualizing of flexibility as some version of 
variance, sometimes with the addition of a context sensitivity component.  This can be 
observed in the explanatory flexibility literature reviewed above.  Explanatory 
flexibility has been operationalized as the standard deviation of explanatory style 
responses.  Yet this is not explanatory flexibility; it should more accurately be termed 
explanatory variance (or deviation).  We argue that flexibility is more akin to degrees 
of freedom than to variance.  That is, flexibility defines where variance can occur, but 
does not mandate it.  Just as you can have infinite degrees of freedom and no 
variance, you can also have infinite flexibility without any corresponding change in 
behavior or cogitation.  Flexibility merely refers to the factors that impact our ability 
to change, not change itself.  We concede that more flexibility (like more degrees of 
freedom) allows for more sources of variance, but, it does not necessitate it.  The 
difference here is profoundly consequential, as the literature currently views the 
utility of flexibility as curvilinear, entirely based upon this mistaken understanding of 
the concept.  For example, Bonanno and Burton (2013) suggest there is an “upper 
limit” to the benefit of flexible responding.   They argue that “too much sensitivity” to 
context leads to erratic thoughts and behavior.  Indeed, their argument is sound, if 
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applied to variance, not flexibility.  On the contrary, we argue that it is rigidity that 
leads to erratic thoughts and behaviors, not ‘too much flexibility’.  For example, an 
individual with an absolutist and rigid belief that they “must please other people all 
the time”, will be forced to continually change their behavior/personality in order to 
achieve this. They must behave differently, with different groups of people, a quality 
colloquially referred as being “two-faced”.  They would therefore manifest high 
variability in their behavior, not due to flexibility, but due to a rigid belief that they 
must please others.  Whereas, an individual that does not believe they “must please 
other people all the time”, is free to maintain a more consistent personality.  
Aldao, Sheppes and Gross (2015) do explicitly differentiate between variability 
and flexibility, however their conception of flexibility remains inadequate.  In 
reference to emotion regulation flexibility, they outline that variability is the 
‘haphazard’ changing of regulatory strategies, while flexibility is the covariation 
between variability and changes in the environment.  The problem here is that 
‘covariation’ is still variation.  This simply demotes flexibility to a moderated form of 
variation, not as an entirely distinct concept.  Consequently, the authors also assign a 
curvilinear utility function to flexibility, and outline ‘maladaptive’ forms of flexibility.  
The latter refers to any flexibility which interferes with goal attainment.  What the 
authors fail to answer is why such flexibility, if it is “flexible”, would prevail?  
Nevertheless, they conclude that while there are benefits to flexibility, we should also 
be sceptical about its utility. 
 While Aldao et al., (2015) conceptualise flexibility as a context-moderated 
version of variability, Hollenstein, Aschoff and Potworowski (2013) conceptualise 
flexibility as a time-moderated form of variability.  They state that “because flexibility 
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is about change, it is necessarily a process that unfolds over time”.  This is perhaps the 
most illustrative example of this mistake so far; flexibility is not about “change”, it is 
about choice.  They go on to claim that “flexibility is a dynamic process. That is, it 
necessarily includes a temporal component as flexibility can only be observed as a 
change (or lack of change) over time.”  This leads to the structure of their proposed 
model of flexibility, which has three time frames, micro (moment to moment), meso 
(reactive) and macro (trait-like).  Figure 1.1 is a simplified schematic of their ‘basic 
conceptualisation of flexibility and rigidity’. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Simplified schematic of Hollenstein et al., ‘basic conceptualisation of 
flexibility” 
 
This view of flexibility has led the authors to frame the argument as a balance 
between either a “stick in the mud” or a “flip-flopping and spineless” person.  They 
also recommend a curvilinear view for the utility of flexibility, outlining that the 
negative aspects of flexibility involve “lowered predictability of behaviour…and limited 
persistence toward achievement of personal goals”.  As before, confounding flexibility 
with variance. 
 Finally, there is one objection to high levels of flexibility which appears to be 
on firmer conceptual ground.  Bonanno and Burton (2013) highlight the ‘resource cost’ 
Original state Perturbation
Flexibility = different state
Rigidity = same state
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of greater flexibility.  It can readily be seen that an absolutist belief or rigid response, 
which applies to all situations without any qualification, may be maladaptive, but is 
not resource intensive.  Indeed the ‘cognitive miser hypothesis’, the preference for 
the simple and less effortful as opposed to the sophisticated and more effortful (Fiske 
and Taylor, 1984; Stanovich, 2009), is the most convincing explanation for the 
prevalence and indeed existence of absolutist thinking. 
 
1.8 Absolutist Responding Predicts Depression 
1.8.1 Teasdale et al., (2001) 
In an influential paper, Teasdale et al., (2001) noted that while cognitive therapy (e.g., 
Beck, Epstein, & Harrison, 1983) has been shown to reduce the risk of depressive 
relapse (Fava, Grandi, Zielezny, Rafanelli, & Canestrari, 1996; Shea et al., 1992), the 
precise mediator for this effect has not been established.  They examined 5 measures 
which are purported to mediate reductions in depressive relapse; (1) the Attribution 
Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982), (2) the Dysfunctional attitude scale 
(DAS-Need for social approval subscale; e.g., Beck, Epstein, & Harrison, 1983), (3) the 
Perceived Uncontrollability of Depression Questionnaire (UNCONTROL; e.g. Teasdale, 
1985), (4) the Characterological Self-Blame for Depression Questionnaire (BLAME; 
Teasdale, 1985) and finally (5) the Metacognitive Awareness Questionnaire (MAQ; e.g. 
Teasdale, 1985).   
The study recruited 158 currently remitted outpatients, with recent major 
depression within the last 18 months but not in the last 2 months.  Patients were 
partially remitted with residual symptoms, scoring at least 8 on the 17-item Hamilton 
Rating Scale for Depression (HRSD; Hamilton, 1960) and 9 on the Beck Depression 
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Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961).  All 158 patients 
were managed on antidepressant medication (ADM), with a subgroup (N = 80) 
receiving 20 weeks of cognitive therapy treatment (16 sessions).  These were 
delivered by trained practitioners in line with Beck et al. (1979).  The CBT treatment 
subgroup later received 2 cognitive therapy booster session in the 48 weeks follow up, 
and all patients continued to be managed on ADM.  Patients’ clinical states were 
assessed before the treatment, monthly during treatment, and bimonthly in the 
follow up phase.  Assessments of cognitive variables were made before treatment, at 
8 weeks, and at the end of the 20-week treatment period.  Depressive relapse was 
determined using the DSM-III-R criteria, successive face to face interviews, and a score 
of 17 on the HRSD. 
The authors found that cognitive therapy reduced the risk of relapse by 
approximately 40%.  Moreover, they also found no difference in post-treatment 
depression scores between the cognitive therapy group and controls (clinically 
depressed, non-CBT intervention group).  This meant that cognitive therapy 
predominantly improved outcomes by reducing the risk of future relapse, not by 
reducing current depressive symptoms.   They found that the cognitive therapy effect 
on relapse was only observable at 8-weeks not 20 weeks, therefore 8-weeks served as 
the post-treatment time point, because there was no post-treatment effect to explain 
for 20-weeks.  Baseline BDI scores alone were predictive of relapse; of the other five 
cognitive variables tested, none predicted depressive relapse after controlling for 
initial levels of depression, at either week 0 or week 8.  Most surprisingly, exploratory 
analyses revealed that ASQ scores at week 0, which were more reflective of a high 
depressotypic attributional style, predicted less risk of relapse, rather than more.  The 
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authors decided to investigate this surprising result by inspecting the data more 
closely, finding that relapse was associated with use of extreme scores (1 or 7 on 7-
point scale).  This association held for both extreme attributional responses typical of 
depression and extreme attributional responses untypical of depression.   
For each item in the ASQ, patients can make as many as 3 extreme responses, 
out of a total of 6.  These relate to whether the situation is down to “me” or “other 
people”, whether it will “always be” or “never” recur and whether it impacts “all” 
situations or just this particular one.  These are either attributions endorsed with a 
score of 1 (“totally due to other people or circumstances”, “will never again be 
present” and “influences just this particular situation”) or attributions endorsed with a 
score of 7 ("totally due to me," "will always be present," and "influences all situations 
in my life").  These attributions are made for both positive and negative events.  While 
some responses are depressotypic (i.e. global and stable attributions for negative 
explanations) others are undepressotypic (specific and unstable attributions for 
negative explanations) for example, an unsuccessful job application is viewed as just 
this particular situation and won’t happen again.  Surprisingly, the authors found that 
extreme undepressotypic responding predicted early relapse more than extreme 
depressotypic responding.  The most significant predictor was the response indicating 
that causes of bad outcomes "will never again be present”.  Strong evidence was 
found for a general tendency within individuals to respond extremely, by significant 
intercorrelations between extreme 1 and 7 scores for good and bad attributions. 
 This exploratory analysis of the ASQ data generated a new hypothesis, namely, 
that extreme responding would predict greater relapse rates.  The authors tested this 
hypothesis on the remaining 4 cognitive variables (DAS, UNCONTROL, BLAME and 
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MAQ).  When the sum of extreme responses was calculated, they were found to 
significantly predict time to relapse at both week 0 and week 8.  This remained 
significant even when initial depression was controlled; indeed “relapse in patients 
showing any extreme score was more than 2.5 times the rate in patients with no 
extreme scores”.  The authors report that on week 0 measures, patients with no 
extreme scores showed 17% relapse, whereas those with any extreme score showed 
44%; and on week 8 measures, patients with no extreme scores showed 15% relapse, 
whereas those with any extreme score showed 42%.  Therefore, the only predictor of 
relapse rates, among the five cognitive variables tested, was extreme responding for 
both functional and dysfunctional responses.   
The authors argue that these extreme scores (1 + 7) reflect an underlying 
“absolute”, “dichotomous” and “black and white” cognitive style.  To test this, they 
calculated the sum of ‘next to extreme scores’ (i.e. “agree very much” or “disagree 
very much”).  Sum of next to extremes did not predict relapse from either Week 0 or 
Week 8.  This is crucial to the distinction between the terms ‘absolute’ and ‘extreme’, 
as discussed in the introduction (figure 1.1).  Although the terms absolute and 
extreme are used interchangeably in this paper, this analysis suggests that a 
distinction should be made, primarily because next to absolute responses may still be 
‘extreme’, but they are not absolute.  This finding is consistent with Litinsky and 
Haslam (1998), who found that weaker forms of dichotomous thinking (i.e. non-
binary) were not associated with suicidal ideation.   
In conclusion, the authors recognise that all five cognitive variables, tested to 
predict depressive relapse failed, and did not show mediational qualities.  However, 
they argue that while the content of the items was not predictive, the form of the 
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responses (absolute) displayed “significant and substantial prediction of relapse, 
differential response to CT, and conformity to mediational criteria”.  It may therefore 
be that CBT mediates relapse prevention by causing a “shift in cognitive mode”, from 
absolutist and dichotomous, to a more nuanced, sophisticated and qualified mode. 
 
1.8.2 Beevers, Miller, Keitner and Ryan, (2003) 
In a partial replication attempt of the Teasdale, et al., (2001) study, Beavers, Miller, 
Keitner and Ryan (2003) used extreme responding scores from 120 hospitalized 
depressed patients to predict time to relapse.  In hospital, patients received family 
therapy (Epstein & Bishop, 1981), Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (Beck et al., 1979) or 
a combination.  They also completed the Modified Hamilton Rating Scale for 
Depression (MHRSD) and the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS).  Extreme response 
scores were calculated in the same way as Teasdale et al., (2001), by summing up the 
number of extreme responses on the DAS (i.e. totally agree or totally disagree).  On 
discharge, treatment continued for 6 months, outpatients were then reassessed with 
the MHRSD and the DAS.  Subsequently they were monitored for 1 year (1 year follow 
up period), in which time they were contacted monthly and completed interviewer 
assessments.  For cognitive factors to be causal (i.e. cognitive vulnerabilities), their 
scores should be associated with subsequent depressive relapse.  The authors 
selected a subsample (N = 53) of participants who reported significant depression 
improvement and were at least partially asymptomatic following acute in-hospital 
depression treatment.  These patients reported 50% reduction in MHRSD score, a 
commonly used criterion to define symptomatic improvement.  Among this 
subsample, the authors then examined whether a change in DAS and extreme 
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responding scores, between pre-treatment to posttreatment, could predict time to 
recurrence of clinically significant depressive symptoms, during the year long follow-
up period.  Analysis was conducted on the basis of residual change scores, that is, the 
difference between the patient’s change score and the average change score.  This 
was in order to account for regression to the mean.  Change in depression was 
factored into the regression model.  Return of clinical depression was defined as a 
score of 17 on the MHRSD (the same as Teasdale et al., 2001). 
 The study found that acute hospital treatment reduced depressive symptoms 
and dysfunctional attitudes as measured by the DAS, but there was no effect of 
treatment on extreme response style.  The authors note that the correlation between 
extreme responding tendency on admission to hospital and at discharge after 
treatment was large (r = .56), suggesting that extreme responding is a relatively stable 
trait.  In a Cox regression survival analysis predicting time to symptom return during 
the follow-up period, several participant characteristic variables were found to be 
significantly associated with time to recurrence.  These variables (e.g. number of 
previous depressive episodes, patient age) were used as covariates along with pre-
treatment to posttreatment change in depression.  After controlling for covariates, 
including change in depression scores, a cox regression found that change in DAS and 
extreme responding both significantly improved the predictive ability of the model.  
Every “one unit” increase in change for DAS and extreme responses was associated 
with a 2% and 6% decrease in rate of symptom recurrence, respectively.  Participants 
reported more extreme positive than extreme negative responses (i.e. totally agree 
with functional items and totally disagree with dysfunctional items).  Absolute levels 
of DAS and extreme responding (not change), did not significantly improve the model.  
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These finding generally support those of Teasdale et al., (2001), however they indicate 
that it is change in these cognitive variables which mediates reduced rates of relapse, 
rather than absolute values.   
 
1.8.3 Peterson et al., (2007) 
Peterson et al., (2007), also conducted a replication study of Teasdale et al., (2001).  
The study had access to 384 depressed outpatients who were undergoing an 8-week 
acute phase treatment on antidepressant medication (fluoxetine).  Remitted patients 
were then entered into a second 19-week continuation phase, in which their 
fluoxetine dose increased, and they were randomly assigned to treatment with or 
without cognitive–behavioural therapy (CBT).  All patients completed the ASQ and 
DAS during the acute phase, the start of the continuation phase and the end of the 
continuation phase.  Extreme responding was calculated in the same way as Teasdale 
et al., (2001).  Analysis was conducted through logistic regression to evaluate the 
relationship between extreme response style and relapse.  Return of depressive 
symptoms was defined as a score of 15 on the HRSD on two consecutive occasions.  
 There were no significant differences in rates of depression relapse between 
antidepressant only and CBT + antidepressant patient groups at the end of the 
continuation phase.  The authors argue that this may be due to higher doses of 
antidepressants prescribed at the start of the continuation phase.  However, the study 
did find that extreme responding on the stable/unstable attributional dimension 
predicted decreased likelihood of “full depression remission” after the 8-week acute 
treatment phase.  This effect was controlled for gender and baseline differences in 
severity of depression.  This effect was only significant for the stability dimension and 
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not for the globality or internality dimensions (as described previously).  This is 
partially consistent with Teasdale et al., (2001) where the stability dimension was 
revealed to be the most predictive of relapse (i.e. bad things will never happen again).  
Extreme responding on the DAS was also predictive of better acute treatment phase 
outcome, supporting the findings of both Teasdale et al., (2001) and Beevers et al., 
(2003).  Additionally, extreme responding on both the ASQ and the DAS predicted 
non-responders to the acute treatment phase.  The authors argue that those with less 
extreme response styles possessed higher levels of “metacognition” which led to their 
eventual remission.  Interestingly, in the continuation phase, those on antidepressant 
treatment only, showed a significant increase in extreme responding on the ASQ and 
DAS, while those receiving CBT did not.  The authors advise that future studies should 
“refine the methodology for measuring extreme responses”.  Every study to date has 
used extreme responding on a Likert type scale to investigate the form versus content 
of cognitions.  This requires an assumption that such responding truly reflects rigid 
and dichotomous thinking styles, though there is currently no empirical support for 
such an assumption. 
 
1.8.4 Ching and Dobson (2009) 
In another replication of Teasdale et al., (2001), Ching and Dobson (2009) examined 
the role of extreme responding as a mediator of relapse prevention, as well as 
predictor of acute treatment outcomes.  The study recruited 107 clinically depressed 
participants, before being assigned into separate treatment groups, all participants 
were asked to complete the Expanded Attributional Style Questionnaire (EASQ; 
Pertson & Vinnanova, 1988).  While this measure is similar to the ASQ, there are 
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however no positive items, and despite having 24 negative items, the authors only 
used six.  Extreme responding was calculated in the same way as Teasdale et al., 
(2001).  Participants were then randomly assigned to two treatment conditions; a 
cognitive therapy group (CT; N = 50) and a behavioural activation group (BA; N = 57).  
This treatment constituted the acute therapy phase of the study; depression status 
and severity were measured using the BDI and HRSD.  On completion of acute phase 
treatment, participants again completed the EASQ and were subsequently monitored 
for a period of 12 months.  Relapse was assessed using a retrospective assessment of 
depressive symptoms.  Based on the occurrence of relapse, the total number of ‘well-
weeks’ was calculated as the number of weeks during follow-up that the participant 
had minimal symptoms.   
 Analysis of the results from the 12-month follow-up period revealed that both 
groups had similar relapse rates and average number of well-weeks (CT = 52% relapse 
and 36.6 average well-weeks; BA = 61% relapse and 36.49 average well weeks).  While 
participant’s initial level of depression significantly predicted relapse, the composite 
extreme response score on the EASQ did not improve the regression model above that 
of initial depression levels alone.  The results from the acute treatment phase found 
no significant difference in depression reduction between the two groups.  Depression 
had abated in 72% of patients in the CT group and 61% of patients in the BA group.  
There was also no significant reduction to extreme responding scores after CT, and ER 
did not predict or moderate acute treatment outcomes.  The authors do acknowledge 
that limited variability in the data may have constrained the ability to find an effect.   
 With a view to future research, the authors recommend subsequent studies 
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examine the construct validity of extreme response measures.  Namely, the extent to 
which these responses truly reflect dichotomous or extreme cognitive processing.  
They also encourage the comparison of alternative definitions for extreme responding 
which could also be measured using different methods. 
 
1.8.5 Jacobs et al., (2010) 
Jacobs et al., (2010) examined extreme responding in 327 adolescents with 
depression, many of who were suffering depression for the first time.  Participants 
were allocated to one of three treatment groups; a CBT group, an ADM group and a 
combination group.  Participants completed the DAS before and after the treatment 
phase, ER was calculated in the same way as Teasdale et al., (2001).  Authors found 
that in both the acute and continuation phase, initial ER scores did not predict failure 
to maintain remission.  A treatment-by-time interaction significantly predicted levels 
of extreme thinking across 36 weeks, this was driven by greater positive ER in the CBT 
group.  This indicated that the content of the items (positive or negative) interacts 
with the form of the response (absolute or moderate).  There were some differences 
between this study and that of Teasdale et al., (2001), which may explain the 
discrepant findings.  Firstly, Teasdale et al., (2001) enlisted chronically depressed 
patients, whereas in this study, many of the participants were enduring depression for 
the first time.   First onset depression patients may not have established extreme 
responding tendencies which develop in the chronically depressed.  Secondly, multiple 
sources have found that extreme responding is more normative in the young (e.g. 
Pertejo & Martinez, 2014; Romero, 2012), including the original Teasdale et al., (2001) 
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paper.  Finally, this study was also underpowered as relatively few participants failed 
to maintain remission. 
 
1.8.6 De Graaf, Huibers, Cuijpers and Arntz, (2010) 
De Graaf, Huibers, Cuijpers and Arntz (2010) used a large community sample (N = 
1129), recruited on behalf of an internet-based cognitive behavioural therapy 
program.  Depressed participants were asked to complete depression measures, and 
were divided into three severity groups based on the number of DSM IV symptoms:  
Mild depression with 2-4 symptoms, major depression with 5-6 symptoms and major 
depression with 7-9 symptoms.  Participants also completed the DAS, and ER scores 
were calculated in the same way as Teasdale et al., (2001).  Unlike past research, this 
study recognised the confounding effect of depression and ‘content contamination’ of 
the extreme response style measure.  For this reason, the authors also administered 
the ‘Questionnaire without Questions’ (QWQ; Berg, Rapaport, 1954).  This is a 
contentless measure, participants have to answer based purely on the presentation of 
the responses.  Previous studies using the QwQ have shown that healthy individuals 
seem to avoid extreme responses and tend to have a preference for positive answers 
(de Jonge and Slaets, 2005). 
 Results revealed that extreme responding on the DAS and the QwQ 
substantially distinguished major depression from minor depression.  This builds on 
the findings from previous studies, showing that extreme responding is not only 
predictive of relapse or poor treatment outcomes, but also strongly associated with an 
increasing number of depressive symptoms. The authors suggest that the importance 
of the specific content of cognitions in major depression might need to be 
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reconsidered.  They argue that “next to seeking to modify the content of cognitions, 
which is classically the main feature of cognitive therapy, clinicians and researchers 
should also seek ways to reduce the extreme response style of depressed patients”.  
The authors did find however, that positive extreme responding was greater in mild 
depression and negative extreme responding was greater in major depression.  This 
was also the case for the QwQ, which had senseless items.  Finally, the authors 
recommend that a new methodological method should be developed to measure 
absolute response style.  The QwQ (questionnaire without questions) is an 
improvement on the DAS and ASQ, with respect to measuring response style in 
depression, as it purports to measure response style without interference of item 
content.  Nevertheless, the authors advocate that “future research should refine the 
methodology for measuring extreme responses”. 
 
1.8.7 Forand and DeRubeis, (2015) 
In all the studies in this research area reviewed above – except for the QwQ – there is 
a confound between the content of the items on the measures used and the style of 
response.  This confound was detected by Forand and DeRubeis (2015), who seek to 
identify “stylistic, mal-adaptive, extreme positive responding” which confounds the 
DAS measure and ER on the DAS measure.  To clarify, the authors believe that the DAS 
contains two types of positive responses, those which are functional (content 
responses), and those which “appear dysfunctional” (style responses).  They cite the 
following example, on the item “If we ask a question, it makes me look inferior”, they 
argue that the extreme positive response (totally disagree) is functional.  However, 
the same response to “It is awful to be disapproved of by people important to you”, 
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appears dysfunctional, as the authors argue it may suggest “ignorance or disregard” 
therefore a non-absolute response may be more rational.  The DAS has a number of 
such items, this study enlisted clinical psychologists and asked them to complete the 
DAS, in the way they would like to see one of their clients complete it.  There 
responses were highly correlated (.81), they identified some functional extreme 
positive responses (17 content responses) and dysfunctional extreme positive 
responses (23 style responses).  The authors hypothesis, that those with extreme 
response style tendencies, will make extreme responses for both content and style 
items.  While, those who predominantly make extreme responses on content items, 
are responding on the basis of content not style.   
 In a randomised control study design, a sample of clinically depressed 
participants (N = 180) were randomized to a cognitive therapy group (N = 60) or an 
antidepressant medication only group (N = 120), for an acute phase treatment period 
of 16 weeks.  Treatment responders (N = 35 and 69, respectively) were followed up for 
12 months.  All participants completed the DAS before and after treatment, ER scores 
were then used to predict relapse rates. 
 Results showed that even in this clinically depressed cohort of participants, 
positive extreme responses were more prevalent than negative extreme responses 
(73% of all ER), and post-treatment this rose even further (96%).  While no extreme 
response variable alone predicted relapse, the style versus content index did 
significantly predict relapse and recurrence.  Namely, those that endorsed more 
extreme style responses relative to content response, had a greater risk of relapse.   
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1.9 Conclusion and Objectives 
This thesis is focussed on absolutist thinking and its relationship with wellbeing.  We 
define absolutist thoughts as those which denote a state of uncompromising totality, 
independent of context and unqualified by nuance.  Absolutism primarily manifests as 
categorical imperatives or dichotomous expressions.  In the preceding literature 
review, we have shown that a clear definition of absolutism, distinct from form 
extremism, has not been conceptually or empirically established.  The term extreme is 
preferred in the literature and used interchangeably with absolute.  This betrays a 
failure to recognise the difference between holding fringe views which lie on a 
continuum (extreme), and total categorical beliefs which are a gross simplification of 
the world but are not necessarily extreme (absolute).  We argue that a distinction 
between extreme and absolute appraisals has impacts on the rationality, flexibility 
and emotional consequences of those appraisals. 
We have reviewed how absolutism has previously been measures, through 
structured response formats, extreme responding on Likert scales and some analysis 
of natural language samples.  The latter, is usually achieved by recruiting independent 
human rater’s to code the text, but there are also instances where automated text 
analysis has been employed (Fekete, 2002).  We aim to extend this work by validating 
an absolutist words dictionary which we will then employ in conducting automated 
text analysis on natural language.  As well as having greater ecological validity, this 
method will also be more flexible than previous methods as it can be applied to both 
experimental and observational data.  Naturally, we will assess its construct validity by 
comparing it to extreme responding on Likert scales.  Using our more ecologically valid 
method for estimating absolutist thinking, we aim to establish links between an 
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absolutist thinking style and wellbeing.  Specifically, affective disorders (anxiety, 
depression and suicidal ideation) which we expect to correlate positively with 
absolutist thinking styles.  This is based on the clinical practice literature, especially 
the REBT and the cognitive distortions in CBT, as well as the previous experimental 
studies reviewed above.  We intend to compare the relative association between an 
absolutist thinking style and wellbeing, with that of a negativistic thinking style and 
wellbeing.  The association between negativity and well-being has long been 
established, indeed for many, the two concepts are almost synonymous.  We intend 
to empirically demonstrate, that although less intuitive, absolutist thinking has an 
equally strong association with wellbeing to that of negativity.  This taps into an 
emerging debate in the field of mental health.  Namely, is affective disorder the result 
of content (negative thinking) or process (cognitive rigidity).  For this reason, in many 
parts of the thesis, we will not discuss absolutist thinking in isolation, but compare it 
to negative thinking.  Finally, we will begin to demonstrate an association between 
absolutist thinking and cognitive rigidity.  These two concepts are often assumed to be 
linked, however there is little empirical evidence demonstrating the association.  The 
link may be important in explaining the mechanism by which absolutist thinking could 
give rise to affective disorder. 
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Chapter 2: In an Absolute State: Elevated use of Absolutist 
Words is a Marker Specific to Anxiety, Depression and Suicidal 
Ideation 
 
2.1 Chapter overview 
Absolutist thinking is considered a cognitive distortion by most cognitive therapies for 
anxiety and depression.  This is predicated on clinical observations and the efficacy of 
CBT in general (not the practice of examining absolutist thoughts specifically).  As 
reviewed in the previous chapter, the few studies that do pertain to absolutist 
thinking, have used Likert type scales, which lack ecological validity.   
Our aim was to examine the prevalence and specificity of absolutism in the 
natural language of those with various affective disorders such as anxiety, depression 
and suicidal ideation.  By analysing ordinary language, we hoped to estimate 
absolutism in a more informative and ecologically valid manner. 
 Across three studies, we conducted a text analysis of 63 internet forums (over 
6,400 members), using an in-house python text analysis program and the Linguistic-
Inquiry and Word Count software (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015).  
We first constructed and independently validated an absolutist words dictionary.  The 
dictionary contained 19-words which were deemed absolutist by clinical and linguistic 
experts at the University of Reading.  Our in-house python program and the LIWC 
determine the percentage prevalence of these absolutist words, by calculating their 
frequency in a given text and the total word count (absolutist words/total word 
count). 
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For study 1, we predicted and found that anxiety, depression and suicidal 
ideation forums contained more absolutist words than control forums (d’s > 3.14); and 
that suicidal ideation forums also contained more absolutist words than anxiety and 
depression forums (d’s > 1.71).  Previously, it had been found that pronouns and 
negative emotion words were the strongest markers for affective disorder in natural 
language (e.g. Rude, Gortner, & Pennebaker, 2004).  Interestingly, we found that 
absolutist words produced larger effects than pronouns and tracked the severity of 
affective disorder natural language more faithfully than negative emotions.  
Paradoxically, negative emotion words were more prevalent in anxiety and depression 
forums than suicidal ideation forums.  Assuming that suicidal ideation is the more 
severe manifestation, we would expect a marker of affective disorder to 
correspondingly track this severity.  Overall, absolutist words proved to be better 
markers for anxiety, depression and suicidal ideation natural language than any of the 
dictionaries contained in the LIWC package (e.g. affect word, sadness words etc.) 
For study 2, our aim was to determine whether greater use of absolutist words 
reflected psychological distress or absolutist thinking specifically.  We examined 
internet forums for borderline personality disorder (BPD), eating disorders (ED), post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and schizophrenia.  We believed that these groups 
would have similar levels of psychological distress, but different levels of absolutist 
thinking.  Based on the literature (reviewed in this chapter and the previous chapter), 
BPD and ED have repeatedly been associated with absolutist thinking, while PTSD and 
schizophrenia are relatively less associated with absolutist thinking.  Importantly, 
there were similar levels of negative emotion words between the groups.  This 
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suggests that elevated use of absolutist words reflects absolutist thinking and not 
psychological distress per se.   
In a subset of depression and suicidal ideation forums, there were occasionally 
‘recovery forums’.  These allow members who believe they are feeling better 
(recovered or remitted) to write about their improvement.  In study 3, we calculated 
the percentage prevalence of absolutist words in these forums.  We found that 
recovery forums contained significantly more absolutist words than control forums 
and were not significantly different from anxiety and depression forums.  This 
suggests that absolutist thinking may be a cognitive vulnerability of depression. 
 
2.2 Introduction 
‘Absolutist thinking’ underlies many of the cognitive distortions (Beck, 1979; Burns, 
1989) and irrational beliefs (Ellis & Harper, 1975) which are purported to mediate the 
core affective disorders.  Words, phrases and ideas that denote totality, either of 
magnitude or probability, are often referred to as ‘absolute’.  Absolutist thoughts are 
independent of context and unqualified by nuance.  In three observational studies, we 
aimed to measure absolutist thinking in a specific and ecologically valid manner.  We 
then compared its relative association between a variety of affective and non-affective 
groups. 
Absolutist thinking has strong empirical links to three distinct mental health 
groups: suicidal ideation, borderline personality disorder (BPD) and eating disorders 
(ED).  Regarding suicidal ideation, structured response formats have shown more 
extreme value judgments by suicidal patients than controls (e.g. Neuringer, 1961; 
1964).  Thematic analysis by independent rater’s also deemed the stories and poetry 
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of suicidal individuals as highly ‘polarized’ (Litinsky & Haslam, 1998; Wedding, 2000).  
Additionally, dichotomous thinking, cognitive rigidity and problem-solving deficits 
have been repeatedly found to co-occur in suicidal individuals (for review see Ellis and 
Rutherford, 2008).  This is supported by a series of empirical studies from Pollock and 
Williams (1998, 2001, 2004). 
BPD patients also make more extreme responses on structured response 
formats than controls (e.g. Veen & Arntz, 2000; Napolitano & Mckay, 2007; Sieswerda, 
Barnow, Verheul & Arntz, 2013; Moritz et al. 2011).  Some studies have used 
‘spontaneous reactions’ or short interviews to identify extreme or dichotomous 
thinking styles (e.g. Arntz & Veen, 2001; Arntz & Haaf, 2012). 
With respect to ED, the ‘Dichotomous thinking in eating disorder scale’ (DTEDS; 
Byrne et al., 2008) is widely used in ED studies (e.g. Antoniou, Bongers & Jansen, 2017; 
Palascha, van Kleef & van Trijp, 2015).  Although obesity and anorexia are often 
studied separately, they both link to absolutist thinking.  For obesity, several reviews 
have found that avoiding absolutist dichotomous thinking improves weight loss 
maintenance (e.g. Ohsiek & Williams, 2011).  Absolutism often takes the form of 
perfectionism in anorexia, as identified through clinical observations (e.g. Garner, 
Garfinkel & Bemis, 1982; Fairburn, Cooper and Shafran, 2003) structured response 
formats (e.g. Feixas et al., 2010; Zotter & Crowther, 1991) and interviews (e.g. Johnson 
and Holloway, 1988)  
Despite the inclusion of absolutist thinking into many cognitive therapy models 
for anxiety and depression (Beck, 1979; Burns, 1989; Williams & Garland 2002); this 
association remains mostly neglected in the empirical literature (Ellis, 1987).  In a 
notable exception, Teasdale et al., (2001) found that an ‘absolutist, dichotomous 
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thinking style’ predicted future depressive relapse, over and above the content of 
responses.  This was evidenced by both positive and negative ‘extreme responses’ on 
Likert type scales.   
Attempts to investigate absolutist thinking have mostly employed some type 
of structured response format.  Ertel (1985) was the first to use quantitative text 
analysis to measure dogmatism with the manual ‘Dogmatism text analysis tool’ 
(DOTA).  More recently, with the advent of automated text analysis, Cohen (2012) 
measured ‘cognitive rigidity’ in the ‘spontaneous autobiographical narratives’ of 
undergraduate students, and found correlations with negative emotionality.  Unlike 
structured response formats, these natural language text analysis studies have more 
ecological validity. 
With the growth of social media, internet forums are increasingly being used 
as a source of naturalistic writing for research in depression and other affective 
disorders (e.g. Fekete, 2002; Griffiths, Calear & Banfield, 2009; Houston, Cooper & 
Ford, 2014).  It is believed that insights into the cognitive processes associated with 
particular affective disorders can be gleaned from how people with those disorders 
write about their experiences. In three connected studies, we investigated the 
frequency of absolutist words contained in different affective and non-affective 
internet forum groups (Table 2.1; see Appendix 3 for more details).  In the first study 
we compared anxiety, depression and suicidal ideation (test) groups with ‘general’, 
asthma, diabetes and cancer (control) groups. We had two specific hypotheses:   
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Hypothesis 1 (H1):  The percentage of absolutist words in anxiety, depression and 
suicidal ideation test forum groups will be significantly greater than study 1 control 
forum groups. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The percentage of absolutist words in the suicidal ideation forum 
group will be significantly greater than in both anxiety and depression forum groups. 
 
Our second hypothesis is partly based on the strong association between 
suicidal ideation and absolutist thinking (for review see Arffa, 1983).  But also, as 
suicidal ideation is the more severe mental health concern, it could be hypothesized 
that absolutist thinking will be correspondingly more extreme. 
In study 2, our aim was to show that absolutist words reflect absolutist 
thinking, rather than psychological distress.  We attempted to control for 
psychological distress by comparing groups believed to have similar levels of negative 
emotions but different levels of absolutist thinking (Table 2.1 and see Appendix 3 for 
more information).  We compared mental health groups strongly associated with 
absolutist thinking (borderline personality disorder [BPD] and eating disorders [ED]; 
cited above) with mental health groups less associated with absolutist thinking (post-
traumatic stress disorder [PTSD] and schizophrenia).  While we recognize that PTSD 
and schizophrenia may also have some links to absolutist thinking, the literature 
suggests these links are likely to be much weaker than those of BPD and ED.  There are 
relatively few studies that have examined absolutist thinking in PTSD and 
schizophrenia, and these have often been limited or produced mixed results (e.g. 
Colbert, Peters & Garety, 2010; Joseph & Gray, 2011).  Conversely, there is a 
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widespread consensus, based on a multitude of studies, that BPD and ED are firmly 
linked to absolutist thinking (e.g. Napolitano & Mckay, 2007; Veen & Arntz, 2000; 
Alberts, Thewissen & Raes, 2012).  We also measured the frequency of negative 
emotion terms to further support the assumption that the four mental health groups 
had comparable levels of negative emotions. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The percentage of absolutist words in BPD and ED test forum 
groups will be significantly greater than in PTSD and schizophrenia control forum 
groups. 
 
In study 3, we aimed to determine the extent to which absolutist thinking 
could be a cognitive vulnerability factor for depression and suicidal ideation.  In a 
subset of depression and suicidal ideation forums, there are ‘recovery’ sub-forums 
(Table 2.1 and see Appendix 3 for more information).  These sub-forums are visited by 
members who feel they are currently out of depression.  They often write very 
positive posts about their progress and words of encouragement to other members.  
Theoretically, a cognitive vulnerability factor should not only be present during an 
episode of depression but also persist during recovery, therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The percentage of absolutist words in the recovery forum group will 
be significantly greater than study 1 control forum groups. 
 
Previous text analysis research has examined many different dictionary ‘dimensions’.  
When analysing written samples from anxious, depressed or suicidal individuals, an 
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increased use of ‘personal pronouns’ and ‘negative emotion words’ has commonly 
been found (Bucci & Freedman, 1981; Fekete, 2002; Lorenz & Cobb, 1952; Rude, 
Gortner, & Pennebaker, 2004; Stirman and Pennebaker, 2001; Weintraub, 1981).  In 
particular, pronouns have been identified as having a stronger relationship with 
affective disorder than negative emotions (Pennebaker & Chung, 2013).  Like 
pronouns, absolutist words are functional; they help determine our style of writing, 
not its contents.  Moreover, functional words are ordinarily outside of conscious 
control (Pennebaker & Chung, 2013), therefore they can serve as implicit markers.  
We believe a shift in focus to ‘how’ we think, rather than ‘what’ we think, can provide 
greater insight into possible cognitive mechanisms underlying affective disorders.   
From the outset, we identified and validated a single dictionary of interest, as 
this study was motivated by specific apriori hypotheses.  This is in contrast to previous 
text analysis studies that have used a subset of already constructed dictionaries, or 
identified features of interest based on the data itself (e.g. using an iterative process 
with cross-validation and feature reduction; Mladenic, 2005).  The large dataset in this 
study, from 12 different groups, representing 63 different internet forums, and over 
6,400 members afforded a degree of ecological validity not achievable in experimental 
studies. However, as with many observational studies, these benefits come with 
inherent costs.  We had limited information about the members posting in the forums, 
and for the most part, their true identities and motivations were unknowable.  
Recognising this limitation, we hope that follow-up studies, using alternative 
experimental designs, will extend the findings presented here. 
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2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Forum Selection 
We used English language internet forums as a source of naturalistic writing for our 
test and control categories.  For all three studies, representative websites were 
located through a Google search (search words: i.e. “suicide forums”, “asthma 
forums”).  Forums were selected for inclusion into the study based on Google rank 
(Table 2.1 and see Appendix 3 for more details), were popular (thus yielding sufficient 
data for analysis) and actively moderated with clearly written moderation policies.  
Each group in the test and control categories was comprised of between four to seven 
separate forums, as determined by forum availability.  For study 1, control groups 
were carefully selected to provide the broadest level of control.  The ‘general’ group 
provides a gender control with two forums for female members (Mumsnet and Ladies 
Lounge) and two for male members (Askmen and Gentlemen’s Club).  The general 
group also controls for age, with a designated forum for young members (Student 
Room) and older members (Pensioners Forum).  The asthma and diabetes groups 
control for chronic physical illness, and the cancer group controls for severe physical 
and psychological distress.  Study 3 ‘recovery’ forums were located within study 1 
depression and suicidal ideation test forums.  
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of Test and Control Internet Forums. 
  Group Forumsb Membersc 
Study 1 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
Generala 7 917 
Asthma 4 418 
Diabetes 4 587 
Cancer 4 451 
Te
st
 
Anxiety 6 597 
Depression 6 529 
Suicidal Ideation 4 368 
Study 2 
C
o
n
tr
o
l PTSD 6 534 
Schizophrenia 6 591 
Te
st
 BPD 4 326 
ED 5 547 
Study 3  Recovery 7 558 
Note.  PTSD = Post Traumatic Stress Disorder; BPD = Borderline Personality Disorder; 
ED = Eating Disorder.  a General Forums = ‘Mumsnet’ (Women), ‘The Ladies Lounge’ 
(Women), ‘The Gentlemen’s Club’ (Men), ‘Ask Men’ (Men), ‘Pensioners Forum’ 
(Elderly), ‘Student Room’ (Young), ‘Work Problems’.  b Number of internet forums in 
each group.  c Number of members which contributed to that group’s corpus. 
 
2.3.2 Data collection 
Forum members can either introduce a new topic (‘first posts’) or contribute to an 
ongoing discussion (‘replies’).  In the interest of simplicity and interpretability, only 
first posts were collected.  Posts were copied and pasted into a text document ready 
 
 
Page 82 of 341 
 
for subsequent text analysis.  Where an individual member contributes multiple 
posts, these were combined into a single text document.  All text files used in this 
study are hosted on Figshare, dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.4743715).  If a forum 
was further divided into sub-forums, only the single most appropriate sub-forum was 
used (See Appendix 3).  For each test and control forum, we aimed to collect 30,000 
words.  Seven out of the 63 forums were not large enough to provide a 30,000-word 
corpus, but were nevertheless retained in the study as they surpassed 10,000 words.  
Posts were only collected if they met our selection criteria: (1) they must contain a 
minimum of 100 words, (2) be authored by a representative member of that online 
community (i.e. not written on behalf of someone else/news article etc.) and (3) 
written in continuous prose (i.e. not lists, poems).  Posts from all test and control 
forums which met the selection criteria were collected sequentially as presented by 
the respective forum website (usually by date order).  Posts were collected between 
April-May 2015 and December-January 2016.  All data in this study was collected from 
the public domain, therefore while ethical consideration is still relevant, ethical 
approval and informed consent is not required.  The aggregate data used in this study 
are hosted on Figshare, dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.4743547.v1.   
 
2.3.3 Word count text analysis   
Word counting text analysis was conducted using validated dictionaries that 
characterize a particular linguistic dimension (i.e. negative words, auxiliary verbs, 
family related words).  For this study, we validated an absolutist and a non-absolutist 
words dictionary using independent expert judges.   
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Absolutist and non-absolutist words indicate magnitudes or probabilities; 
absolute words do so without nuance (i.e. always, totally, entire) while non-absolute 
words indicate some degree of nuance (i.e. rather, somewhat, likely).  Both 
dictionaries are comprised of functional words devoid of valence, mostly adverbial 
intensifiers or modal verbs.  A subclass of non-absolutist words, which we have 
termed ‘extreme words’, indicate extreme (but not absolute) magnitudes or 
probabilities (i.e. “very”).  While the terms extreme and absolute have previously 
been used interchangeably (e.g. Teasdale, et al., 2001), we treat them here as 
qualitatively distinct. 
To construct these dictionaries, we initially brainstormed over 300 absolutist 
words and 200 non-absolutist words (including extreme words).  Testing on pilot data 
(control and test groups), revealed that many of the words on these original lists were 
too obscure to register with sufficient frequency for analysis.  Consequently, the 
original dictionaries were reduced to the most prevalent 22 absolutist words and 43 
non-absolutist words (including 21 extreme words).  While this was based on a mostly 
arbitrary cut off, it was intended that the lists be large enough to produce 
representative dictionary percentages, but small enough to facilitate independent 
validation by experts.  The 22 absolutist words and 43 non-absolutist words were 
combined into a single list of 65 words (Appendix 4).  Five independent expert judges 
were asked to categorize them as absolute, non-absolute and/or extreme.  Two of the 
judges are clinical psychologists from The University of Reading Charlie Waller 
Institute and three are linguists from The University of Reading School of Clinical 
Language Sciences.  Judges were permitted to place words into more than one 
category (i.e. extreme and absolute).  The agreement between our original 
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categorization of the words (absolutist/non-absolutist) and that of the judges ranged 
between 83-94% while the inter-judge agreement was 96%.  Words were considered 
absolute, extreme or non-absolute based on a majority decision by the judges.  Three 
words ‘anything’, ‘need’ and ‘needed’ were moved from the absolutist dictionary to 
the non-absolutist dictionary as they were not categorized as absolute by the majority 
of judges.  All the words on our non-absolutist dictionary were judged non-absolute.  
Judges showed almost no agreement on extreme words, this category was 
consequently removed from the analysis (collapsed into the non-absolutist category). 
The resulting 19-word absolutist dictionary is shown in Table 2.2.   Both 
dictionaries were used in the text analysis of test and control groups.  We also ran 
dictionaries contained within the LIWC program (Pennebaker, Mehl & Niederhoffer, 
2003).  This program provides 73 validated dictionaries covering a wide range of 
‘dimensions’ (i.e. questioning words, affective processes, auxiliary verbs).  All 
dictionaries, other than the absolutist dictionary, were run purely for the benefit of 
comparison. 
The LIWC text analysis software was used to test our absolutist and non-
absolutist dictionaries as well as the LIWC dictionaries.  It calculates the prevalence of 
a given dictionary as a percentage of the total number of words analysed.  
Throughout, we have referred to this percentage measure of a dictionary’s 
prevalence as its ‘index’.  In each forum, we calculated an index for 75 dictionaries (1 
absolute, 1 non-absolute and 73 LIWC).   
For the absolutist index, we have endeavoured to account for false positives.  
There are three principal types of false positives; a negation before the absolutist 
word (i.e. “not completely”), a qualifier before the absolutist word (i.e. “almost 
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completely”) or a salutation (i.e. “hello everyone”).  These would ordinarily register 
on our absolutist index and distort our measure of absolutism.  Fortunately, the LIWC 
(2015 version) can also count phrases, so we ran a second version of our absolutist 
dictionary comprised of the most common false positives (as described, see Appendix 
5).  The absolutist false positive index was subtracted from the absolutist index to 
provide a better estimate of absolutism.  We nevertheless rely on the assumption 
that any remaining false positives are equally distributed between groups. 
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Table 2.2 List of 19 Independently Validated Absolutist Words 
Absolutist Words 
1 absolutely 
2 all 
3 always 
4 complete 
5 completely 
6 constant 
7 constantly 
8 definitely 
9 entire 
10 ever 
11 every 
12 everyone 
13 everything 
14 full 
15 must 
16 never 
17 nothing 
18 totally 
19 whole 
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Study 1 
2.4.1.1 Data analysis.  The control and test category forums were subdivided into 
groups as shown in Table 2.1.  To analyse the data, a multilevel mixed-effects 
modelling approach was adopted (see Appendix 1 for the SPSS syntax script).  This is 
the recommended analysis method for this type of data structure (Baayen, Davidson, 
& Bates, 2008).  Members were nested within forums, and forums were nested within 
groups (i.e. depression).  Because low-frequency words cannot be measured reliably 
at the members level, we used the forums as the subject’s category.  This is important 
in comparing the performance of different dictionary dimensions.  Effect sizes 
(Cohen’s d) were calculated from the t values produced by the mixed-effects model 
(𝑑 = 2𝑡/√𝑑𝑓).  Mixed-effects models consider both fixed and random effects and can 
be used to assess the influence of the fixed effects on the dependent variables after 
accounting for some outside random effects.  Residuals were weighted by the word 
count of each text file and all the analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS software 
(version 21).  To correct for positive skew in the data, we used a log10(𝑥 +1) 
transformation, adding 1 to deal with 0 values (cf. Yamamura, 1999).  We report raw 
values for descriptive statistics to facilitate a more intuitive understanding.  The 
bootstrap procedure was also used to produce better estimates of p-values and 
confidence intervals (CI).  This method is often recommended because it does not 
assume normally distributed data (Cumming, 2014).  Bootstrapped confidence 
intervals (95%; bias-corrected and accelerated) were computed through 1,000 random 
resamples (with replacement) using the stratified sampling method, with forums as 
the strata variable.   
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2.4.1.2 Control group.  There was no significant omnibus effect among the control 
groups as determined by a multilevel mixed effects model F(7, 11) = 0.754, p = .635 
(Table 2.1 and see Appendix 3 for more information).  Consequently, they were 
combined into a single ‘control group’.  Importantly, this suggests that the absolutist 
index is largely independent of content, as it demonstrates remarkably little variance 
across a wide range of very different discussion topics. 
 
2.4.1.3 Multilevel mixed-effects model for the absolutist index.  There was a large, 
significant difference in the absolutist index between the study 1 groups, as 
determined by a multilevel mixed-effects model F(3,29) = 71.549, p < .001.  Using 
paired comparisons in the mixed-effects model, we compared the control group with 
each of the study 1 test groups to assess our first hypothesis.  We also compared the 
suicidal ideation forum group with the remaining two test groups (anxiety and 
depression forums) to assess our second hypothesis.  The mean absolutist index for 
the control forum group (M = .97%, SD = 0.11) was significantly lower than anxiety (M 
= 1.45%, SD = 0.10, p < .001, d = 3.24, 95% CI [.36, .52]), depression (M = 1.45%, SD = 
0.10, p < .001, d = 3.14, 95% CI [.35, .52]) and suicidal ideation (M = 1.80%, SD = 0.14, 
p < .001, d = 4.56, 95% CI [0.72, 0.98]) test forum groups.  Moreover, the suicidal 
ideation group was significantly greater than both anxiety (p < .001, d = 1.74, 95% CI 
[−0.54, −0.29]) and depression (p < .001, d = 1.71, 95% CI [−0.53, −0.29]) groups 
(Figure 2.1).  These results are consistent with both of our study 1 hypotheses.  Post 
hoc comparisons with a Bonferroni correction revealed that there was no significant 
difference between anxiety and depression forum group means (p = 1.00).    
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Figure 2.1 Mean percentage of absolutist words in study 1 groups.  Error bars indicate 
± 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals.   
 
2.4.1.4 Multilevel mixed-effects model for the comparison dictionaries.  Using the LIWC 
software, we produced indices for our non-absolutist dictionary and all 73 LIWC 
dictionaries. We were interested in determining which comparison dictionary index 
would produce comparable significance levels and effect sizes to that of our absolutist 
index.  We again conducted a multilevel mixed-effects model and pairwise 
comparisons for each of the 74 comparison dictionary indices.  Table 2.3 displays the 
test statistics and effect sizes for the 16 dictionaries with the largest effects.  Notably, 
our absolutist index has satisfied the study hypotheses better than any of the linguistic 
dimensions previously linked to affective disorder (negative emotions, personal 
pronouns etc.).  While ‘negative emotion’ words were predictably more prevalent in 
test group forums than control forums, they paradoxically were less prevalent in 
suicidal ideation forums than anxiety or depression forums.  This was also the case for 
other content dictionaries like ‘sad’, affect’ and ‘feel’.   
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Table 2.3 Results for Study 1 Paired Comparisons, Displayed are 16 Dictionaries with 
the Largest Effects. 
Dictionary 
H1 H2 
Control < 
Anxiety 
Control < 
Depression 
Control < 
Suicidal 
Ideation 
  Anxiety < 
Suicidal 
Ideation 
Depression < 
Suicidal 
Ideation   
d t d t d t       d t d t 
Absolutist 3.24 8.57** 3.14 8.48** 4.56 12.43**   1.74 4.62** 1.71 4.60** 
Death 1.95 5.02** 2.42 6.29** 8.08 21.37**   5.70 14.82** 5.28 13.82** 
Anxiety 10.04 27.21** 2.68 7.37** 0.52 1.44   6.67 −18.27** 1.47 −4.06** 
Neg. Emo 5.81 15.85** 4.36 11.98** 3.56 9.92**   1.05 −2.90* 0.05 −0.14 
Sad 2.02 5.56** 5.18 14.38** 3.70 10.44**   1.78 4.96** 0.51 −1.43 
Affect 4.47 12.18** 3.69 10.15** 3.23 9.03**   0.37 −1.02 0.15 0.41 
Anger 2.43 6.65** 2.38 6.59** 3.54 9.94**   1.36 3.76* 1.35 3.77* 
Certain 1.84 4.89** 2.02 5.43** 3.21 8.78**   1.51 4.07** 1.34 3.63* 
Pronouns 2.53 6.96** 2.56 7.10** 2.90 8.12**   0.69 1.92 0.65 1.81 
Insight 3.04 8.08** 2.69 7.24** 1.22 3.35*   1.08 −2.92* 0.87 −2.35* 
Article 2.41 −6.57** 2.34 −6.43** 2.64 −7.35**   0.57 −1.57 0.60 −1.65 
Swear 1.02 2.75* 0.98 2.67* 2.55 7.06**   1.49 4.08** 1.50 4.12** 
Feel 2.32 6.36** 2.08 5.72** 1.17 3.27*   0.64 −1.78 0.48 −1.33 
Function 1.75 4.83** 2.15 5.97** 2.01 5.63**   0.48 1.33 0.18 0.50 
I 1.87 5.15** 1.95 5.37** 1.88 5.22**  0.27 0.74 0.21 0.57 
Negate 0.77 2.13* 1.89 5.26** 1.95 5.49**   1.13 3.16* 0.32 0.9 
Note.  For each dictionary, three t-tests compared the transformed data for the 
control group index (dictionary % prevalence) to each of the test groups (anxiety, 
depression and suicidal ideation forums) to address H1 = Hypothesis 1.  Two t-tests 
also compared the suicidal ideation forum group with the remaining two test groups 
(anxiety and depression) to address H2 = Hypothesis 2.  LIWC dictionaries are ordered 
according to average Cohen’s d effect size.  ‘Neg. Emo’ = Negative emotions; ‘I’ = First 
person singular pronouns (e.g. I, me, my).  *p < .05.  **p < .001  
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2.4.1.5 Analysis of covariance.  We ran an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to measure 
the unique predictive validity of absolutist words after partialling out the effects of the 
negative emotion words, pronouns, and certainty words.  Negative emotions and 
pronouns have previously been identified as strong linguistic markers of affective 
disorder, and the certainty words index is the most conceptually related to our 
absolutist index.  We found that there was still a significant main effect for the 
absolutist index between groups, after controlling for the certainty index, negative 
emotions index and the pronoun’s index, F(3, 3860) = 20.575, p < .001).  Paired 
comparisons reveal that all contrasts remained significant to p < .01. 
 
2.4.1.6 Confirmatory factor analysis.  For study 1 forums, we calculated indices for 
each individual word in the absolutist and non-absolutist dictionaries using an in-
house python script (see Appendix 2 for full python code) and the Natural Language 
Tool Kit (NLTK; Bird, Klein & Loper, 2009).  This means that we had the percentage 
prevalence of each word rather than each dictionary.  Using these data, we conducted 
a confirmatory factor analysis on the combined list of 65 absolutist and non-absolutist 
words with a Direct Oblimen rotation and a loadings cut-off > 0.55.  We found that the 
highest loading words on the first factor were all absolutist except for ‘really’ (which is 
an adverbial intensifier) and ‘anything’ which we had originally categorized as 
absolutist but due to lack of independent expert validation, was moved to the non-
absolutist dictionary.  The highest loading words on factor 2 were all non-absolutist 
except for the absolutist word ‘definitely’.  Other than ‘definitely’, no absolutist word 
loaded outside of factor one.  The factor analysis was not able to separate ‘extreme 
words’ from non-absolutist words (see Table 2.4).  To examine the absolutism factor 
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further, we used structural equation modelling (SEM) to test the model fit of the 7 
highest loading words on factor 1 from the factor analysis.  Model fit was assessed 
using AMOS version 24 (SPSS).  A 7-item, one factor model adequately fit the data (X2 
= 14.461, X2/degrees of freedom [df] = 14, GFI = .912, CFI = .996, NFI = .903).  Including more 
words in the model reduced the model fit below generally accepted levels. 
 
2.4.1.7 Sensitivity analysis.  The smallest group in this study is the suicidal ideation 
group.  Inferences about this group are based on data from 368 members in four 
separate suicidal ideation forums.  Moreover, these forums may be perceived as less 
conventional than others used in this research.  For this reason, we conducted a 
sensitivity analysis to ensure the results obtained from this group are robust.  The 
multi-level mixed-effects model for the absolutist index was recalculated after 
sequentially excluding all data from each of the suicidal ideation forums in turn.  This 
produced four sets of test statistics, each with one suicidal ideation forum excluded.  
Paired comparisons showed that the absolutist index for the suicidal ideation group 
remained significantly greater than the control group (p’s < .001, d’s = 3.85-4.41), the 
anxiety group (p’s < .001, d’s = 1.39-1.71) and the depression group (p’s < .001, d’s = 
1.37-1.69).  The narrow range of effect sizes for each comparison confirms that these 
findings are robust, and not driven by a forum outlier in the suicidal ideation group. 
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Table 2.4 Highest Loading Words in the Confirmatory Factor Analysis. 
 Components 
FACTORS 1 2-5 
everything 0.864  
ever 0.725  
always 0.717  
nothing 0.684  
anythinga 0.68  
never 0.634  
reallyb 0.602  
completely 0.594  
every 0.559  
about  0.677 
huge  0.636 
generally  0.625 
often  0.611 
some  0.602 
somewhat  0.589 
slight  0.576 
might  0.576 
definitelyc  0.573 
nearly  0.562 
Note.  Individual absolutist and non-absolutist words factored according to their study 
1 forums indices.  a Italicized word not categorized as absolutist by independent 
expert judges.  b Italicized word not categorized as absolutist by independent expert 
judges.  c Italicized word categorized as absolutist by independent expert judges. 
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2.4.2 Study 2 
2.4.2.1 Multilevel mixed-effects model for the absolutist index.  Our third hypothesis 
predicted that mental health forum groups strongly associated with absolutist thinking 
(BPD and ED) would use more absolutist words than mental health forum groups less 
associated with absolutist thinking (PTSD and schizophrenia).  A multilevel mixed-
effects analysis found that there was a significant difference in the absolutist index 
between study 2 groups F(3,16) = 5.515, p = .009.  Paired comparisons revealed that 
the mean absolutist index for the BPD forum group (M = 1.47, SD = 0.12) was 
significantly greater than the PTSD (M = 1.13, SD = 0.07, p < .001, d = 1.93, 95% CI 
[−0.38, −0.14]) and the schizophrenia forum groups (M = 1.14, SD = 0.10, p < .001, d = 
1.94, 95% CI [−0.42, −0.20]).  They also revealed that the absolutist index of the ED 
forum group (M = 1.25, SD = 0.12) was significantly greater than the schizophrenia (p = 
.009, d = .81, 95% CI [−0.25, −0.05]) but not PTSD (p = .081, d = .84, 95% CI [−0.22, 
0.01]) forum groups (Figure 2.2).  A critical assumption in this contrast, is that the 
control and test groups have similar levels of psychological distress.  We sought to 
verify this assumption using the LIWC negative emotions dictionary.  A paired 
comparison found no significant difference in the mean negative emotions index 
between the study 2 control (M = 3.51, SD = 0.73) and test (M = 3.71, SD = 0.31, p = 
.335) forum groups (Figure 2.2).  Therefore, it seems that absolutism is associated with 
certain types of psychopathology forums and not psychological distress forums per se. 
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Figure 2.2 Mean percentage of (a) absolutist words in study 2 groups (b) negative 
emotion words for study 2 groups.  Error bars indicate ± 95% bootstrapped confidence 
intervals.  PTSD = Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, ED = Eating Disorder, BPD = 
Borderline Personality Disorder. 
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2.4.2.2 Comparison of study 1 with study 2.  In comparing the absolutist index of study 
1 and 2 groups, post hoc comparisons with a Bonferroni correction revealed that the 
suicidal ideation forum group had an index significantly greater than ED and BPD 
forum groups (p < .001).  ED but not BPD had an index significantly lower than anxiety 
and depression forum groups (p’s = .001).  Study 2 control forum groups PTSD and 
schizophrenia had an index significantly lower than all study 1 test forum groups (p’s < 
.001).   
 
2.4.2.3 Sensitivity analysis.  The smallest group in this study is the BPD group.  
Inferences about this group are based on data from 326 members in four separate 
BPD forums. This group also produced the most extreme absolutist index scores.  
Once again, we conducted a sensitivity analysis to ensure the results obtained from 
this group are robust.  The multi-level mixed-effects model for the absolutist index 
was recalculated after sequentially excluding all data from each of the BPD forums in 
turn.  This produced four sets of test statistics, each with one BPD forum excluded.  
Paired comparisons show that the absolutist index for the BPD group remained 
significantly greater than the PTSD group (p’s < .026, d’s = 1.25-1.91) and the 
schizophrenia group (p’s < .008, d’s = 1.56-2.24).  Once again, the positive findings 
from the smallest group in the study appear to be robust and not dependent on any 
single forum outlier. 
 
2.4.3 Study 3 
2.4.3.1 Multilevel mixed-effects model for the absolutist index.  Our final hypothesis 
predicted that the recovery forum group would use significantly more absolutist 
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words than the study 1 control forum group.  Paired comparisons in a multilevel 
mixed-effects model found that the mean absolutist index of the recovery forum 
group (M = 1.31%, SD = 0.14) was significantly greater than the study 1 control forum 
group (p < .001, 95% CI [−0.41, −0.24], d = 2.02).  Paired comparisons also found a 
significant difference in the absolutist index between the recovery forum group and 
the anxiety group (p = .018, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.23], d = .56) and depression group (p = 
.018, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.22], d = 0.52).  Like the anxiety and depression groups, the 
recovery group also had a significantly lower absolutist index than the suicidal ideation 
group (p < .001, 95% CI [−0.37, −0.67], d = 2.31).  Although the absolutist index of the 
recovery group was significantly different from anxiety and depression groups, the 
more accurate bias corrected confidence intervals reveal that the differences are 
marginal; relative effect sizes reveal that the recovery group absolutist index is closer 
to anxiety and depression (d’s < 0.56) than to the control group (d = 2.02; Figure 2.3).  
We noted earlier that the contents of the recovery forums were very positive.  To 
illustrate this fact, we ran the LIWC positive emotions dictionary on the above groups 
(Figure 2.3).  There was indeed a very large difference in the prevalence of positive 
emotions.  Paired comparisons found that the recovery forum group contained more 
positive emotion words than all the remaining groups (p’s < .001). 
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Figure 2.3 Mean percentage of (a) absolutist words (b) positive emotion words, for the 
recovery group and all study 1 groups (control, anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation).  
Error bars indicate ± 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
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2.4.3.2 Sensitivity analysis.  Although the recovery group is relatively large, with 558 
members in 7 different forums, this group is somewhat unconventional and the 
number of members in each forum were somewhat unequal (see Appendix 3).  We 
therefore deemed it appropriate to conduct another sensitivity analysis to ensure the 
results obtained from this group are robust.  The multi-level mixed-effects model for 
the absolutist index was recalculated after sequentially excluding all data from each of 
the recovery forums in turn.  This produced seven sets of test statistics, each with one 
recovery forum excluded.  Paired comparisons show that the absolutist index for the 
recovery group remained significantly greater than the control group (p’s < .001, d’s = 
1.88-2.30).  This again confirms that the positive findings from this group are robust 
and not dependent on any single forum outlier. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
2.5.1 Main Findings  
The data we have presented confirms that the use of absolutist words is elevated in 
the natural language of various affective disorder forum groups.  As expected, in study 
1 we found that the percentage of absolutist words in anxiety, depression and suicidal 
ideation test groups was significantly greater than control groups (H1); and that the 
percentage of absolutist words in the suicidal ideation forum group was significantly 
greater than in both the anxiety and depression forum groups (H2).  These findings 
have support from a previous study, Fekete (2002) used an adapted Weintraub text 
analysis method on four internet forums (suicide, depression, anxiety and a journalism 
control). They found significant results for 13 language variables including negations 
and dichotomous expressions.  Our first study has built on this preliminary finding, 
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using a wider range of more rigorous controls, a larger corpus of data and a 
hypothesis driven study design. 
 In study 2, consistent with our expectations, we found the absolutist index was 
greater for BPD and ED forums than PTSD and schizophrenia forums; although this did 
not reach significance between ED and PTSD.  All four mental health groups contained 
similar amounts of negative emotion terms, but only BPD and ED are strongly 
associated with absolutist thinking.  This suggests that our index is more sensitive to 
absolutism than psychological distress.  
 In study 3, we proposed that if the absolutist index for the recovery forums 
was similar to depression forums, this would suggest that absolutist thinking has some 
trait like qualities that persist outside of depressive episodes.  This is indeed what we 
observed.  Even though the recovery forums were largely very positive, the 
percentage of absolutist words in the recovery group had overlapping confidence 
intervals with both the anxiety and depression forum groups, and was significantly 
greater than the control forum group.  It is widely acknowledged that an episode of 
depression increases the risk of future depressive episodes (Teasdale et al., 2000).  In 
many ways, preventing this recurrence is the focus of most treatments.  
Consequently, there is keen interest in identifying potential cognitive vulnerability 
factors which are observed during episodes of depression and persist even after the 
episode has ended.  Our findings indicate that absolutism may be such a vulnerability 
factor.  The ‘scar hypothesis’ (Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson & Franklin, 1981) provides 
a different explanation.  Here the depressive episode itself alters the linguistic 
style/vocabulary of the individual, this then persists as a ‘scar’ after the depressive 
episode has abated.   
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2.5.2 Comparison with other dictionaries 
Text analysis research on written data from depressed and suicidal individuals has 
repeatedly shown elevated use of negative emotion words and pronouns (for review 
see Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).  We also found these to be strong markers of 
affective disorder in the present study.  However, we have paradoxically found that 
‘negative emotions’, ‘sad’, ‘affect’ and ‘feel’ dictionaries, were more prevalent in 
anxiety and depression than the suicidal ideation group.  This is inconsistent with the 
belief that suicidal individuals have a greater amount of negative emotions (de Klerk 
et al., 2011; Orbach, Mikulincer, Gilboa-Schechtman, & Sirota, 2003; Stein, Apter, 
Ratzoni, Har-Even & Avidan, 1998).  While some research has previously shown that 
‘negative emotion [words] use tends to increase approaching suicide’ (Pennebaker & 
Chung, 2013).  These mixed findings only reaffirm that ‘function’ words are a better 
gauge of thinking processes than ‘content’ words (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007).  Our 
absolutist dictionary also produced larger effects than pronouns (and its first person 
singular subcategory), which had previously been identified as better markers of 
affective disorder than negative emotion words (Pennebaker & Chung, 2013). 
The LIWC ‘certainty’ index (Table 2.3) is the most closely related to our 
absolutist index, comprising words that denote high or total certainty.  While indeed 
similar, the certainty index does not include some words which are absolutist (i.e. 
‘nothing’) and contains others which are not (i.e. ‘frankly’).  Moreover, unlike our 
absolutist dictionary, many of its component words are not neutrally valenced (i.e. 
perfect).   
Finally, we found that ‘swear’ words produced a similar significance pattern to 
absolutist words (Table 2.3).  Swear words are commonly used as adverbial 
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intensifiers (Peters, 1994; Romero S, 2012).  For example, instead of writing ‘I’m 
completely sick of this’, depressed/suicidal individuals may write something akin to 
‘I’m fucking sick of this’, replacing the absolutist word ‘completely’ with something 
even more forceful; both functionally serving as adverbial intensifiers of the strongest 
kind.   
  
2.5.3 Absolute vs. Extreme 
Previous studies have often used the terms absolute and extreme interchangeably 
(e.g. Teasdale et al., 2001).  A central assumption in the present research is that 
absolutist words are uncorrelated with extreme words; this assumption was tested.  
We found that only 25% of absolutist words were also deemed extreme by some of 
the independent expert judges.  Moreover, none of the words we had categorized as 
extreme were deemed absolutist, with the single exception of ‘really’ which was 
categorized as absolutist by one out of the five judges.  This was reaffirmed by the 
confirmatory factor analysis (Table 2.4), in which only words we had categorized as 
absolutist loaded onto factor one, with the single exception, once again, of the 
adverbial intensifier ‘really’.  We believe that a clear distinction should be made 
between these two concepts in future research; and that the terms should not be 
used interchangeably.  
 
2.5.4 Anxiety and depression within control groups 
Individuals with cancer, PTSD and schizophrenia have high levels of comorbid anxiety 
and depression.  This might lead us to expect a higher absolutist index for these forum 
groups.  However, the cancer group produced an absolutist index identical to the 
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other study 1 control groups; and the PTSD and schizophrenia groups had a 
significantly lower absolutist index than all study 1 test groups.  This may be because 
symptoms of anxiety and depression in cancer, PTSD and schizophrenia have a known 
specific cause, namely, having cancer, PTSD or schizophrenia.  One does not have to 
be absolutist, or even disposed to affective disorder, to experience feelings of anxiety 
or depression about a brain tumour, a traumatic event, or hallucinations.  In contrast, 
anxiety and depression disorders often have multiple vague or even unknown causes.  
Predisposed individuals are pushed into anxiety and depression by circumstances 
which by necessity would not have the same effect in the general population. 
 
2.5.5 Implications.   
The maladaptive status of absolutist thinking is a recognized part of cognitive therapy 
(CT; Williams & Garland, 2002).  To date, theoretical and anecdotal support has 
mostly served as the basis for its inclusion, we hope the findings from our studies will 
add empirical justification.  The extent to which absolutist thinking is currently 
addressed by CT, depends on the form of CT used, and the preferred methods of each 
practitioner.  For example, combatting absolutist thinking is at the very core of 
Rational-Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT; David, Lynn & Ellis, 2009), whereas 
reducing negative thoughts takes primacy in other forms of CT.  Recently, research 
into treating cognitive vulnerabilities and preventing relapse has migrated towards 
the new ‘third wave’ therapies (Teasdale et al., 2000).  These therapies, such as 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT) and Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT) are largely geared towards increasing cognitive flexibility (e.g. Kahl, 
2012).  Our findings are therefore in step with the recent trend towards cultivating 
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adaptive cognitive processes (i.e. flexibility) as distinct from changing the content of 
thoughts (i.e. negativity). 
 
2.5.6 Measuring absolutism 
In this chapter we have measured absolutist thinking using natural language text 
analysis.  Previous efforts to measure absolute thinking have relied on totalling the 
number of end-point responses on Likert scales.  Compared to using natural language 
text analysis this method has significant drawbacks which centre around three areas.  
Firstly, there has been no work which demonstrates that an absolute response style 
on Likert scales actually corresponds to absolute thinking (akin to study 2 detailed 
above).  Secondly, the content of the items on the different questionnaires, often 
confound the nature of an absolute response.  For instance, is an absolute response 
to a moderate question truly absolute?  Moreover, the end-points are sometimes 
labelled with non-absolutist quantifiers (e.g. “strongly agree”).  Finally, measuring 
absolute thinking through Likert scales lacks ecological validity.  In chapter 5, we will 
identify natural language markers which correspond to absolute responses on Likert 
scales.  This will show where the two methods overlap and where they depart, 
moreover, it may give insights into the construct validity of measuring absolute 
responding on Likert scales.  We also hope to encourage other researchers to use the 
natural language surrogates for absolute responding on Likert scales we identify in 
conducting their investigations. 
 
2.5.7 Limitations and future directions.   
Because this study had large samples from multiple sources, and a naturalistic 
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observational design, it consequently had low experimental control.  For example, we 
could only infer general demographic characteristics from different forums (e.g. 
women post on Mumsnet and young people post on Student Room etc.).  Usernames 
served to distinguish members, however it is possible that some members might post 
using more than one profile or use different usernames for different forums.  
Fundamentally, the identities and motivation of users is largely unknowable, and this 
is an inevitable limitation in this study.  As outlined in the methods, we did check that 
the authors of posts were at least purporting to be a representative of the relevant 
online community, but we had no power to go beyond this basic check.  Follow-up 
studies could use an experimental study design, and perhaps alternative 
methodologies, to replicate and extend the findings initially presented here.  Despite 
likely being limited to a smaller sample size and perhaps lacking ecological validity, 
such studies would be able to control participant characteristics, writing topics and 
the setting. 
 Our findings in this study relate to differences between-groups, such an analysis 
provides important insights into the markers associated with affective disorder.  
However, in this research, we have not addressed within-person variation in 
absolutist thinking and how that relates to changes in affective symptoms at an 
individual level (c.f. Molenaar and Campbell, 2009). For example, are individual 
changes in suicidal ideation over time reflected in changes in use of absolutist words? 
Future research could seek to track absolutist thinking (and affective disorder) in 
individuals over time.  This could have even greater utility for clinical practice. 
 In measuring aggregate differences in absolutist words between groups we 
have not examined the specific nature of the relationship.  While we present data, 
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which may point to absolutism as a possible cognitive vulnerability factor, the extent 
and mechanism of any causal role is not addressed here.  Future intervention studies 
could examine the causal status of absolutist thinking, one possibility would be to use 
a cognitive bias modification paradigm (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011).  The aim would be to 
introduce some manipulation of absolutist thinking in participants and then examine 
the subsequent effects.  Alternatively, a narrow form of CBT which focussed on 
targeting absolutist thinking could be clinically trialled. 
2.5.8 Author Contributions  
M. Al-Mosaiwi created the research design from an initial idea contributed by T. 
Johnstone. M. Al-Mosaiwi collected, ana-lyzed, and interpreted the data under the 
supervision of T. Johnstone. M. Al-Mosaiwi drafted the manuscript, and T. Johnstone 
provided critical revisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 107 of 341 
 
Chapter 3: Replication of Study 1 in Four Other Languages 
 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
In a follow-up replication study for chapter 2, we located German, French, Russian and 
Spanish depression and suicidal ideation forums.  Our aim was to replicate and extend 
our main findings above in other languages and cultures.  We show that absolutist 
words continue to be strong markers for affective disorder in all the languages and 
cultures tested.  They produced larger effect sizes than pronouns.  However, we did 
not find differences in the percentage prevalence of absolutist words between 
depression and suicidal ideation, in any language except English. 
 
3.2 Introduction 
Text analysis research has consistently found that pronouns (e.g. ‘I’, ‘myself’, ‘you’) 
and negative emotion words (e.g. ‘hate’, ‘depressed’, ‘unhappy’) were the strongest 
markers for depression in natural language text (Rude, Gortner and Pennebaker, 
2004).  Subsequently, our lab examined the role of absolutist words (e.g. ‘always’, 
‘nothing’, ‘completely’ etc.) as possible markers in the natural language of affective 
disorder.  We define absolutist words, as those which denote totality, either of 
magnitude or probability, and are unqualified by nuance.  We collected natural 
language text from anxiety, depression and suicidal ideation internet forums; finding 
that anxiety and depression forums contained approximately 50% more absolutist 
words than control forums (e.g. Mumsnet, Student room, Cancer forums etc.).  
Moreover, suicidal ideation forums contained approximately 75-80% more absolutist 
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words than control forums.  Interestingly, absolutist words were stronger markers of 
affective disorder natural language than pronouns.  They also tracked the severity of 
affective disorder forums more faithfully than ‘negative emotion’ words, as the latter 
was found to be paradoxically lower in suicidal ideation forums than anxiety and 
depression forums (Al-Mosaiwi and Johnstone, 2018).   
Our research was confined to using English absolutist words, and analyzing 
English language forums.  We do not know whether absolutist words continue to be 
strong markers for the natural language of depression and suicidal ideation, in other 
languages and other cultures.  If the effect does not generalize to other languages, we 
should infer that absolutist words are not a universal linguistic feature of affective 
disorder.  Our previous findings may therefore be specific to English speaking culture, 
or a quirk of the English language.  We predict not, our expectation is that regardless 
of language and culture, absolutist words will continue to be strong linguistic markers 
for depression and suicidal ideation natural language.   
In this study, we seek to demonstrate the effect in 4 other languages; namely, 
German, French, Russian and Spanish.  We chose these languages because they 
spanned across different cultures, and we were confident of finding suitable forums 
for them.  For each language, we focused on locating adequate internet discussion 
forums for control, depression and suicidal ideation conditions. 
As with Al-Mosaiwi and Johnstone (2018), we have used the Linguistic-Inquiry 
and Word Count software (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015) to 
conduct the text analysis.  This program provides 73 independently validated 
dictionaries covering a wide range of ‘dimensions’ (e.g. negative emotion words, 
family words, pronouns).  We ran the LIWC pronouns and negative emotions 
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dictionaries, to compare absolutist words with these already known markers for 
affective disorder.  There has been at least one previous foreign language replication 
of this type (although it did not examine absolutist words).  Ramirez-Esparza, Chung, 
Kacewicz and Pennebaker (2008) found that negative emotion words and first person 
singular pronouns were the strongest markers of natural language in Spanish 
depression forums (as opposed to control breast cancer forums). 
 
3.3 Method 
3.3.1 Forum Selection.   
Representative websites were located through a Google search (search words: e.g. 
“depression forums”).  These search terms were first translated into the relevant 
language (e.g. German) in order to find forums in that language.  Forums were google 
translated into English and inspected to ensure suitability.  Forums were included into 
the study if they were deemed to deal with the relevant topic (e.g. depression), 
contain natural language text, and posts must be authored by representative 
members of that group (e.g. depressed users) 
We aimed to recruit six forums for each group (control, depression and 
suicidal ideation) in each language.  We struggled to locate suicidal ideation forums, 
only finding one for each of the languages.  We failed to find any suicidal ideation 
forums in Spanish, therefore Spanish only had two conditions (control and 
depression).  In French, we could only locate five depression forums, and so we 
collected five control forums to match.  The control forums covered topics such as 
parenting, gardening, being a student, being a pensioner, men’s forums, work forums, 
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health forums and general practical forums (see Appendix 6 for full details and 
website addresses for control, depression and suicidal ideation forums). 
 
3.3.2 Data Collection.   
Forum members can either introduce a new topic (‘first posts’) or contribute to an 
ongoing discussion (‘replies’).  In the interest of simplicity and interpretability, only 
first posts were collected.  Posts were copied and pasted into text documents ready 
for subsequent text analysis.  All text files used in this study are hosted on Figshare, 
dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.4743715).  If a forum was further divided into sub-
forums, only the single most appropriate sub-forum was used (see Appendix 6).  
Where a member makes multiple posts, these were combined into a single text 
document. 
For each control, depression and suicidal ideation forum, we aimed to collect 
30,000 words.  Sixteen out of the forty-nine forums were not large enough to provide 
a 30,000-word corpus, but were nevertheless retained in the study as they surpassed 
10,000 words.  Posts were only collected if they met our selection criteria: (1) they 
must contain a minimum of 100 words, (2) be authored by a representative member 
of that online community (i.e. not written on behalf of someone else/news article etc.) 
and (3) written in continuous prose (i.e. not lists, poems).  Posts from all depression 
and control forums which met the selection criteria were collected sequentially as 
presented by the respective forum website (usually by date order).  All data in this 
study was collected from the public domain, therefore while ethical consideration is 
still important, informed consent is not required.  This complies with the University of 
Reading research ethics guidelines, and the ethical guidance for internet-mediated 
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research set out by The British Psychological Society (British Psychological Association, 
2013).  The aggregate data used in this study are hosted on Figshare, 
dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.4743547.v1.   
 
3.3.3 Text Analysis.   
Word counting text analysis was conducted using validated dictionaries that 
characterize a particular linguistic dimension (i.e. negative words, auxiliary verbs, 
family related words).  For this study, we used our in-house absolutist dictionary, 
which has been validated by independent expert judges (two clinical psychologists and 
three linguists from The University of Reading).  The dictionary is made up of 19 
absolutist words (Table 2.2) and was previously used to define absolutist words in Al-
Mosaiwi and Johnstone (2018).  For this study, we translated the English language 
absolutist dictionary into German, French, Russian and Spanish.  This was achieved in 
two stages; in the first stage the absolutist words were translated using Google 
translate software, this translation was then refined through consultation with native 
speakers in the second stage.  The resultant dictionaries can be found in Appendices 
7-10.  The LIWC program also contains validated pronouns and negative emotions 
dictionaries, which they have translated into German, French, Russian and Spanish.  
Purely for comparison, we will also test these dictionaries to compare absolutist words 
with other well-known markers for the natural language of depression.  The pronoun 
dictionary has pronoun subcategories (e.g. first person singular, personal pronouns, 
third person pronouns), we will also run these subcategories and compare absolutist 
words to the pronoun subcategory which produces the largest average effects.  For 
each language, the LIWC text analysis software was used to test the various 
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dictionaries.  It calculates the prevalence of a given dictionary as a percentage of the 
total number of words analysed.  We have referred to this percentage measure of a 
dictionary’s prevalence as its ‘index’.  For every text document, we calculated an index 
for each of the linguistic dimensions. 
 
3.3.4 Data Analysis.   
The data from each language was analysed separately and a multilevel mixed-effects 
modeling approach was adopted (see Appendix 1 for the SPSS syntax script).  This is 
the recommended analysis method for this type of data structure (Baayen, Davidson, 
& Bates, 2008).  Members were nested within forums, and forums were nested within 
groups (i.e. depression).  Mixed-effects models consider both fixed and random 
effects and can be used to assess the influence of the fixed effects on the dependent 
variables after accounting for some outside random effects.  Residuals were weighted 
by the word count of each text file and all the analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS 
software (version 21).  To correct for positive skew in the data, we used a log10(𝑥 +1) 
transformation, adding 1 to deal with 0 values (cf. Yamamura, 1999).  We report raw 
values for descriptive statistics to facilitate a more intuitive understanding.  The 
bootstrap procedure was also used to produce better estimates of p-values and 
confidence intervals (CI).  This method is often recommended because it does not 
assume normally distributed data (Cumming, 2014).  Bootstrapped confidence 
intervals (95%; bias-corrected and accelerated) were computed through 1,000 random 
resamples (with replacement) using the stratified sampling method, with forums as 
the strata variable.   
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Prevalence of absolutist words.   
We conducted a mixed effects model for the German, French, Russian and Spanish 
absolutist indices.  We found a large and significant difference between forum 
conditions (control, depression, suicide) for the German F(2,9) = 11.848, p = .003), 
French F(2,7) = 5.541, p = .036) and Russian F(2,6) = 24.62, p < .001) absolutist indices.  
For the German forums (Figure 3.1), paired comparisons found that the control group 
(M = 1.34, SD = .84) contained a significantly lower percentage prevalence of 
absolutist words than depression (M = 2.03, SD = 1.10; p < .001, d = 2.96, 95% CI [.06, 
.17]) and suicidal ideation (M = 2.08, SD = .94, p < .001, d = 1.71, 95% CI [.02, .21]) 
forums.  There was no significant difference between suicide and depression forums 
(p = .807, 95% CI [-.10, .10]).  For the French forums (Figure 3.1), paired comparisons 
also found that the control group (M = 1.13, SD = .65) contained a significantly lower 
percentage prevalence of absolutist words than depression (M = 1.54, SD = .91; p < 
.001, d = 2.26, 95% CI [.02, .13]) but not suicidal ideation (M = 1.54, SD = .74, p = .094, 
d = 1.51, 95% CI [.02, .17]) forums.  There was no significant difference between 
suicide and depression forums (p = .879, 95% CI [-.09, .09]).  For the Russian forums 
(Figure 3.1), paired comparisons also found that the control group (M = .84, SD = .60) 
contained a significantly lower percentage prevalence of absolutist words than 
depression (M = 1.54, SD = .82; p < .001, d = 4.77, 95% CI [.10, .19]) and suicidal 
ideation (M = 1.56, SD = .91, p < .001, d = 3.04, 95% CI [.05, .23]) forums.  There was 
no significant difference between suicide and depression forums (p = .856, 95% CI [-
.09, .09]).  Finally, we found a large and significant difference in the percentage of 
absolutist words between control (M = 0.93, SD = .70) and depression (M = 1.55, SD = 
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.91; p < .001, d = 2.90, 95% CI [.06, .17]) Spanish forums (Figure 3.1; there was no 
Suicidal ideation forum). 
 
Figure 3.1  Precentage prevalence of absolutist words in German, Spanish, French and Russian language 
depression, suicidal ideation and control internent forums. 
 
3.4.2 Negative emotion words and Pronouns.   
The LIWC software provides validated dictionaries for the linguistic categories of 
negative emotion words and pronouns (including subcategories).  These LIWC 
dictionaries are also available in a range of languages including German, French, 
Russian and Spanish, which we used in this study.  Using the LIWC, we calculated the 
percentage prevalence of these dictionaries in the control, depression and suicidal 
ideation forums.  In addition to confirming that negative emotion words and pronouns 
serve as linguistic markers for depression and suicidal ideation, in languages other 
than English, we also sought to compare their effects with those of absolutist words.  
We again conducted a multilevel mixed-effects model and pairwise comparisons for 
each linguistic marker.  Table 3.1 displays the test statistics and effect sizes for the 3 
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dictionaries in each of the four languages tested.  Of the various pronoun dictionaries, 
we found that first person singular pronouns (I, me, mine) produced the largest 
average effects, therefore we will compare the effects of the absolutist dictionary to 
this pronoun subcategory.  First person singular pronouns produced large and 
significant differences between control and depression forums (p’s < .05, d’s > 1.49) 
but not for control and the suicidal ideation forum (p’s > .05, d’s > .84; excluding the 
Spanish language).  Negative emotion words also produced large and significant 
differences between control and depression forums (p’s < .05, d’s > 2.80) as well as 
control and the suicidal ideation forum (p’s < .05, d’s > 1.91; excluding the Spanish 
language).  Therefore, both these linguistic dimensions appear to be strong markers 
for the natural language of depression and suicidal ideation, in other languages 
besides English.  Nevertheless, we found that absolutist words produced larger effects 
than pronouns in every language tested, this is consistent with the findings reported 
previously by Al-Mosaiwi and Johnstone (2018) for English forums (Table 2.3).  We 
therefore again conclude that absolutist words are stronger markers of depression 
and suicidal ideation natural language than pronouns (which had previously been 
considered the strongest markers).  Negative emotion words did produce larger 
effects than absolutist words and this is also consistent with the findings reported in 
Al-Mosaiwi and Johnstone, (2018). 
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Table 3.1 Test Statistics and Effect Sizes for each Language 
Dictionary 
H1 
Control < 
Depression 
Control < 
Suicidal 
Ideation 
Depression < 
Suicidal 
Ideation 
d t d t d t 
Absolutist Words             
German 2.96 4.67** 1.71 2.60* .04 .06 
French 2.26 3.17* 1.51 1.95 .03 .04 
Russian 4.77 6.77** 3.04 3.80* .06 .07 
Spanish 2.90 4.53**         
I             
German 1.63 2.57* .99 1.56 .12 .19 
French 1.49 2.11* 0.84 1.18 .03 .04 
Russian 4.47 7.03** 2.59 3.90* .04 .06 
Spanish 2.40 3.81*         
Negative Emotion             
German 3.80 6.02** 2.10 3.24* .01 .02 
French 2.80 3.98* 1.91 2.65* .24 .33 
Russian 5.67 8.08** 3.45 4.44* 0.09 0.12 
Spanish 4.04 6.40**         
 
Note.  For each dictionary, two t-tests compared the transformed data for the control 
group forums (dictionary % prevalence) to depression and suicidal ideation forum 
groups.  One t-tests also compared the depression forums group with suicidal ideation 
forums group.  There were no suicidal ideation forums in Spanish.  ‘I’ = First person 
singular pronouns (e.g. I, me, my).  *p < .05.  **p < .001 
 
 
 
 
Page 117 of 341 
 
3.4.3 Analysis of Covariance.   
We ran an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) to measure the unique predictive validity 
of absolutist words after partialling out the effects of the negative emotion words and 
pronouns.  We found that there was a significant main effect for the absolutist index 
between groups, after controlling for negative emotions words and pronoun’s, for the 
German forums F(2, 1032) = 39.989, p < .001), French forums F(2, 885) = 3.548, p < 
.029) Russian forums F(2, 778) = 9.558, p < .001) and Spanish forums F(1, 828) = 
34.802, p < .001).  Paired comparisons reveal that all contrasts that were significant, 
remained significant to p < .05. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Across a range of languages, we find that absolutist words are strong markers for 
depression and suicidal ideation natural language.  Specifically, we found a 
significantly greater percentage prevalence of absolutist words in German, French, 
Russian and Spanish depression/suicidal ideation forums compared to control forums.  
This replicates and extends previously reported findings using English language forums 
(Al-Mosaiwi and Johnstone, 2018).  We can therefore infer, that the phenomenon is 
not specific to any given culture or language. 
For the languages included in this study, we found no significant differences in 
the prevalence of absolutist words between depression and suicidal ideation forums.  
This conflicts with Al-Mosaiwi and Johnstone (2018) where suicidal ideation forums 
were shown to contain significantly more absolutist words than depression forums for 
English language forums.  It should be noted that in conducting the data collection, we 
struggled to find adequate suicidal ideation forums in other languages.  We failed to 
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find any in Spanish, and only one for each of the remaining languages.  By contrast, in 
Al-Mosaiwi and Johnstone (2018) we had collected data from four separate suicidal 
ideation English language forums (more than all the languages in this study 
combined).  This may also explain why the difference between control and suicidal 
ideation French forums did not reach significance.  It could be therefore that with 
more data, a better estimate of absolutist words in suididal ideation forums would 
have generated more significant differences.  Moreover, members self-select into 
forums and it may be that English language suicidal ideation forms are more clearly 
district from depression forums, as compared to forums included in this study.  Once 
again, with so few suicidal ideation forums included in the study, it is difficult or make 
clear inferences. 
There is an important distinction between function words (e.g. articles, 
prepositions) and content words (e.g. nouns, adjectives).  Function words shape the 
structure of language and determine grammatical relationships, but have little lexical 
meaning.  Content words name objects and their qualities, they have lexical meaning, 
but do not play a grammatical or structural role.  Absolutist words and pronouns are 
function words, while negative emotion words are categorized as content words.  Put 
more simply, absolutist words and pronouns relate to how people think, negative 
emotion words relate to what people think. 
Of the function words, pronouns are considered to be the best markers for 
depression and suicidal ideation natural language (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010).  
We have shown previously (Al-Mosaiwi and Johnstone, 2018) that absolutist words 
are actually better linguistic markers (produce larger effects and more significant 
results) than pronouns.  In this study, we have reaffirmed this conclusion, by 
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replicating and extending this finding using four other languages.  With respect to how 
people think, we conclude that absolutist words are the strongest markers for 
depression and suicidal ideation, in every language tested.  Negative emotion words 
did produce larger average effects than absolutist words, however as discussed, these 
are content words.  It is less meaningful to compare content words with function 
words as they address separate aspects of language. 
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Chapter 4: Absolutist words in a clinical and community sample 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Having tested our method of estimating the prevalence of absolutist words usage in 
the natural language found on internet forums.  We aimed toextend this word by 
examining the prevalence of absolutist words in data collected from a community and 
clinical sample.  We obtained our data through a collaboration with the ‘Anxiety and 
Depression in Young People (AnDy) Research Clinic’.  The AnDy clinic had data from a 
research project which recruited 206 participants (aged 12-18) in a community 
sample.  The sample included young people with symptoms of depression and anxiety 
similar to those in a clinical population (81 participants had anxiety symptoms similar 
to those with clinically diagnosed anxiety disorder and 45 participants had depression 
symptoms similar to those with clinically diagnosed depressive disorder).  However, 
the AnDy clinic make clear that the presence of clinical depression and/or anxiety 
diagnoses was not formally assessed, therefore the fraction of the sample that might 
have met formal diagnostic criteria is undetermined.   
We predicted that participants with symptoms of anxiety and depression 
similar to that of a clinical population would use more absolutist words than 
participants with symptoms of anxiety and depression similar to that of a community 
sample.  This expectation is driven by our findings in chapter 2 and 3, as well as the 
clinical literature which identifies absolutist thinking as a cognitive distortion and 
vulnerability factor for affective disorder. 
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4.2 Method 
Participants were administered a modified version of the ‘Ambiguous Scenarios Test 
for Depression’ (AST-D; Berna et al., 2011).  Some items were removed as they were 
not deemed pertinent to adolescents, others were modified to make them more 
pertinent for adolescents, the final form of the AST contained 20 items.  For each of 
the 20 items, participants were asked to (a) rate the scenario for pleasantness (from 1 
= Not at all pleasant; to 9 = Very pleasant) and (b) give a written description of their 
imagined outcome for the situation.  Participants completed the measure without 
time restrictions. 
In our study, we collected all the written responses for each item on the 
measure.  These were transcribed onto a word processor and compiled into a single 
text document.  The response from participants that had anxiety and depression 
symptoms similar to a clinical population were separated from the rest of the 
community sample.  Therefore, we generated two text documents for each item 
(community and clinical sample), and there were 20 items in total. 
 
4.3 Results 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the percentage prevalence 
of absolutist words in the answers of clinical and community samples.  We found that 
there was no significant difference in the percentage prevalence of absolutist words 
between the answers of clinical (M = .815, SD = .675) and community (M = .831, SD = 
.607) samples; t(38) = -.079, p = .938. 
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We also found, that for the percentage prevalence of pronouns, there was also 
no significant difference between the answers of clinical (M = 19.569, SD = 4.814) and 
community samples (M = 19.427, SD = 4.321); t(38) = .099, p = .922. 
There was however a significant difference in the percentage prevalence of 
negative emotion words between the answers of clinical (M = 5.643, SD = 2.422) and 
community (M = 3.984, SD = 1.896) samples; t(38) = 2.411, p = .021. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
We have not replicated our findings in chapter 2 and 3 using the answers to questions 
collected in-lab.  When answers are not in the form of natural language, but rather 
constrained by having to address a specific question, the effects previously shown are 
not apparent.  This also applied to pronouns, another linguistic marker strongly 
identified with the natural language of depressed and anxious individuals. 
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Chapter 5: Linguistic Markers of Moderate and Absolute 
Natural Language 
 
5.1 Chapter overview 
As discussed at the end of chapter 2, measuring absolutist thinking has previously 
relied on totalling the number of absolute responses on Likert scales.  In chapter 2 we 
introduce a natural language text analysis alternative to this method with a number of 
distinct advantages.  In this chapter, we will discuss these advantages and identify 
natural language markers for absolute responding on Likert scales.  In this way, the 
two methods will be compared directly and we can observe where they overlap. 
In social, personality and mental health research, a stylistic tendency for selecting 
extreme end-points on Likert scales (absolute responding) has been linked to certain 
cultures, lower intelligence, lower income and personality/mental disorders.  In this 
study, we introduce a more sophisticated, informative and ecologically valid approach 
for estimating absolute responding.  We identified natural language markers that 
correspond to absolute responding on Likert scales.  We focussed on ‘function words’ 
(e.g. particles, conjunctions, prepositions) as they are more generalizable because 
they do not depend on any specific context.   
We conducted a text analysis of online reviews for films, tourist attractions and 
consumer products.  All written reviews were accompanied by a rating scale (akin to 
Likert scale), which allowed us to label text samples as absolute/moderate (study 1), 
and positive/negative (study 2).  Study 1 identified 18 function words that could 
classify absolute/moderate text with over 90% accuracy.  Dictionaries from the 
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Linguistic-Inquiry and Word Count software (Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 
2015), revealed that thoughtfulness was more prevalent in moderate text, while 
certainty was more prevalent in absolutist text.  Importantly, we also found that our 
19 words absolutist dictionary also correlated strongly with absolute reposes on Likert 
scales.  This confirms the convergent validity between calculating the percentage 
prevalence of absolutist words in natural language and absolute responding on Likert 
type scales.  In study 2, text analysis found that negativity was associated with 
differentiation, deficit and the past; whereas positivity was associated with inclusion 
and the present. 
Having established convergent validity, in study 3, we apply our more 
sophisticated and ecologically valid method of measuring absolutist thinking to 
determining whether there are differences in absolutism between cultures.  Past 
research has controversially suggested that African American and Latin American 
cultures are more prone to absolute responding, relative to White American and Asian 
American cultures.  These findings were predicated on Likert-type responses; study 3 
finds they generally cannot be supported when measured in a more ecologically valid 
method and in natural language. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
In social, personality and mental health research, absolute responding (or ‘extreme’ 
responding) is a response style estimated using Likert type scales.  Where selecting 
the absolute endpoints of a scale (e.g. 1 and 5 on a 5-point scale) corresponds to 
absolute responding, while selecting any point in-between corresponds to non-
absolute or moderate responding.  This study aimed to identify linguistic markers 
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which act as surrogates to absolute and moderate responding on Likert scales.  These 
markers could expand our understanding of both the language and cognition related 
to absolute and moderate responding.  The language we use has previously been 
shown to relate to the way we think (e.g., Al-Mosaiwi & Johnstone, 2018).  In 
measuring absolute and moderate responding, linguistic markers are also a more 
informative and ecologically valid alternative/addition to using Likert scales. 
 
5.2.1. Absolute Responding using Likert Scales and the Limitations  
Absolute responding on Likert-scales has been linked to a number of cognitive, social 
and cultural factors. Lower IQ and less education (e.g., Light, Zax & Gardiner, 1965; 
Marin, Gamba & Marin, 1992) have been associated with more absolute responding, 
as have personality characteristics such as intolerance of ambiguity and simplistic 
thinking (e.g., Naemi, Beal & Payne, 2009).   
Greater absolute responding has also been linked to ‘black’ and ‘Hispanic’ 
cultures (e.g., Bachman & O'malley, 2010; Hui & Triandis, 1989; Marin, Gamba & 
Marin, 1992); while lower absolute responding (more moderate responding) is linked 
to Japanese, Chinese (e.g., Chen, Lee, & Stevenson, 1995) and Korean cultures (e.g., 
Chun, Campbell & Yoo, 1974).  On closer inspection, these cultural findings often 
depend on the size of the scale used; an observed effect on a 5-point scale may not be 
apparent on a 10-point scale (e.g., Clarke, 2000; Hui & Triandis, 1989).  Such 
inconsistencies naturally raise doubts about the veracity of the results. 
 Additionally, a series of studies with depressed participants reveal that both 
positive and negative absolute responses on Likert scales predicted future relapse 
(e.g., de Graaf et al., 2010; Peterson et al., 2007, Teasdale et al., 2001).  However, 
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other studies have failed to find the effect (Ching & Dobson, 2010), or raised 
methodological concerns regarding the use of Likert scales, specifically in reference to 
the effect of item content on response style (Forand & DeRubeis, 2014).  That is, the 
content of the questions and the labelling of the end-points (e.g. “Mostly agree”), 
could compromise the absolute nature of an end-point response.  This moderating 
effect would not be accounted for when simply measuring the number of end-point 
responses.   
These previous findings have exclusively relied on observing an absolute 
response style on Likert scales.  This simplistic method cannot be applied to qualitative 
data, it lacks ecological validity, and there is no evidence as to whether the findings 
generalize beyond Likert scales.  That is, it is not clear whether the absolute 
responding of some groups relates to meaningful differences in absolutist thinking, or 
simply an experimental artefact specific to using Likert scales.   
Our proposed method of measuring absolute responding through linguistic 
markers in natural language presents an alternative that avoids some of the 
limitations inherent to Likert scales.  Being based on complex, naturalistic data 
(natural language), it offers greater flexibility and ecological validity because it is not 
reliant on structured response formats and can be used in an observational study of 
data acquired from a wide variety of sources. 
 
5.2.2. Function Word Linguistic Markers 
To be generalizable, linguistic markers cannot depend on the content of any given 
subject (e.g. nouns, verbs, adjectives), as these will differ from one subject to another.  
Therefore, we restrict our feature selection to include only ‘function words’, which 
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have a grammatical and structural role, but convey little to no content (e.g. particles, 
conjunctions, prepositions).  Ordinarily, we attend to the content of language and 
have little conscious awareness of its functional style.  For this reason, function words 
have previously been examined as implicit measures, particularly for differences in 
writing style (for review see Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010).   
Text analysis studies have associated specific classes of function words with 
certain writing styles.  For example, conjunctions, negations, articles and prepositions 
have been associated with a categorical or formal language style (Chung & 
Pennebaker, 2007).  Exclusive words (e.g. “but”, “except”, “without”), conjunctions 
and prepositions have been shown to be markers of greater ‘cognitive complexity’ 
(Pennebaker & King 1999). Increased use of auxiliary verbs, pronouns and adverbs are 
characteristic of a narrative language style (Pennebaker et al., 2014).  Personal 
pronouns predictably indicate a self-focus; while it is suggested that third person 
pronouns (they, he, she) are a sign of wellbeing (Chung & Pennebaker, 2007).  We aim 
to extend this literature by identifying function words which correlate with absolute 
and moderate responding on Likert-type scales. 
 
5.2.3. Machine learning classification 
Text analysis combined with machine learning has regularly been used to classify 
natural language text linked to positive vs. negative ratings (e.g., Feldman, 2013); this 
is referred to as ‘sentiment analysis’.  In this study, we followed the same process, 
except we were interested in absolute/moderate ratings differences, rather than 
positive/negative.  The purpose of building a classifier, similar to those previously used 
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for valence classification, was to demonstrate the predictive accuracy of the linguistic 
markers we identified in the training set. 
Although we were primarily concerned with identifying functional linguistic 
markers for absolute and moderate ratings.  In a second study, we also took the 
opportunity to identify functional word markers for positive and negative sentiment.  
This is a novel approach, as most valence sentiment analyses exclude function words 
because they have little semantic meaning.  To the best of our knowledge, no study 
has previously conducted a sentiment analysis using only function words. 
 
5.3 Methods and Data Analysis 
5.3.1. Data Collection 
The internet is increasingly being used as a source of naturalistic writing for research 
in linguistics and psychology.  Many websites allow users to leave lengthy comments 
in the form of personal narratives, requests for help, or reviews.  In this study, we 
collected natural language text posts from three popular websites; IMDB, TripAdvisor 
and Amazon.  All three websites combine a star rating system (akin to a Likert scale) 
with written natural language reviews about films, holiday destinations or products 
respectively.  Reviews paired with the lowest or highest (end-point) ratings were 
labelled absolute, and all other reviews were labelled non-absolute (or moderate). The 
valence of the reviews (positive or negative) was not factored into the analysis.  This 
means that absolutely positive reviews were grouped with absolutely negative 
reviews as they were both absolute.  Convergent validity in absolute responding 
between Likert scales and natural language was therefore estimated using the star 
rating scales and the text posts of these websites.  
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 We selected the websites IMDB, TripAdvisor and Amazon as they were large 
enough to provide sufficient data for training and testing with our classifier approach.  
All three websites currently have the most web traffic in their respective domains of 
‘Arts and Entertainment’, ‘Travel’ and ‘Shopping’ as shown by www.similarweb.com.  
We selected websites from three completely different industries, so that the linguistic 
markers identified would be less dependent on any particular context.  In IMDB, users 
commented on films, for TripAdvisor they wrote about tourist destinations and on 
Amazon they reviewed everyday products.  From each website we selected 18 films, 
tourist attractions and products, respectively.  Generally, our selection procedure was 
to first identify the films, tourist attractions and products with the most overall 
number of reviews.  We then singled out those that had the broadest ratings 
distributions (i.e. not predominantly positive or negative).  This was to ensure a 
reasonable sample size could be collected at each level of the star rating scale.  
Additionally, we were keen to select films, tourist attractions and products from wide 
mix of different genres, countries and categories (respectively).   
For each film, tourist attraction and product, we gathered the written text 
accompanying each star rating.  We aimed to collect 15,000 words for each level of 
star rating for all films, attractions and products.  Where this was not possible, we 
simply collected all the available reviews, ensuring a minimum of 3,000 words were 
sampled.  These were copied and pasted into a single text file.  For TripAdvisor and 
Amazon, reviews are rated on a 5-point scale, this resulted in 90 text files (18*5) from 
each website.  IMDB was a slight exception, where the star rating scale ranges from 1-
10 (not 1-5), so we generated 180 text files (18*10) for this website.   
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To reduce the IMDB 10-point scale to match with the Amazon and TripAdvisor 
5-point scales, we first aligned the absolute end-points.  For both scales, 1-star meant 
absolute negative.  Absolute positive is 10-stars for IMDB but was reassigned to 5 to 
match the TripAdvisor and Amazon 5-point scale (i.e. 1-star -> 1-star; 10-stars -> 5-
stars).  We next determined that the central values on the 10-point scale (that 
corresponding to ‘3’ on a 5-point scale) were between 5-6, these were reassigned as 3 
(i.e. 5-stars -> 3-stars; 6-stars -> 3-stars).  This meant that 2-4 stars on a 10-point scale, 
which are neither absolutely negative, nor central, corresponded to 2-stars on a 5-
point scale.  Similarly, ratings 7-9 stars on a 10-point scale, which are neither 
absolutely positive, nor central, corresponded to 4-stars on a 5-point scale.  This 
realignment achieved our main objective of preserving the integrity of the absolute 
end-points (e.g. not combining 9-stars with 10-stars, as 9-stars is not an absolute). 
 
5.3.2. Data-Analysis in R 
We used R programming language (R Development Core Team, 2010) to conduct the 
text analysis and measure function word usage by dividing text into unigrams (single 
words).  For our training set, we identified unigrams which best differentiated 
between absolute and moderate natural language.  These would then be used in 
machine learning classification, on an independent test set, to automatically label text 
as either absolute or moderate.   
 
5.3.2.1. Pre-processing Data 
Text analysis and pre-processing was performed using the quanteda Package (Benoit 
et al., 2016) in R.  We first divided our data into a training and test set (70:30 split), we 
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used a stratified partition to ensure that the proportions of the different groups (i.e. 
absolute/moderate; positive/negative) were comparable in both the training and test 
sets.  Both sets were then tokenized (separated into individual words), and all tokens 
(words) were converted to lower case. 
In R, function words are termed ‘stop words’, as these are traditionally the 
words which data scientists remove from their analysis.  Stop words are commonly 
viewed as unimportant because they convey little content, therefore R has standard 
procedures for removing them.  By making slight alterations to these same 
procedures, we could retain stop words and remove all other words (content words) 
instead.   
 Tokens were then ‘stemmed’, this is a process which reduces words to their 
root form, for example, the words ‘argued’, ‘argues’ and ‘arguing’ would become 
‘argue’.  Tokens were also normalized by converting frequency counts for each token 
type into percentage prevalence values.  Importantly, the features on the test and 
training data sets must match; therefore, tokens which only appear in the test set 
were removed and tokens which only appear in the training set were added to the 
test set with a percentage prevalence score of 0. 
 
5.3.2.2. Feature Selection and Classification 
Machine learning and classification was implemented with the caret package (Kuhn, 
2008) in R.  Other functions, including data manipulation and visualization tools were 
retrieved from the CRAN library (R Core Team, 2014).   
A Gaussian naive Bayes classifier was used to classify absolute and moderate 
labelled reviews (Appendix 11-12).  Naive Bayes is a probabilistic classifier based on 
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applying Bayes’ theorem and assumes independence between features.  This classifier 
was used because it is simple, predicts between categories, and is particularly suited 
when the dimensionality of inputs is high, as is the case with text analysis (Scikit-learn, 
2016). 
Each function word token was treated as an independent predictor, and its 
importance was evaluated individually.  Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve 
analysis was conducted on each predictor, plotting their true positive rate against the 
false positive rate for a range of discrimination thresholds.  The area under the curve 
(AUC) of the ROC was used as the metric for variable importance.  Function words 
were then ranked according to their importance and sequentially incorporated into 
the classifier to determine how many of these linguistic markers are required to 
satisfactorily discriminate between absolute and moderate natural language.  This is 
done via cross-validation, a process that partitions data into ‘training’ and ‘test’ sets.  
The training set was used to identify the most important features, and to train the 
naive Bayes classifier.  The ‘test’ set is used only to examine the predictive accuracy of 
the trained classifier.  More important than the classification accuracy is the Cohens 
Kappa statistic, which compares the observed accuracy with the expected accuracy 
(random chance), thereby taking into account prior probabilities.  Generally, a kappa 
greater than 0.75 is considered ‘excellent’ (Fleiss, 1981).  We thus obtain classification 
accuracies for models with increasing numbers of features.   
 
5.3.2.3. Feature Selection and Classification of Valence 
Our main objective was to examine content-free function words as markers for the 
style of responses (absolute/moderate).  For the purpose of comparison, we 
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conducted an additional feature selection and classification analysis of the valence 
content of responses (positive/negative) using the same data and methodology.  
Reviews paired with 1-2 stars were labelled negative, and reviews with 4-5 stars were 
labelled positive. 
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Unigrams and classification 
Based on ROC curves, we identified tokens (unigrams) which were most predictive of 
moderate and absolute reviews (Figure 5.1).  The Kappa values for trained models 
with increasing numbers of linguistics features are shown in Figure 5.2.  Interestingly, 
the top three features alone (the words “but”, “seem” and exclamation marks) can be 
used to adequately distinguish absolute and moderate natural language in the test set 
(kappa = 0.73).  The best classification accuracy is achieved by including the top 25-34 
features (kappa = 0.76-0.80).  There is then a precipitous drop in classifier 
performance when more than 34 features are added to the model, this is referred to 
as ‘over-fitting’, and occurs when new features add more noise than signal. 
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Figure 5.1  The top 31 tokens (unigrams) which are most predictive of absolute and moderate reviews.  
The size of font reflects the order of importance as designated by the ROC curve values for each 
unigram.  The tokens specific to absolute reviews are in red, while the tokens specific to moderate 
reviews are in green. 
 
Figure 5.2  Cohens Kappa accuracy values for classifiers with increasing features as ranked by the 
receiver operating characteristic curve analysis. 
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5.4.2 Unigram natural language markers - absolutism 
The highest kappa was obtained using the top 31 linguistic features (Figure 5.2), of 
these, 11 are specific to absolute reviews and 20 are specific to moderate reviews 
(Figure 5.1).  We combined the absolute words into a single dictionary to analyse their 
distribution across the 5-point rating scale.  This was done using the Linguistic Inquiry 
and Word Count software (LIWC; Pennebaker, Booth, Boyd, & Francis, 2015), which 
calculates the percentage prevalence of words.  To analyze the data, a linear mixed-
effects modeling approach was adopted (see Appendix 1 for the SPSS syntax script).  
This is the recommended analysis method for this type of data structure (Baayen, 
Davidson, & Bates, 2008).  Our fixed factor is the star ratings and our random factor is 
the websites.  Mixed-effects models consider both fixed and random effects and can 
be used to assess the influence of the fixed effects on the dependent variable after 
accounting for random effects (namely, correlated residuals in star ratings from the 
same website).  We found a significant main effect for the absolutist words with 
respect to the star rating factor F(4, 327) = 40.01, p < .001.  There was also a 
significant main effect for websites F(2, 327) = 216.97, p < .001, but no significant 
interaction between star ratings and websites F(8, 327) = 1.12, p = .35.  Paired 
comparisons with a Bonferroni correction for star ratings found that 1-star reviews (M 
= 2.07%, SD = .60) had significantly more absolutist words than 2 (M = 1.39%, SD = .52, 
p < .001), 3 (M = 1.46%, SD = .52, p < .001) and 4 (M = 1.30%, SD = .54, p < .001) star 
reviews; but crucially were not significantly different from 5-star reviews (M = 2.12%, 
SD = .71, p = .74).  Similarly, 5-star reviews also had significantly more absolutist words 
than 2 (p < .001), 3 (p < .001) and 4 (p < .001) star reviews.  There was no significant 
difference in the prevalence of classifier absolutist words between 2, 3 and 4-star 
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reviews (p’s > .46; Figure 5.3).  Paired comparisons for the random factor of website 
found that the prevalence of classifier absolute words was significantly different 
between all three websites (p’s < .001).  However, there was no interaction between 
websites and star ratings (Figure 5.3).   
 
5.4.3 Unigram natural language markers - moderation 
We combined the 20 remaining classifier moderate words into a single dictionary to 
analyse their distribution across the 5-point rating scale using the LIWC.  We ran a 
linear mixed effects model, with star ratings as the fixed factor and websites as a 
random factor.  We found a significant main effect for the classifier moderate words 
with respect to the star rating factor F(4, 327) = 36.47, p < .001).  There was also a 
significant main effect for websites F(1, 327) = 33.07, p < .001, and no significant 
interaction between ratings and websites F(8, 327) = 1.18,  p = .31.  Paired 
comparisons for star ratings found that 1-star reviews (M = 4.19%, SD = .52, p < .001) 
had significantly fewer moderate words than 2 (M = 4.97%, SD = .58, p < .001), 3 (M = 
5.15%, SD = .59, p < .001) and 4 (M = 5.19%, SD = .65, p < .001) star reviews; but 
crucially, were not significantly different from 5-star reviews (M = 4.36%, SD = .56, p = 
.91.  Similarly, 5-star reviews also had significantly fewer moderate words than 2 (p < 
.001), 3 (p < .001) and 4 (p < .001) star reviews (Figure 5.3).  Paired comparisons for 
the random factor of website found that the prevalence of classifier absolute words 
was significantly different between all three websites (p’s < .001).  However, there was 
no interaction between websites and star ratings (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.3  Prevalence of absolute and moderate words, across different star ratings for IMDB, Amazon 
and TripAdvisor websites. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
5.4.4 Unigrams and Classification of Valence 
Based on ROC curves, we identified tokens (unigrams) which were most predictive of 
positive and negative reviews (Figure 5.4).  The Kappa values for trained models with 
increasing numbers of linguistics features are shown in Figure 5.5.  Overall, the 
classification accuracies for valence are lower than those for absolute and moderate 
ratings.  None of the models achieved a kappa value of 0.75, the standard for excellent 
classifiers set by Fleiss (1981).  This reveals that function words are better markers for 
the style of responses (absolute/moderate) than for the content of responses 
(positive/negative). 
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Figure 5.4 The top 30 tokens (unigrams) which are most predictive of positive and negative reviews.  
The size of font reflects the order of importance as designated by the ROC curve values for each 
unigram.  The tokens specific to positive reviews are in orange, while the tokens specific to negative 
reviews are in blue. 
 
  
Figure 5.5  Cohens Kappa accuracy values for classifiers with increasing features as ranked by the 
receiver operating characteristic curve analysis. 
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5.5 Discussion 
5.5.1. Unigrams and Machine Learning 
Our feature selection process identified 31 unigrams which most distinguish absolute 
natural language from moderate natural language in review comments.  Of these, 11 
were specifically more prevalent in absolute review comments and 20 were 
specifically more prevalent in moderate review comments.  The classifier’s absolutist 
words include ‘ever’, ‘never’ and ‘anyone’, which are defined as ‘at any time’, ‘at no 
time’ and ‘any person’, respectively, therefore all denoting absolutes.  Also included 
are the determiners ‘my’, ‘you’ and ‘your’, which determine the reference for a noun 
group.  There are two negations “can’t” and “doesn’t”, which are used in categorical 
imperatives.  The final linguistic feature is ‘exclamation marks’, which are used as 
intensifiers.   
For the moderate words included in the classifier, ‘but’, ‘though’, ‘despite’, 
‘other’ and ‘however’ are all used to introduce nuance or exception.  The words 
‘much’ and ‘more’ both refer to large amounts.  The words ‘rather’, ‘somewhat’ 
‘sometime’ and ‘some’ all specify a moderate extent or amount.  The moderate words 
‘seem’ ‘maybe’ and ‘probable’ have a vague noncommittal property and the word 
‘overall’ seeks to combine separate components.  Finally, it was surprising to find that 
the word ‘certain’ is specific to moderate reviews as certainty is absolutist.  Analysis of 
‘certain’ used in context reveals that it is used to specify subcomponents (e.g. “certain 
aspects”) rather than relating a state of total confidence (e.g. being certain). 
Throughout, we have used the term absolute rather than ‘extreme’ as we 
believe, and have previously demonstrated (Al-Mosaiwi & Johnstone, 2018) that there 
is a qualitative difference between words that convey absolutes and words that 
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convey large extents (or extremes).  This can also be gleaned here, where the words 
‘much’ and ‘more’, which denote large amounts, are actually markers specific to 
moderation as opposed to absolutism. 
 Using these 31 predictors, our classifier test performance accuracy is greater 
than 90% with a Kappa greater than 0.80.  This is considered excellent by prominent 
guidelines for classifier accuracy (e.g., Fleiss, 1981).  Interestingly, good classifier 
performance was achieved using any number of features from the top 3-35, as 
defined by Fleiss (1981).  There is therefore flexibility for researchers in selecting 
linguistic features that measure absolute/moderate natural language in text. 
In this study, we have restricted our feature selection to stop words/function 
words, unlike the majority of other text analysis classifiers.  We believe this will 
improve the generalizability of our classifier as it is not dependent on subject specific 
content or sentiment analysis.   
 For both absolutist and moderate words, we found an effect of website 
(random factor) but no interaction between websites and the star ratings.  This means 
that although the percentage frequency of these words varied between different 
contexts (i.e. films, tourist attractions and products), the relative distribution across 
the rating scales remains the same.  The similar distribution pattern of predictors 
across the rating scales, for all the websites, affirms our intention to identify 
generalizable linguistic markers for absolute and moderate text.  Moreover, we found 
there was no significant difference in percentage prevalence for absolute words and 
moderate words between absolute positive (5-stars) and absolute negative (1-star) 
natural language reviews.  Our predictors are therefore independent of valence. This 
is a necessary quality for generalizable absolute/moderate natural language markers.  
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Finally, we found that the percentage prevalence of absolute words was only 
significantly elevated at absolute end-point reviews and that there was no significant 
difference between moderate 2-4 star ratings.  This was not the case for moderate 
words, which were not as discriminating. 
 As detailed in the introduction, there are practical applications for these 
linguistic markers of absolute and moderate responding.  They could be employed by 
researchers to estimate absolute and moderate language in qualitative natural 
language data.  This could be done for various groups of interest, possibly in an 
observational study design.  Such an analysis would be more informative than 
counting absolute responses on Likert scales, and significantly more ecologically valid.  
In this way, previous findings relating to absolute and moderate response style, which 
have relied exclusively on Likert scales, could be supported or challenged via a 
linguistic analysis.  This is especially important as many of these findings are 
contentious and consequential. 
 
5.5.2 Limitations and Future Directions 
In this study, we used review websites as they conveniently provide both natural 
language and a Likert type rating scale, which allows us to establish convergent 
validity.  However, more work is needed to confirm or amend the features identified 
in this study based on a wider variety of writing topics and formats (e.g. narrative 
writing).  We employed a simple naive Bayes classifier because it is easy to train and 
produces excellent results, however, more sophisticated algorithms would no doubt 
further improve the classification accuracy.  Although, sophisticated classification 
models can be difficult to interpret and suffer from over fitting.  Also, in this study we 
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made no distinction between extreme and moderate ratings in the classification 
problem.  Future work may seek to classify absolute vs. extreme natural language.  
Finally, just as there are possibly cultural differences in response styles on Likert 
scales, this may also be the case for absolute and moderate language use.  While the 
use of absolutist words have previously been shown to reflect absolutist thinking (Al-
Mosaiwi & Johnstone, 2018), whether this is impacted by cultural differences is not 
clear. 
 
5.5.3 Author Contributions  
M. Al-Mosaiwi created the research design, collected, analyzed, and interpreted the 
data under the supervision of T. Johnstone. M. Al-Mosaiwi drafted the manuscript, 
and T. Johnstone provided critical revisions. 
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Chapter 6: The Prevalence of Absolutist Words Between 
Cultures 
 
6.1 Introduction 
An extreme response style is the tendency to select the extreme end-points on Likert 
scales.  While in the literature it is commonly termed extreme responding, here we 
will use the term absolute, as it is more accurate.  It is believed that certain 
cultures/ethnicities are more prone to absolutist responding, and correspondingly 
there are cultures/ethnicities believed to be less prone.  A series of studies have found 
that black Americans are more prone to absolute responding on Likert scales than 
white Americans (Bachman and O’Malley, 1984; Bachman et al., 2010; Bachman et al., 
2011).  Additionally, several studies have also shown that Latin American/Mexican 
cultures were also more prone to an absolutist response style compares to white 
Americans (Davis, Resnicow and Couper, 2011; Rao, 2009; Weech-Maldonado, 2008).  
In contrast, studies have found that Asian Americans/Japanese Americans are less 
disposed to an absolutist response style (Liu, Conrad and Lee, 2017; Johnson, 2005; 
Zax and Takahashi, 1967; Hamamura, 2008)  
An implicit suggestion in this research is that the response style differences 
signal differences in thinking.  However, we believe that measuring absolute 
responding/thinking on Likert scales lack ecological validity.  A more sophisticated 
method has already been described in chapter 2, therefore in this study we aim to 
determine whether the findings described can be replicated though a text analysis of 
the natural language of these groups.  We will run our absolutist dictionary from 
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chapter 2, and the classifier absolute and moderate words dictionaries from chapter 2.  
To replicate previous findings in the literature, with this new more sophisticated 
method, we would expect to see a higher prevalence of absolutist words in the natural 
language of black and Latin American cultures compared to white Americans.  
Moreover, we would also expect to see lower levels of absolutist words in Asian 
American natural language compared to all the other groups.  Correspondingly, we 
would expect to see this pattern in reverse for the moderate words identified in 
chapter 2. 
 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Data collection and processing 
In this study, we set out to collect the natural language text data in 200 different 
blogs, authored by individuals belonging to one of three ethnicity/culture groups 
(White, Black, Asian American, Latin American), this meant collecting 50 blogs for each 
group.  The blogs in each group covered a wide range of different topics including 
entertainment, culture, news, beauty, family, fashion, food, health, patenting, politics, 
relationships, travel, lifestyle, parenting and technology.  We aimed to have each topic 
covered in all the groups, with approximately equal proportions.  Blogs were located 
through a Google search for blogger in each culture group (e.g. “black bloggers”).  This 
often found websites that had listed such bloggers, we systematically went through 
such lists as we could find to locate suitable bloggers.  A blog was included if it 
supplied a minimum of 200 words of natural language, covered on of the topics listed 
above, was authored by a representative member of that groups culture/ethnicity and 
was a blog rather than a more officious and profession news outlet.  The 
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culture/ethnicity of the authors was determined by visually inspecting their picture on 
the blog, in the rare cases where a picture was not apparent, we looked for other 
signs, such as explicit mentions (e.g. “as a black x…”).  Once an appropriate blog was 
located, we copied the natural language text and pated it into a text document ready 
for subsequent analysis, this was done 50 times for each group.  The text documents 
underwent word counting analysis using the Linguistic inquiry and word count 
software (LIWC).  We ran our absolutist dictionary, which was constructed in chapter 
2, as well as the classified absolutist dictionary and classifier moderate dictionary 
described in chapter 2. 
 
6.3 Results 
With respect to the percentage prevalence of absolutist words, there was no 
statistical difference between groups as determined by a one-way ANOVA (F(3,196) = 
1.381, p = .25).  This is confirmed by paired comparisons which found no significant 
difference between any of the groups (Figure 6.1; p’s > .464). 
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Figure 6.1 Mean percentage of absolutist words in blog posts for different cultural 
groups.  Error bars indicate ± 95% confidence intervals.   
 
Similarly, for the percentage prevalence of classifier absolutist words, there was no 
statistical difference between groups as determined by a one-way ANOVA (F(3,196) = 
1.631, p = .183).  This is confirmed by paired comparisons which found no significant 
difference between any of the groups (Figure 6.2; p’s > .188).  For the percentage 
prevalence of classifier moderate words, there was a statistical difference between 
groups as determined by a one-way ANOVA (F(3,196) = 3.748, p = .0.12).  Paired 
comparisons found that Latin American blogs used significantly fewer moderate words 
(M = 1.36%, SD = .56) than ‘White’ blogs (M = 1.78%, SD = 0.74; p = .014; Figure 6.3)  
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Figure 6.2 Mean percentage of ‘classifier’ absolutist words in blog posts for different 
cultural groups.  Error bars indicate ± 95% confidence intervals.   
 
Figure 6.3 Mean percentage of ‘classifier’ moderate words in blog posts for different 
cultural groups.  Error bars indicate ± 95% confidence intervals.   
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6.4 Discussion 
For the most part, we have not replicated the findings of previous studies, showing a 
significantly greater tendency for absolute responding in black and Latin American 
cultures compared to white American culture.  Also, we have not found a significantly 
lower tendency for absolute responding in Asian American culture compared to the 
other tested cultures.  With regard to moderate words, we did find that natural 
language by Latin American authors did contain fewer moderate words than the 
natural language authored by white Americans which is consistent with our 
expectations based on previous research, however no other significant differences 
were found.  Although we found only one difference between the groups which met 
the significance threshold, the overall pattern of results was consistent with what we 
expected based on previous literature.  Namely, white and Asian American groups 
used more moderate word and fewer absolutist words.  Perhaps with a larger sample, 
this difference may reach the significance threshold. 
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Chapter 7: Absolute Positive or Extreme Positive – Which is 
Preferred? 
 
7.1 Chapter Overview 
Thus far, we have examined the relationship between absolutist thinking and various 
symptoms of affective disorder.  We have also assessed and contrasted different 
methods for measuring absolutist thinking.  In this chapter, we will investigate the 
prevalence of absolutism in community samples.  We compare absolute and extreme 
thinking in a behavioural paradigm, and examine the physiological impact elicited by 
absolute vs. extreme statements. 
We find, that when given the choice, participants strongly prefer extreme (but 
not absolute) positive statements over those that are absolute.  This demonstrates 
that participants are clearly able to distinguish the two and that they dislike 
absolutism.  The second study employed psychophysiological measures of skin 
conductance response and heart rate variability.  This study found that absolute 
positive statements elicited significantly lower amplitudes, greater latency and greater 
dispersion.  This suggests that absolute positive statements induced a state of 
confusion in participants relative to extreme positive statements. 
 
7.2 Introduction 
Absolutist thinking, is characterised by a belief which is unqualified by any nuance and 
independent of context.  Extreme thinking, a belief which is extreme (but not 
absolutist), is the closest thinking style to absolutist thinking.  Therefore, for the most 
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part, the only difference between extreme and absolutist thinking is that extreme 
thinking is not absolutist.  In our first study, we aim to determine the extent to which 
participants are repelled specifically by absolutism.  To do this, we contrast absolutist 
beliefs with extreme ones, as ask participants to select which the most/least prefer.  
This is done for both positively and negatively valenced beliefs.  We predict that 
participants will prefer extremely positive statements over absolutely positive ones. 
Our beliefs may express absolute probabilities (e.g. absolute certainty) or they 
mat express absolute magnitudes (e.g. the extent of something is absolute).  We set 
out to discover whether individuals are more likely to endorse absolute probabilities 
or magnitudes, here we had no specific hypothesis.  
Participants selected absolute or extreme beliefs with respect to different 
scenes.  Some of these scenes were social in nature (e.g. party), others were related to 
achievement (e.g. exam) and the remainder depicted what we term ‘core needs’ (e.g. 
doctors office).  Core needs relate to the basic necessities of life, such as safety, health 
and employment.  We predicted that participants may be more disposed to being 
absolutist with respect to core needs, than for social or achievement situations.  This 
is because core needs, as the name suggests, are fundamental requirements and so an 
absolutist attitude towards them may be more likely. 
In our second study, we aimed to determine how absolutist beliefs impact our 
physiology.  We simply recorded skin conductance response and heart rate in 
participants, while they are presented with absolute and extreme beliefs.  Skin 
conductance in an individual varies depending on the activity of their sweat glands, 
which are in turn controlled by the sympathetic nervous system.  For this reason, it is 
believed that skin conductance measures psycho-physiological arousal.  We expected 
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that absolute beliefs would result in a higher skin conductance level and possibly a 
higher frequency of non-specific skin conductance responses.  That is, both positive 
and negative absolute statements will result in greater arousal.  This is consistent with 
theories of fight and flight (an instinct also controlled by the sympathetic nervous 
system), fight or flight situation induce high arousal and are generally not 
characterised as nuanced. 
 
7.3 STUDY 1 
7.3.1 Method 
7.3.1.1 Participants 
A total of 46 undergraduate students were recruited from the University of Reading 
School of Psychology and Clinical Language Studies in exchange for course credit.  
Participants were predominantly female (88%) with an age range of 18-36 (Mean age 
= 20 years, SD = 5.84 years).  Some level of depression, anxiety or stress was reported 
by 45.9% of the sample.  All participants were recruited through the SONA system, 
which is an online portal that we used to advertise our study to internal students, 
manage sign-ups and reward participants with course credits.  The study was reviewed 
by the University Research Ethics Committee and has been given a favorable ethical 
opinion for conduct.  All participants read and signed an information sheet and 
consent form prior to participation. 
 
7.3.1.2 Materials 
Ten different images depicting everyday scenes (e.g. taking an exam, going on a blind 
date, starting a new job) were paired with captions that provide some explicit 
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information about the image (e.g. “Entering an important exam”, “Evaluating your 
date”, “Starting a new job”).  The images (plus captions) were designed to set up 
different scenes that were not overly positive or negative.  For each scene, we 
constructed absolutely positive statements (e.g. “I’m 100% confident this exam will be 
a total success”), absolutely negative statements (e.g. “I’m 100% confident this exam 
will be a total failure”), extremely positive statements (e.g. “I’m fairly confident this 
exam will be a huge success”) and extremely negative statements (e.g. “I’m fairly 
confident this exam will be a huge failure”).  This means that for each scene (e.g. 
exam), there are four different statements.  The statements were designed to be 
syntactically similar, but semantically different.  Moreover, there statements were 
also designed to contain a probability portion (e.g. “I’m fairly confident…”) and a 
magnitude portion (e.g. “this exam will be a huge failure”).  Participants were told that 
these were “self-talk statements; things you might say to yourself in a given situation”.  
In the first part of the study, the absolutely positive statements were paired with the 
extremely positive statements for each scene, to form the main contrast for this study 
(Contrast 1).  The absolutely negative statements were paired with the extremely 
negative statements to form the second contrast for this study (Contrast 2).   
 
Contrast 1: Absolute Positive Statement vs. Extremely Positive Statement 
Contrast 2: Absolute Negative Statement vs. Extremely Negative Statement 
 
In the second part of the study, each statement was separated into two fragments, 
one fragment contained the probability portion (e.g. “I’m fairly confident…”), and the 
other fragment contained the magnitude portion (e.g. “this exam will be a huge 
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failure”).  This means that for each scene (e.g. exam), where there had been four 
different statements, there were now eight different statement fragments.   
 
Contrast 1:  
Absolute Positive Probability Fragment 
Absolutely Positive Magnitude Fragment 
Extreme Positive Probability Fragment 
Extreme Positive Magnitude Fragment 
Contrast 2:  
Absolute Negative Probability Fragment 
Absolutely Negative Magnitude Fragment 
Extreme Negative Probability Fragment 
Extreme Negative Magnitude Fragment 
 
Finally, the scenes were categorized into three groups; ‘Social’ (Date, Party, New Job), 
‘Core’ (Doctor, Mugging, Unemployment), ‘Achievement’ (Future goals, Interview, 
exam, presentation). 
 
7.3.1.3 Procedure 
The first part of the study was separated into two blocks for contrast 1 and contrast 2.  
In the first block, participants were presented with statements from contrast 1.  For 
each of the 10 scenes, participants were asked to decide which of the two statements 
describes the way they “would most prefer to think?”.  Participants made selections, 
by pressing “a” or “b” on a keyboard, corresponding with the statement they wanted 
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to select.  In the second block, participants were presented with statements from 
contrast 2 and were asked to decide which of the two statements describes the way 
they “would least prefer to think?”.  There were no time restraints in either block; the 
experiment was delivered using E-prime 2.0 software, and the images depicting the 
scenes were located using google search (e.g. “exam pictures”). 
The second part of the study, was also separated into two blocks for contrast 1 
statement fragments and contrast 2 statement fragments.  In order to have a 
complete statement, participants needed to select a probability (e.g. “I’m fairly 
confident…”) and a magnitude fragment (e.g. “this exam will be a huge failure”).  
These could both be absolutist, both extreme, or some mixture.  In the first block, 
statement fragments from contrast 1 were presented for each scene and participants 
were asked to construct the statement they “would most prefer to think?”.  
Participants made their selections, by pressing “a”, “b”, “c” or “d” on a keyboard, 
corresponding with the statement fragments they wanted to select.  In order to 
construct a full statement, they must select at least two fragments.  This was repeated 
in the second block for statement fragments from contrast 2, this time participants 
were asked to construct the statement they “would least prefer to think?”   
 
7.3.1.4 Measures 
Attribution Style Questionnaire.  The ASQ (Peterson et al., 1982) presents scenarios for 
six positive and six negative outcomes (Appendix 16).  Participants are instructed to 
make causal attributions for the outcomes and rate those causes on three 7-point 
scales: External/Internal (1 totally due to other people or circumstances, 7 totally due 
to me), Unstable/Stable (1 will never again be present, 7 will always be present), and 
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Specific/Global (1 influences just this particular situation, 7 influences all situations in 
my life).  We calculated the total score for each of the positive and negative subscales 
separately.  A high score on the ASQ negative subscale is purported to be 
depressogenic, while a high score on the ASQ positive subscale is purported to be 
protective against depressive symptoms.  Our primary interest in administering this 
questionnaire was to measure absolute responding, which is calculated by summing 
the total number of absolute responses (i.e. 1 and 7 on the 7-point Likert scales).  This 
resulted in an overall ASQ absolute responding score.  We also calculated 
“explanatory flexibility”, which is operationalized by Fresco, Rytwinski and Craighead 
(2007) as the standard deviation of each participant’s responses to the stable and 
global subscales, for negative events on the ASQ.  Like absolute responding, 
explanatory flexibility is said to be an indicator of participant flexibility, we would 
therefore expect a negative correlation between these metrics (i.e. high explanatory 
flexibility = low absolute responding). 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale.  The DAS (Weissman, 1979) is designed to assess 
dysfunctional beliefs relating to social dependency, prerequisites for happiness, and 
perfectionism among other things (Appendix 17).  It presents 40 statements to which 
participants respond on a 7-point scale (totally disagree to totally agree).  A high score 
on the DAS suggests a high level of dysfunctional attitudes and consequently a greater 
vulnerability to depression.  Our primary interest in administering this scale was to 
measure absolute responding; this was again calculated by summing the total number 
of absolute responses (i.e. 1 totally agree and 7 totally disagree).  This resulted in an 
overall DAS absolute responding score. 
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Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale.  The DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is 
a 42-item self-report measure which assesses the presence of depression (DASS-D), 
anxiety (DASS-A), and stress (DASS-S) symptoms (Appendix 21).  Participants are asked 
to rate on a four-point scale how much each statement applied to them over the past 
week, scaling from 0 (does not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much or 
most of the time).  The DASS has demonstrated good reliability and validity in non-
clinical and clinical populations (Antony et al., 1998; Crawford and Henry, 2003).  
Cronbach’s α for the Depression, Anxiety and Stress subscales were .96, .89, and .93, 
respectively (Brown et al., 1997). 
 
7.3.2 Results 
7.3.2.1 Part 1 Descriptive 
For contrast 1, we found that participants selected the absolute positive statements as 
the most preferred option 26.72% (SD = 20.33) of the time and extreme positive 
statements 73.38% (SD = 20.33) of the time.  For contrast 2, participants selected the 
absolute negative statements as the least preferred option 77.30% (SD = 30.94) of the 
time and extreme negative statements 22.71% (SD = 30.94) of the time.  Therefore, 
participants believed that extreme positive statements were the most preferred way 
to think and absolute negative statements as the least preferred way to think. 
 
7.3.2.2 Comparing ‘social’, ‘core’ and ‘achievement’ 
Paired samples t-tests for the number of absolute positive statements selections in 
contrast 1, found significantly fewer absolute positive statements in social (M = 5.62%, 
SD = 7.81) than core (M = 10.01%, SD = 10.49) groups (t(44) = 2.379, p = .022).  As well 
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as social and achieve (M = 11.11%, SD = 10.74) groups (t(44) = 2.394, p = .021).  There 
were no significant differences between core and achieve groups (t(44) = .904, p = 
.371).  Paired samples t-tests for the number of absolute negative statements 
selections in contrast 2, found no significance differences between social (M = 23.10%, 
SD = 10.03) and core (M = 22.97%, SD = 10.82) groups (t(44) = .256, p = .800), social 
and achieve (M = 31.37%, SD = 12.54) groups (t(44) = .428, p = .671) and also no 
significant difference between core and achieve groups (t(44) = .558, p = .580). 
 
7.3.2.3 Part 2 Descriptive 
For contrast 1, we found that participants selected the absolute positive statements as 
the most preffered option 32.45% (SD = 21.55) of the time and extreme positive 
statements 67.55% (SD = 21.55) of the time.  For contrast 2, participants selected the 
absolute negative statements as the least preffered option 77.89% (SD = 24.20) of the 
time and extreme negative statements 22.11% (SD = 24.20) of the time.  Therefore, 
once again participants believed that extreme positive statements were the most 
preferred way to think and absolute negative statements as the least preferred way to 
think. 
 
7.3.2.4 Comparing ‘social’, ‘core’ and ‘achievement’ 
Paired samples t-tests for the number of absolute positive statements selections in 
contrast 1, found significantly fewer absolute positive statements in social (M = 8.00%, 
SD = 6.86) than the core (M = 11.88%, SD = 7.41) group (t(44) = 3.875, p < .000).  There 
was no significant difference between social and achieve (M = 12.50%, SD = 10.31) 
groups (t(44) = 1.614, p = .114) however there was between core and achieve group 
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(t(44) = 2.594, p = .013).  Paired samples t-tests for the number of absolute negative 
statements selections in contrast 2, found a significance differences between social (M 
= 24.44%, SD = 9.12) and core (M = 21.67%, SD = 7.83) group (t(44) = 2.891, p = .006).  
There was no significant difference between social and achieve (M = 31.77%, SD = 
9.66) group (t(44) = .596, p = .554) however there was between core and achieve 
group (t(44) = 2.702, p = .01). 
 
7.3.2.5 Probability and Magnitude 
For contrast 1, we found that 46% of participants constructed statements from 
fragments that were both extremely positive and only 11% of participants constructed 
statements from fragments that were both absolutely positive.  Moreover, 24% of 
participants chose an absolute magnitude and an extreme probability fragment to 
construct statements, while 17% constructed statements using an absolute probability 
fragment and an extreme magnitude fragment.  For contrast 2, we found that 8% of 
participants constructed statements from fragments that were both extremely 
negative and only 69% of participants constructed statements from fragments that 
were both absolutely negative.  Moreover, 8% of participants chose an absolute 
magnitude and an extreme probability fragment to construct statements, while 15% 
constructed statements using an absolute probability fragment and an extreme 
magnitude fragment. 
 
7.3.2.6 Questionnaires correlations 
For the DAS, ASQ and DASS, we found that there was no significant correlation 
between the DAS and the ASQ negative subscale r(44) = −0.285 , p = .058, nor the ASQ 
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positive subscale r(44) = .089 , p = .563.  There was a stronger correlation in response 
style, specifically, absolute responding between the DAS and the ASQ (r(44) = .668 , p 
< .001).  Participants made absolute responses at both ends of these scales, that is, 
both absolute adaptive responses and absolute mal-adaptive responses, as defined by 
the measures (DAS and ASQ) themselves.  We found that explanatory flexibility 
(variance in the ASQ) was positively correlated with both absolute responding on the 
DAS r(44) = .575, p > .001, and absolute responding on the ASQ itself r(44) = .819, p < 
.001.   
 
7.3.3 Discussion 
Extreme statements are preferred to absolute statements.  Our results find that 
participants would prefer to be extremely, but not absolutely, positive.  Ostensibly, it 
may have been predicted that since absolute positivity is objectively more positive 
than extreme positivity, participants could have preferred it.  That is, participants 
would have selected the most positive option, which is absolute positivity.  This is not 
what we find, indicating that individuals are willing to select less positive option which 
have other attractive features (i.e. more realistic or rational).  Naturally, we found that 
absolute negativity was the “least preferred way to think”, this asymmetry highlights 
the point further.  While participants deemed absolute negativity the least preferred 
way to think, they did not correspondingly believe that absolute positivity was the 
most preferred way to think. 
We identified that probability and magnitude claims are two of the principal 
ways in which individuals could be absolutist.  In part 2 of study 1, our aim was to 
identify whether participants were more disposed to be absolutist about probability 
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or magnitude.  Our findings show that more participants were likely to endorse 
absolute positive magnitude statement fragments as the most preferred way to think 
(24%), than absolute positive probabilities statement fragments (17%).  
Correspondingly, in contrast two, participants were more likely to endorse absolute 
negative probability statement fragments as the least preferred way to think (15%) 
compared to absolute negative magnitude statement fragments (8%).  Overall, this 
shows that where absolutism was endorsed, it was more likely to be endorsed for 
magnitude rather than probability. 
We also found that participants were less likely to endorse absolute 
statements in scenes depicting social situations (e.g. party) than those depicting 
achievement or a core scene.  We cannot conclude too much from this finding as it is 
not what we had expected, we predicted that core scenes, due to their importance, 
may encourage participants to be more absolutist.   
All participants completed the DAS and the ASQ. The former measures 
maladaptive attitudes and the latter measures maladaptive attributions, both 
purported to be cognitive vulnerabilities for depression.  Consequently, we expected 
that the items on these measures would correlate.  It was surprising therefore that 
our results show no significant correlation between these two measures.  While the 
content of the DAS and the ASQ did not reliably correlate, there was a consistent and 
large correlation in response style.  Specifically, absolute responding (selecting 1 + 7) 
on the DAS correlated with absolute responding on the ASQ.  While absolute 
responding scores on the DAS and ASQ have been calculated in past studies (e.g. 
Teasdale et al., 2001; Peterson et al., 2007; Beevers, Miller, Keitner and Ryan, 2003; 
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Ching and Dobson, 2009; Forand and Derubeis, 2015), we are not aware of any 
correlation coefficients previously reported.   
The standard deviation in ASQ scores on negative items (on the global and 
stable subscales) is said to reflect “explanatory flexibility”.  That is, low variation 
(standard deviation) in scores is considered an indication of maladaptive rigidity, while 
high variation is believed to denote adaptive flexibility.  Previously reported empirical 
data has shown that explanatory flexibility (rather than ASQ scores) moderate the 
relationship of negative life events to levels of self-reported depression symptoms 
(Fresco, Rytwinski & Craighead, 2007).  Paradoxically, we found that explanatory 
flexibility is positively correlated with absolute responding on the DAS and ASQ.  As a 
result, it may be necessary to amend our inferences regarding absolute responding 
and explanatory flexibility.  Previously it had been inferred that greater absolute 
responding on the ASQ and DAS also reflects more rigid thinking (e.g. Teasdale et al., 
2001; Peterson et al., 2007), this may need to be revised.  Alternatively, it may be that 
high variance on the ASQ may not actually reflect explanatory flexibility, as true 
flexibility is not well captured by simply calculating variance.  
 
7.3.3.1 Future work 
Regarding study 1, it may be interesting to replicate the findings using absolute 
positive and moderate negative statements (rather than extreme positive).  In this 
way, the cost of not selecting the absolute positive option is not a slightly less positive 
option, but an overtly negative statement.  This would better explore the extent to 
which participants are repelled by absolute positivity and attracted by perhaps more 
realistic options.  Secondly, it would be profitable to replicate the findings on the ASQ 
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and DAS with regard to correlated response style and incongruences between 
‘explanatory flexibility’ and absolute responding’, in a larger sample. 
 
7.4 STUDY 2 
7.4.1 Method 
7.4.1.1 Participants 
A total of 46 undergraduate students were recruited from the University of Reading 
School of Psychology and Clinical Language Studies in exchange for course credit.  
Participants were predominantly female (88%) with an age range of 18-36 (Mean age 
= 20 years, SD = 5.84 years).  Some level of depression, anxiety or stress was reported 
by 45.9% of the sample.  All participants were recruited through the SONA system, 
which is an online portal that we used to advertise our study to internal students, 
manage sign-ups and reward participants with course credits.  The study was reviewed 
by the University Research Ethics Committee and has been given a favorable ethical 
opinion for conduct.  All participants read and signed an information sheet and 
consent form prior to participation. 
 
7.4.1.2 Materials 
In study 2, we continued to use absolute positive/negative and extreme 
positive/negative statements as before, however these were now simplified to only 4-
5 words (e.g. “I’m certain to fail”).  Therefore, for each scene, there were 4 such 
statements, these were presented to participants individually, without images or 
captions.  The order of the statements of pseudorandomized and counterbalanced, 
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each appearing on the screen, for only 12 seconds.  There was also a 12 second inter-
stimulus interval (ISI) between each statement presentation, without jitter.  The 
stimulus was delivered using E-prime 2.0. 
 
7.4.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were led into a testing cubicle, were they could view the stimulus on a 
computer monitor.  They were asked to sit comfortably, and simply read the 
statements to themselves, as they appear on the screen.   Before the task began, they 
were asked to wash and dry their hands, as we fit skin conductance electrodes to their 
left hand distal phalanges.  They rested their arm on a cushion placed on their lap and 
their fingers hung freely off the edge.  We also attached a finger pulse measure on 
their right hand (index finger).  In this way, we recorded skin conductance and heart 
rate during the task.  The task lasted less than 8 minutes from start to finish (40*12). 
 
7.4.2 Results 
The skin conductance response (SCR) data was processed using the ‘Psycho-
Physiological Modelling’ (PSPM) program (Bach and Friston, 2013).  We employed a 
non-linear (flexible latency and duration; event-related) analysis method, with 
normalization and a ‘Butterworth’ bandpass filter.  We instituted a 17 second time 
window, this spanned the time from 2 seconds after stimulus presentation to 5 
seconds before the end of the ISI.  Our sample rate was 1k with a down sample of 10.  
Analysis was conducted using Matlab. 
We conducted paired comparisons between the SCR’s for absolute statements 
vs. extreme statements (collapsing for valence), as well as the SCR’s for positive 
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statements vs. negative statements (collapsing for absolutism status) and the 
interaction between absolutism status and valence.  We looked for difference in the 
SCR amplitudes, peak latency and dispersion, Table 7.1 displays the results of these 
paired contrasts. 
Table 7.1 Test statistics for differences between amplitude, peak latency and 
dispersion, between absolute and negative statements. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
mean sem t p df Contrast name 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-0.06 0.07 -0.8 0.427 43 Absol>Ext - Test: amplitude 
0.11 0.07 1.66 0.104 43 P>N - Test: amplitude 
0.08 0.05 1.54 0.1316 43 Inter - Test: amplitude 
-0.04 0.23 -0.19 0.8512 43 Absol>Ext - Test: peak latency 
0.38 0.22 1.76 0.0852 43 P>N - Test: peak latency 
-0.84 0.29 -2.87 0.0063* 43 Inter - Test: peak latency 
0.23 0.14 1.6 0.1168 43 Absol>Ext - Test: dispersion 
-0.29 0.17 -1.67 0.1024 43 P>N - Test: dispersion 
-0.44 0.17 -2.54 0.0148* 43 Inter - Test: dispersion 
Absol = Absolute statements (both positive and negative collapsed) 
Ext = Extreme statements (both positive and negative collapsed) 
*p < .05 
 
Running a contrast of absolute vs. extreme (collapsed across valence), shows no 
significant differences in amplitude (p = .427), latency (p = .851) or dispersion (p = 
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.117).  But there were a couple of significant interactions for peak latency (p = .006) 
and dispersion (p = .015), which we investigated in the next set of contrasts. 
 
To examine the interaction, we compared absolutely positive statements with 
extreme positive statements, and absolute negative statements with extreme 
negative statements.  This was done for SCR amplitudes, peak latency and dispersion 
(see Table 7.2). 
 
Table 7.2 Test statistics for differences between amplitude, peak latency and 
dispersion, between absolute positive and extreme positive statements. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
mean sem t p df Contrast name 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
-0.14 0.07 -2.04 0.0474 43 Ap>Ep - Test: amplitude 
0.02 0.1 0.21 0.835 43 An>En - Test: amplitude 
0.76 0.38 2.02 0.0491 43 Ap>Ep - Test: peak latency 
-0.84 0.36 -2.34 0.0242 43 An>En - Test: peak latency 
0.74 0.24 3.11 0.0033 43 Ap>Ep - Test: dispersion 
-0.27 0.19 -1.38 0.1762 43 An>En - Test: dispersion 
Ap = Absolute positive statements (both positive and negative collapsed) 
Ep = Extreme positive statements (both positive and negative collapsed) 
*p < .05 
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Looking at the difference between absolute vs. extreme within-valence results, it 
seems absolute positive conditions have significantly lower amplitude (p = .047), 
greater latency (p = .049) and greater dispersion (p = .003) than extreme positive.  One 
interpretation is that while extreme positive appraisals are straightforwardly a good 
thing, absolute positive appraisals are confusing to participants.  Superficially they are 
absolutely good, however we know from the behavioural data that participants don't 
like them.  It may be that this ambiguity would produce the observed later peak onset, 
greater dispersion and reduced amplitude.  Consistent with this is the lack of 
significance for negative valence (except latency).  This would be expected to be the 
case as both absolute and extreme negativity are both straightforwardly bad. 
Heart rate variability was analysed using the ‘Kubios’ (available 
at: http://kubios.uku.fi) software in combination with MATLAB.  Here we found that 
RMSSD (root mean square of successive differences) does not correlate with absolute 
responding nor with depression scores.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 167 of 341 
 
Chapter 8: Absolutely Positive or Moderately Negative – Which 
is the Better Way to Think? 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In western cultures, having a positive attitude and an optimistic outlook is at the core 
of pop-psychology.  This is perhaps best illustrated by the academy award winning 
song Ac-Cent-Tchu-Ate the positive (Johnny Mercer, 1944).  Recently inducted into the 
Library of Congress for its “cultural, artistic and historical significance to American 
society” (Library of Congress, 2015), the lyrics recommend an absolute positive 
thinking style: 
 
You’ve got to accentuate the positive; 
Eliminate the negative;  
Latch on to the affirmative;  
Don’t mess with Mister In-Between 
Don’t mess with Mister In-Between 
 
In this study, we examine the extent to which participants agree with the songs 
sentiment; namely, that it is desirable to encourage an absolute positive outlook and 
eliminate negativity.  By ‘absolute’, we mean a state of total positivity, removing all 
nuance, provisos and limitations.  To a greater or lesser extent, we all produce 
absolutist thoughts occasionally.  We are disposed to them, because their 
straightforward simplicity helps reduce cognitive load (Fiske and Taylor, 1984).  
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However, an absolute positive outlook could also be engendered through ideology; a 
basic belief that negativity is always unwelcome and absolute positivity leads to 
success. 
The Mercer song is delivered in the style of a sermon, which is fitting, as much 
of the contemporary promotion of positive thinking is derived from an Evangelical 
Protestant ethic.  For example, Norman Vincent Peale, the author of the highly 
influential and best-selling book “The Power of Positive Thinking” (1952), was a pastor 
at the Marble Collegiate Church in Manhattan.  His influence stretched to the Oval 
Office, as both a friend to Nixon and a personal mentor to Donald Trump.  Neither of 
whom are famed for their moderation, but Trump in particular cites Peale as a major 
influence.   
In addition to pastors, there are countless motivational speakers, lifestyle 
guru’s and success coaches that all advocate a similar form of positivity maximization 
and negativity elimination philosophy.  In her best-selling book The Secret (2007), 
Byrne advances this viewpoint through the popular pseudo-scientific “law of 
attraction”, which states that positive energy attracts positive energy.  Although 
support for this form of irrational and absolute positivity is mercifully limited in the 
scientific community, its prevalence in the general population is not well understood. 
In contrast, scientific proponents of positive thinking advocate a limited, 
rational and nuanced form of positivity.  Scheier and Carver (1993) on the power of 
positive thinking, concede that it is “possible to be too optimistic” and that optimism 
could be detrimental in uncontrollable situations.  Moreover, they argue that 
optimists are more likely to accept reality while pessimists deny negative situations 
exist – this suggests a radically different definition for positive thinking to that of pop-
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psychology.  Fredrickson (2005), another key advocate of positivity, argues that a 
“critical positivity ratio” greater than 11:1 (positive/negative) is maladaptive, signalling 
that there is some upper limit to positivity. 
 Empirically, too much positive thinking has repeatedly been linked to negative 
outcomes.  Oettingen (1996) finds that unrealistic positive thinking is linked to 
negative outcomes in weight-loss.  Baumeister (1989) finds that positive irrational 
beliefs “render the individual vulnerable to disconfirmation, which may be acutely 
unpleasant”.  Later, Baumeister et al., (2003) also demonstrate that boosting self-
esteem of pupils does not improve academic performance and can be 
counterproductive.  These findings were supported by Forsyth et al. (2007) who show 
that bolstering self-esteem of students resulted in worse exam scores for low 
achieving students.  Multiple studies have found that positive thinking hinders 
entrepreneurial success (e.g. Bergen and Bressler, 2011; Balasuriya, Muradoglu and 
Ayton, 2010; Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), they argue that overconfidence and 
unrealistic expectations should be tempered to improve outcomes.  Also in the social 
sphere, Anderson et al., (2006) finds that an inflated status and self-perception is 
associated with lower levels of social acceptance.  
In emotion regulation, a developing consensus appears to be that neither 
positivity nor negativity are absolutely beneficial or detrimental.  Hazlett, Molden and 
Sackett (2011) propose that individuals should shift flexibly between positive and 
negative thinking “based on the perceived value of each outlook”.  McNulty and 
Fincham (2012) describe how forgiveness, positive thinking, optimism and kindness 
can either benefit or harm well-being depending on the context.  This is supported by 
a concept which has been termed “defensive pessimism”, where individuals set low 
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expectations for stressful events to buffer anxiety and motivate preparation (Norem 
and Cantor, 1986).  Consistent with the emphasis on flexibility, defensive pessimism is 
highly sensitive to context.  For example, Shepperd, Oullette and Fernandez (1996) 
reveal that students progressively became more pessimistic as exams approached to 
“manage their anxiety”.  Finally, Wood, Perunovic and Lee (2009) found that repeating 
positive self-statements had a limited benefit to those that already had high self-
esteem, but was detrimental to those with low self-esteem. 
The link between positive thinking and good or bad outcomes appears to be 
strongly moderated by the factor of time.   Specifically, irrational positive beliefs 
appear to only be beneficial in the short term and detrimental in the long term (Taylor 
and Brown, 1988).  This is supported by Robins and Beer (2001) who found that 
although there were short term academic benefits to positive thinking in students; 
long term consequences reveal greater narcissism, decreased self-esteem and well-
being.  As well as greater disengagement with academia and lower performance.  
McNulty and Fincham (2012) analysed four longitudinal studies and found that 
positivity was associated with better wellbeing initially.  However, it was found to be 
harmful over longer periods of time, therefore they argue that complete 
understanding can only be achieved by examining short- and long-term contextual 
implications. 
In this study, we used a forced choice paradigm to present participants with a 
series of scenarios with ambiguous valence, each accompanied by an absolute positive 
statement and a moderate negative statement.  Our main aim was to determine 
which they believe is the better way to think, and which is closer to the way they 
themselves think.  The order of these questions was randomized as answers to one 
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question may impact the other.  That is, stating the way you think may impact which 
you believe is the better way to think, or the reverse.  As a secondary contrast, 
participants were shown absolute negative statements vs. moderate positive 
statements to the same scenarios; this provided balance and helped veil the aim of 
Contrast 1.  For a third of participants, this second contrast was changed to absolute 
positive vs. moderate positive.  Pilot data suggested that participants strongly prefer 
moderate positive statements over absolute positive statements, and that this may 
influence their choice in Contrast 1, by implicitly highlighting the irrationality of 
absolute positivity.  Another third of participants were put into a time pressure 
condition.  We believed that time pressure would result in more superficial choices 
(Evans, Handley and Bacon, 2009) and so a greater number of absolute positive 
selections. 
We expected that participants who endorse more absolute positive statements 
could have a more general absolutist thinking style.  That is, they would be more likely 
to make absolute responses on other measures.  Participants were asked to complete 
the Attribution Style Questionnaire (ASQ) and the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS), 
both commonly used to measure cognitive vulnerability to depression.  Teasdale et al., 
(2001) found that positive and negative “extreme responding” on these measures 
better predicts time to relapse in remitted depressed patients than their actual scores.  
Extreme responding (or what we will refer to more accurately as “absolute 
responding”) is the tendency to endorse the absolute end-points on Likert type scales 
(i.e. 1 and 7 on a 7-point scale).  This metric has been employed by others (e.g. 
Peterson et al., 2007; Forand and DeRubies, 2014) as a marker for rigid absolutist 
thinking and a possible cognitive vulnerability to depression.  If endorsing absolute 
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positive statements in the behavioral task reflects a more general disposition towards 
absolutism, we might expect this to correlate with absolute responding to the ASQ 
and the DAS.  Explanatory flexibility (variance on the ASQ) is another purported 
measure of flexibility; theoretically, high explanatory flexibility should correlate with 
lower absolute responding.  Finally, participants also completed the Depression, 
Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS), a 42-item questionnaire designed to measure three 
negative emotion states (depression, anxiety and stress).  Partly this was to control for 
initial levels of negative emotions, but we also predicted that absolute responding on 
the ASQ and DAS would correlate with greater overall negative emotions, this was 
based on pilot data and previous studies (e.g. Teasdale et al., 2001). 
 
8.2 Method 
8.2.1 Participants 
A total of 120 undergraduate students were recruited from the University of Reading 
School of Psychology and Clinical Language Studies in exchange for course credit.  This 
sample size was based on expected effect sizes for differences between groups.  
Participants were predominantly female (83%) with an age range of 18-36 (Mean age 
= 20 years, SD = 2.4 years).  Some level of depression, anxiety or stress was reported 
by 47.5% of the sample (Table 8.1).  All participants were recruited through the SONA 
system, which is an online portal that we used to advertise our study to internal 
students, manage sign-ups and reward participants with course credits.  The study was 
reviewed by the University Research Ethics Committee and has been given a favorable 
ethical opinion for conduct.  All participants read and signed an information sheet and 
consent form prior to participation. 
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8.2.2 Materials 
Ten different images depicting everyday scenes (e.g. taking an exam, going on a blind 
date, starting a new job) were paired with captions that provide some context to the 
image (e.g. “You have done an average amount of revision”, “You have only just met 
your blind date”, “You just started a new job”).  The images (plus captions) were 
designed to set up different scenes that were not overly positive or negative.  For each 
scene, we constructed absolutely positive statements (e.g. “This exam is certain to be 
a total success”), absolutely negative statements (e.g. “This exam is certain to be a 
total disappointment”), moderately positive statements (e.g. “This exam might be 
rather successful”) and moderately negative statements (e.g. “This exam might be 
somewhat disappointing”).  The statements were designed to be syntactically similar, 
but semantically different.  Participants were told that these were “self-talk 
statements; things you might say to yourself in a given situation”.  To validate the 
valence and the absolutist status of these scenes/statements, a subset of participants 
were asked to rate the scenes and statements for valence/absolutism (as appropriate) 
at the end of the study.  Participants’ ratings support our categorization of the 
statements (all 10 scenes, self-talk statements and ratings are available online at 
10.6084/m9.figshare.5567044).  The absolutely positive statements were paired with 
the moderately negative statements for each scene, to form the main contrast for this 
study (Contrast 1).  The absolutely negative statements were paired with the 
moderately positive statements to form the second contrast for this study (Contrast 
2).  For some participants, Contrast 2 was modified by combining absolute positive 
statements with moderate positive statements to form a modified Contrast 2 
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(Contrast 2b).  The contrasts were presented to participants underneath the image 
and caption of each scene. 
 
Contrast 1: Absolute Positive vs. Moderate Negative 
Contrast 2: Absolute Negative vs. Moderate Positive 
Contrast 2b: Absolute Positive vs. Moderate Positive 
 
8.2.3 Procedure 
Participants were asked two questions for each contrast, (Q1) “Which is the better 
way to think?” and (Q2) “Which is closer to the way you think?”.  The questions were 
presented in a block design and the block order was reversed for 50% of participants.  
This created two order groups, (order 1; N = 60) answered Q1 in the first block and Q2 
in the second block, (order 2; N = 60) answered Q2 in the first block and Q1 in the 
second block.  All participants had been fully briefed on both questions and the nature 
of the task, but were not told which block they would receive first.  Each question was 
presented to participants only at the start of the block, followed by the scenes and 
relevant contrasts.   
Participants were also randomized into one of three manipulation groups.  
Manipulation group 1 (N = 40) was presented with Contrast 1 and Contrast 2 for each 
scene.  Manipulation group 2 (N = 40) was identical to manipulation 1, except they 
were put under time constraints.  They were asked to respond as quickly as they could 
and informed that there was a 12 second time limit on responses.  Manipulation 
group 3 (N = 40), was identical to manipulation 1, except they were presented with 
Contrast 1 and Contrast 2b (absolute positive vs. moderate positive).  All participants 
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were therefore presented with two contrasts (1 + either 2 or 2b) for each scene, 
within each block.  Participants made selections, by pressing “a” or “b” on a keyboard, 
corresponding with the statement they wanted to select.  Finally, at the end of the 
task, participants were asked two write a short sentence outlining the motivation for 
their answers.  Besides the time constraint imposed in manipulation group 2, progress 
through all aspects of the study was otherwise self-paced.  The experiment was 
delivered using E-prime 2.0 software and the images depicting the scenes were 
located using google search (e.g. “exam pictures”). 
 
8.2.4 Measures 
Attribution Style Questionnaire.  The ASQ (Peterson et al., 1982) presents scenarios for 
six positive and six negative outcomes (Appendix 16).  Participants are instructed to 
make causal attributions for the outcomes and rate those causes on three 7-point 
scales: External/Internal (1 totally due to other people or circumstances, 7 totally due 
to me), Unstable/Stable (1 will never again be present, 7 will always be present), and 
Specific/Global (1 influences just this particular situation, 7 influences all situations in 
my life).  We calculated the total score for each of the positive and negative subscales 
separately.  A high score on the ASQ negative subscale is purported to be 
depressogenic, while a high score on the ASQ positive subscale is purported to be 
protective against depressive symptoms.  Our primary interest in administering this 
questionnaire was to measure absolute responding, which is calculated by summing 
the total number of absolute responses (i.e. 1 and 7 on the 7-point Likert scales).  This 
resulted in an overall ASQ absolute responding score.  We also calculated 
“explanatory flexibility”, which is operationalized by Fresco, Rytwinski and Craighead 
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(2007) as the standard deviation of each participant’s responses to the stable and 
global subscales, for negative events on the ASQ.  Like absolute responding, 
explanatory flexibility is said to be an indicator of participant flexibility, we would 
therefore expect a negative correlation between these metrics (i.e. high explanatory 
flexibility = low absolute responding). 
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale.  The DAS (Weissman, 1979) is designed to assess 
dysfunctional beliefs relating to social dependency, prerequisites for happiness, and 
perfectionism among other things (Appendix 17).  It presents 40 statements to which 
participants respond on a 7-point scale (totally disagree to totally agree).  A high score 
on the DAS suggests a high level of dysfunctional attitudes and consequently a greater 
vulnerability to depression.  Our primary interest in administering this scale was to 
measure absolute responding; this was again calculated by summing the total number 
of absolute responses (i.e. 1 totally agree and 7 totally disagree).  This resulted in an 
overall DAS absolute responding score. 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale.  The DASS (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is 
a 42-item self-report measure which assesses the presence of depression (DASS-D), 
anxiety (DASS-A), and stress (DASS-S) symptoms (Appendix 21).  Participants are asked 
to rate on a four-point scale how much each statement applied to them over the past 
week, scaling from 0 (does not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much or 
most of the time).  The DASS has demonstrated good reliability and validity in non-
clinical and clinical populations (Antony et al., 1998; Crawford and Henry, 2003).  
Cronbach’s α for the Depression, Anxiety and Stress subscales were .96, .89, and .93, 
respectively (Brown et al., 1997). 
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8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Sample Characteristics 
Sample characteristics are presented in Table 8.1.  The sample comprised of mainly 
female undergraduate students at the University of Reading; there were no significant 
differences (all p > .05) between the groups in the proportion of female participants or 
the average age of the participant.  There were also no significant differences (all p > 
.05) between the study groups in symptoms of depression, anxiety or stress.  Finally, 
there were no significant differences (all p > .05) between the groups in their scores 
on the ASQ or DAS self-report scales, or the metrics derived from them, namely the AR 
and explanatory flexibility metrics.   
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Table 8.1  Classifications of depression, anxiety and stress symptom severity are 
derived from the standard DASS (Depression, Anxiety, Stress Scale) scoring template. 
  
Order 1  
(N = 60) 
Order 2  
(N = 60) 
Manipulation 1 
(N = 40) 
Manipulation 2 
(N = 40) 
Manipulation 3 
(N = 40) 
 
N % N % N % N % N % 
Female gender 49 82% 52 86% 32 80% 33 83% 34 85% 
Depression           
     Normal 36 60% 41 68% 29 73% 27 68% 21 53% 
     Mild 2 3% 9 15% 3 8% 3 8% 5 13% 
     Moderate 13 22% 6 10% 7 18% 5 13% 7 18% 
     Severe 9 15% 4 7% 1 3% 5 13% 7 18% 
Anxiety           
     Normal 38 63% 40 67% 26 65% 27 68% 25 63% 
     Mild 4 7% 6 10% 7 18% 1 3% 2 5% 
     Moderate 9 15% 5 8% 4 10% 4 10% 6 15% 
     Severe 9 15% 9 15% 3 8% 8 20% 7 18% 
Stress           
     Normal 40 67% 43 72% 30 75% 27 68% 26 65% 
     Mild 8 13% 6 10% 5 13% 4 10% 5 13% 
     Moderate 5 8% 5 8% 2 5% 5 13% 3 8% 
     Severe 7 12% 6 10% 3 8% 4 10% 6 15% 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
ASQ Positive 4.89 0.65 5.10 0.52 5.04 0.62 5.06 0.64 4.89 0.52 
ASQ Negative 4.42 0.70 4.19 0.66 4.16 0.58 4.29 0.82 4.47 0.63 
DAS 181 45 188 26 183 39 182 38 190 34 
AR 16.37 11.36 13.58 10.30 13.10 11.16 16.40 11.67 15.40 9.67 
Explanatory Flexibility 1.42 0.40 1.41 0.41 1.43 0.38 1.43 0.38 1.39 0.45 
Notes: 
AR is calculated from the DAS and ASQ (sum end-point responses on the Likert scales).  
Explanatory flexibility is calculated from the ASQ (variance on ASQ).  ASQ Positive = 
Attribution Style Questionnaire positive subscale; ASQ Negative = Attribution Style 
Questionnaire negative subscale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitude Scale; AR = Absolute 
Responding. 
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8.3.2 Contrast 1: Absolute Positive or Moderate Negative 
Q1 – Which is the better way to think? 
In Contrast 1 (absolute positive statements vs. moderate negative statements), a two-
way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of order and manipulation, on 
selecting absolute positive statements, as the better way to think.  We found no 
statistically significant interaction between the effects of order and manipulation on 
selecting absolute positive statements, F (2, 114) = 0.485, p = .617, 𝜂p2 = .008.  There 
was also no statistically significant main effect of manipulation, F (2, 114) = 1.804, p = 
.169, 𝜂p2 = .031, but there was a significant effect of order, F (1, 114) = 8.901, p = .003, 
𝜂p2 = .072.  Participants that were asked Q1 first (order 1), selected absolute positive 
statements as the better way to think significantly fewer times (M = 53.7%, SD = 2.3%) 
than those that were asked Q1 after having already answered Q2 (M = 67%, SD = 
2.6%; Figure 8.1).  We conducted one sample t-tests to determine whether there was 
a significant difference in the percentage of absolute positive and moderate negative 
statement selections (compared to 50%).  We separately analysed order 1 and 2 as 
there was a main effect of order.  For order 1, we found that the percentage of 
absolute positive statement selections (M = 53.7%, SE = 2.3%) and moderate negative 
statement selections (M = 46.3%, SE = 2.3%) were not significantly different from 50%, 
t(59) = 1.227, p = .225, d = .32.  Both produced the same t and p values, as this is a 
forced choice paradigm.  For order 2, we found that the percentage of absolute 
positive statement selections (M = 67%, SE = 2.6%) was significantly greater than 50%, 
and the percentage of moderate negative statement selections (M = 32.7%, SE = 2.6%) 
was correspondingly significantly lower than 50%, t(59) = 5.092, p < 0.001, d = 1.33.  
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This emphasizes the order effect; absolute positive statements were deemed the 
“better way to think”, only in order 2 (Figure .1). 
 
Q2 – Which is closer to the way you think? 
In Contrast 1 (absolute positive statements vs. moderate negative statements), a two-
way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of order and manipulation, on 
selecting absolute positive statements, as “closer to the way you think”.  There was no 
statistically significant interaction between the effects of order and manipulation on 
selecting absolute positive statements, F (2, 114) = 2.803, p = .065, 𝜂p2 = .047.  There 
was also no statistically significant main effect of order, F (1, 114) = .008, p = .930, 𝜂p2 
= .000, and only a marginally significant effect of manipulation, F (2, 114) = 3.517, p = 
.033, 𝜂p2 = .058.  Pairwise comparisons with a Bonferroni correction found that 
manipulation group 1, selected fewer absolute positive statements (M = 23.5%, SD = 
2.17%) than manipulation group 3 (M = 35%, SD = 2.1%, p = .044; Figure 8.1).  As there 
was no effect of order and only a marginal effect of manipulation, we conducted a 
one-sample t-test (compared to 50%) using the full sample.  We found that the 
percentage of absolute positive statement selections (M = 30.5%, SD = 2%) was 
significantly lower than 50% and the percentage of moderate negative statement 
selections (M = 69%, SD = 2.2%) was significantly greater than 50% t(119) = 9.639, p < 
.001, d = 1.77.  The greater proportion of moderate negative statement selections in 
Q2, highlights a discrepancy between the way participants actually thought, and what 
they believed was the better way to think (Figure 8.1).  Participants believed it was 
better to be more positive than they actually were, this was especially the case in 
order 2. 
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Figure 8.1  Figures presenting the mean number of absolute positive and moderate 
negative statement selections (contrast 1), for order 1 and order 2 groups.   
A. Which is the better way to think? (Q1).  B. Which is closer to the way you think? 
(Q2).   
Order 1 = “Which is the better way to think?” asked before “Which is closer to the way 
you think”; Order 2 = “Which is the better way to think?” asked after “Which is closer 
to the way you think”.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
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8.3.3 Contrast 2: Absolute Negative or Moderate Positive 
Q1 – Which is the better way to think? 
In Contrast 2 (absolute negative statements vs. moderate positive statements), a two-
way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of order and manipulation, on 
selecting absolute negative statements, as the better way to think.  There was no 
statistically significant interaction between the effects of order and manipulation on 
selecting absolute negative statements F (1, 76) = 3.867, p = .053, 𝜂p2 = .048.  There 
was also no statistically significant main effect for manipulation, F (1, 76) = 1.973, p = 
.164, 𝜂p2 = .025, and no statistically significant main effect for order, F (1, 76) = .009, p 
= .926, 𝜂p2 = .000.  Naturally, participants overwhelmingly believed that moderate 
positivity was a better way to think than absolute negativity (Figure 8.2).  Contrast 2 
was only presented to participants in manipulation groups 1 and 2, not manipulation 
group 3.  As there was no effect of order or manipulation, we conducted a one-sample 
t-test (compared to 50%) using the full sample.  As expected for Q1, we found the 
percentage of absolute negative statement selections (M = 9%, SD = 1.3%) was 
significantly lower than 50% and the percentage of moderate positive statement 
selections (M = 91%, SD = 1.2%) was significantly greater than 50%, t(79) = 33.098, p < 
0.001, d = 7.45. 
 
Q2 – Which is closer to the way you think? 
In Contrast 2 (absolute negative statements vs. moderate positive statements), a two-
way ANOVA was conducted that examined the effect of order and manipulation, on 
selecting absolute negative statements, as “closer to the way you think”.  There was 
no statistically significant interaction between the effects of order and manipulation 
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on selecting absolute negative statements, F (1, 76) = .058, p = .810, 𝜂p2 = .001.  The 
was also no statistically significant main effect for manipulation, F (1, 76) = 3.176, p = 
.079, 𝜂p2 = .040, and no statistically significant main effect for order, F (1, 76) = .188, p 
= .666, 𝜂p2 = .002 (Figure 8.2).  Contrast 2 was only presented to participants in 
manipulation groups 1 and 2, not manipulation group 3.  For Q2, as there was no 
effect of order or manipulation, we conducted a one-sample t-test (compared to 50%) 
using the full sample.  We found that the percentage of absolute negative statement 
selections (M = 26.6%, SD = 2.6%) was significantly lower than 50% and the 
percentage of moderate positive statement selections (M = 74%, SD = 2.4%) was 
significantly greater than 50%, t(79) = 9.744, p < 0.001, d = 2.19.   
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Figure 8.2  Figures presenting the mean number of absolute negative and moderate 
positive statement selections (contrast 2), for order 1 and order 2 groups.   
A. Which is the better way to think? (Q1).  B. Which is closer to the way you think? 
(Q2).  Figure C and D present the mean number of absolute positive and moderate 
positive statement selections (contrast 2b), for order 1 and order 2 groups.  C. Which 
is the better way to think? (Q1).  D. Which is closer to the way you think?   
Order 1 = “Which is the better way to think?” asked before “Which is closer to the way 
you think”; Order 2 = “Which is the better way to think?” asked after “Which is closer 
to the way you think”.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals 
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8.3.4 Contrast 2b: Absolute Positive or Moderate Positive 
Q1 – Which is the better way to think? 
Contrast 2b (absolute positive statements vs. moderate positive statements) was only 
presented to manipulation group 3.  When asked which is the better way to think, an 
independent samples t-test found that participants that were asked Q1 first (order 1), 
selected absolute positive statements as the better way to think significantly fewer 
times (M = 25.5%, SD = 1.6%) than those that were asked Q1 after having already 
answered Q2 (M = 47.5%, SD = 2.4%), t(38) = 2.717, p = .01, d = .88.  This mirrors the 
findings for Contrast 1 (Figure 8.2).  We conducted a one sample t-test to determine 
whether there was a significant difference in the percentage of absolute positive and 
moderate positive statement selections (compared to 50%).  We separately analysed 
order 1 and 2 as there was a main effect of order.  For order 1, we found that the 
percentage of absolute positive statement selections (M = 25.5%, SD = 1.6%) was 
significantly lower than 50% and the percentage of moderate positive statement 
selections (M = 74.5%, SD = 1.6%) was significantly greater than 50% t(19) = 6.826, p < 
.001, d = 3.13.  For order 2, we found that the percentage of absolute positive 
statement selections (M = 47.5%, SD = 2.4%) was not significantly different from 50% 
and the percentage of moderate positive statement selections (M = 52.5%, SD = 2.4%) 
was also not significantly different from 50%, t(19) = .457, p = .653, d = .21.  As with 
Contrast 1, this emphasizes the order effect in Q1; a higher percentage of absolute 
positive statements were deemed the “better way to think” in order 2 than in order 1 
(Figure 8.2). 
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Q2 – Which is closer to the way you think? 
Finally, in Contrast 2b (absolute positive statements vs. moderate positive 
statements), an independent samples t-test found that there was no significant 
difference in the selection of absolute positive statements for Q2, between 
participants that were asked Q1 first (order 1; M = 18%, SD = 1.5%), and those asked 
Q1 after having already answered Q2 (order 2; M = 22.5%, SD = 1.7%), t(38) = .865, p = 
.393, d = .28; Figure 8.2.  We therefore conducted a one-sample t-test (compared to 
50%) using the full sample.  We found the percentage of absolute positive statement 
selections (M = 20.3%, SD = 1.6%) was significantly lower than 50% and the 
percentage of moderate positive statement selections (M = 80%, SD = 2.6%) was 
significantly greater than 50%, t(39) = 11.469, p < 0.001, d = 3.67 (Figure 8.2). 
 
8.3.5 Correlations between questionnaires 
There was a small but significant correlation between the DAS and the ASQ negative 
subscale r(118) = -.287 , p = .001, as well as the ASQ positive subscale r(118) = -.255 , p 
= .005.  There was however a stronger correlation in response style, specifically, 
absolute responding (selecting absolute end points on the 7 point Likert scales) 
between the DAS and the ASQ r(118) = .445, p > .001.  Participants made absolute 
responses at both ends of these scales, that is, both absolutely adaptive responses 
and absolutely mal-adaptive responses, as defined by the measures (DAS and ASQ) 
themselves.  Additionally, we found that explanatory flexibility (standard deviation on 
ASQ) was positively correlated with both absolute responding on the DAS r(118) = 
.242, p = .008, and absolute responding on the ASQ itself r(118) = .522, p > .001.  This 
paradoxically suggests that absolutism in both the DAS and ASQ (believed to reflect 
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rigidity) is linked to greater explanatory flexibility (Table 8.2).  It may be that absolute 
responding on the DAS and ASQ does not actually relate to rigidity, or that variance on 
the ASQ does not actually reflect flexibility, or both. 
 
8.3.6 Correlations between questionnaires from unpublished data 
To test the findings from this study, we re-analysed previously unpublished data from 
our lab where the DAS, ASQ and DASS had been administered to a similar sample of 
46 undergraduate participants (mean age = 20 years, 79% female).  We found that 
there was no significant correlation between the DAS and the ASQ negative subscale 
r(44) = −0.285 , p = .058, nor the ASQ positive subscale r(44) = .089 , p = .563.  Again, 
there was a stronger correlation in response style, specifically, absolute responding 
between the DAS and the ASQ (r(44) = .668 , p < .001).  As before, participants made 
absolute responses at both ends of these scales, that is, both absolute adaptive 
responses and absolute mal-adaptive responses, as defined by the measures (DAS and 
ASQ) themselves.  We again found that explanatory flexibility (variance in the ASQ) 
was positively correlated with both absolute responding on the DAS r(44) = .575, p > 
.001, and absolute responding on the ASQ itself r(44) = .819, p < .001.  This completes 
the full replication of findings from our original data set using a previously 
unpublished data set, collected from a similar undergraduate sample (Table 8.3). 
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Table 8.2 Pearson correlations for the present data set. 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
DASS(D) 1 -             
DASS(A) 2 .76** -            
DASS(S) 3 .75** .81** -           
DAS 4 -.39** -.34** -.37** -          
DAS(AR) 5 -.07 .03 -.08 .30** -         
ASQ(P) 6 -.22* -.22* -.12 .26** .14 -        
ASQ(N) 7 .35** .24** .30** -.29** .04 -.10 -       
ASQ(AR) 8 .06 .11 .08 -.04 .45** .16 -.02 -      
ASQ(F) 9 -.09 -.01 -.04 .12 .24** .04 -.18* .52** -     
Q1(AbsolP) 10 -.02 -.08 -.07 -.04 .02 -.13 .01 .04 .10 -    
Q1(ModN) 11 .02 .08 .08 .04 -.02 .13 -.02 -.04 -.11 -1** -   
Q2(AbsolP) 12 -.11 -.14 -.17 .14 .25** .15 -.16 .18* .08 .08 -.08 -  
Q2(ModN) 13 .11 .14 .20* -.14 -.25** -.14 .15 -.17 -.12 -.05 .07 -.97** - 
Notes: 
DASS = Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale; DASS(D) = Depression subscale; DASS(A) 
= Anxiety subscale; DASS(S) = Stress subscale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitude Scale; ASQ 
= Attribution Style Questionnaire; ASQ(P) = Positive subscale; ASQ(N) = Negative 
subscale; AR = Absolute Responding; ASQ(F) = Explanatory flexibility; Q1 = Which is 
the better way to think; Q2 = Which is closer to the way you think; AbsolP = Absolute 
positive; ModN = Moderate negative. 
** Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level (2-tailed) 
*   Correlation is significant at the p < .05 level (2-tailed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 189 of 341 
 
 
Table 8.3 Pearson correlations for the unpublished data set. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
DASS Dep 1 -         
DASS Anx 2 .66** -        
DASS 
Stress 
3 .61** .76** -       
DAS 4 -.14 -.12 -.15 -      
DAS (AR) 5 .11 .06 -.08 .33* -     
ASQ Pos 6 -.22 -.26 -.24 .09 .15 -    
ASQ Neg 7 .16 .06 -.03 -.29 .21 -.06 -   
ASQ (AR) 8 .30* .37* .19 .02 .67** .29* .21 -  
ASQ Flex 9 .07 .19 .06 .06 .50** .46** -.15 .68** - 
Notes: 
DASS = Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale; DASS(D) = Depression subscale; DASS(A) 
= Anxiety subscale; DASS(S) = Stress subscale; DAS = Dysfunctional Attitude Scale; ASQ 
= Attribution Style Questionnaire; ASQ(P) = Positive subscale; ASQ(N) = Negative 
subscale; AR = Absolute Responding; ASQ(F) = Explanatory flexibility. 
** Correlation is significant at the p < .01 level (2-tailed) 
*   Correlation is significant at the p < .05 level (2-tailed) 
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8.3.7 Correlations between absolute responding on questionnaires and statements 
We found that when participants were asked Q2 (“Which is closer to the way you 
think?”), their tendency to endorse absolute positive statements correlated 
significantly with greater absolute responding on the DAS r(118) = .252, p = .005, and 
the ASQ r(118) = .179, p = .05.  Crucially, for Q1 (“Which is the better way to think?”), 
there was no significant correlation between the number of absolute positive 
responses and absolute responding on the DAS r(118) = .022, p = .813, or the ASQ 
r(118) = .044, p = .635.  This suggests that absolute responding on the DAS and ASQ 
may reflect an absolutist thinking style, rather than simply a questionnaire response 
style (Table 8.2). 
 
8.4 Discussion 
In the absolute positive vs. moderate negative contrast, we find a marked discrepancy 
between the way participants actually think, and the way they believe they ought to 
think.  While most responses for Q2 (which is closer to the way you think?) selected 
moderately negative statements over absolutely positive statements; this pattern 
disappeared, or was reversed for Q1 (which is the better way to think?).  Participants 
generally believe they ought to think more positively, even selecting clearly irrational 
absolutely positive self-talk statements for ambiguous situations.  This may be the 
result of a widespread notion, in western culture, that a positive outlook is an 
unmitigated good, and even a moderate negative outlook is ideally avoided.  
Interestingly, participants concede that they do not actually choose to think this way, 
when forced to decide, they generally identified moderate negativity as closer to the 
way they actually think.  This discrepancy is best illustrated in the written explanations 
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participants provided after the behavioral task.   For example, one participant wrote “I 
try and think more rationally about situations” to justify their answers to Q2, but later 
wrote “I chose more positive answers for the way we should think about situations” to 
justify their answers to Q1.  This was typical of the sort of remarks participants made 
(full list of anonymized remarks is available online; 10.6084/m9.figshare.5567041).  
For Contrast 2b, moderate negative was replaced with moderate positive.  For Q1, 
participants believed it was better to be moderately positive than absolutely positive 
(64% and 36%, respectively).  The 24% drop in absolute positive selections compared 
to Contrast 1 suggests that avoiding negativity was a major motivating factor for that 
contrast.  As with Contrast 1, participants generally favored the moderate option as 
being closer to the way they think. 
The order in which the questions (Q1, Q2) were asked had a significant effect 
on the extent to which participants endorsed absolute positivity.  Participants in order 
1 (n = 60) were asked Q1 first, and were significantly less disposed towards absolute 
positivity on Q1 than participants in order 2 (n = 60).  It seems that for order 2, having 
reflected on which is closer to the way they think (Q2) first, encouraged significantly 
more absolute positive responses on Q1 (Figure 8.1).  This supports past research 
which has shown that the more participants focus on themselves, the more 
unrealistically optimistic they become (e.g. Weinstein and Lachendro, 1982; Kruger 
and Burrus, 2004).  In Contrast 2b, participants were once again more likely to 
endorse absolute positive statements for Q1, if they had been asked Q2 first.  Overall, 
the effect of reflection on how they themselves think, systematically encourages 
participants to endorse absolute positive statements as the better way to think. 
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All participants completed the DAS and the ASQ. The former measures 
maladaptive attitudes and the latter measures maladaptive attributions, both 
purported to be cognitive vulnerabilities for depression.  Consequently, we expected 
that the items on these measures would correlate.  Our findings are mixed, while the 
present data set found a weak but significant correlation between the DAS and both 
the positive and negative subscales of the ASQ (Table 8.2), our previously unpublished 
data (with smaller sample size) failed to corroborate this finding (Table 8.3).  Past 
studies have reported similar mixed findings; some studies found significant 
correlations with modest effect sizes (e.g. Ciesla and Roberts, 2007; Enggasser and 
Young, 2007), others found no significant correlations (e.g. Barber and DeRubeis, 
2001).  While the content of the DAS and the ASQ did not reliably correlate, there was 
a consistent and medium/large correlation in response style.  Specifically, absolute 
responding (selecting 1 + 7) on the DAS correlated with absolute responding on the 
ASQ.  This was the case for both the present data set, and our labs previously 
unpublished data (Table 8.2 and 8.3).  While absolute responding scores on the DAS 
and ASQ have been calculated in past studies (e.g. Teasdale et al., 2001; Peterson et 
al., 2007; Beevers, Miller, Keitner and Ryan, 2003; Ching and Dobson, 2009; Forand 
and Derubeis, 2015), we are not aware of any correlation coefficients previously 
reported.   
The standard deviation in ASQ scores on negative items (on the global and 
stable subscales) is said to reflect “explanatory flexibility”.  That is, low variation 
(standard deviation) in scores is considered an indication of maladaptive rigidity, while 
high variation is believed to denote adaptive flexibility.  Previously reported empirical 
data has shown that explanatory flexibility (rather than ASQ scores) moderate the 
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relationship of negative life events to levels of self-reported depression symptoms 
(Fresco, Rytwinski & Craighead, 2007).  Paradoxically, we found that explanatory 
flexibility is positively correlated with absolute responding on the DAS and ASQ.  This 
means that greater rigidity implied by one measure (absolute responding) results in 
greater flexibility implied by the other (explanatory flexibility); this was found in both 
the present data set, and our previously unpublished data set (Table 8.2 and 8.3).  As a 
result, it may be necessary to amend our inferences regarding absolute responding 
and explanatory flexibility.  Previously it had been inferred that greater absolute 
responding on the ASQ and DAS also reflects more rigid thinking (e.g. Teasdale et al., 
2001; Peterson et al., 2007), this may need to be revised.  Alternatively, it may be that 
high variance on the ASQ may not actually reflect explanatory flexibility, as true 
flexibility is not well captured by simply calculating variance.  Ideally, flexibility should 
not be measured by repurposing the ASQ, but rather through existing (Martin & 
Rubin, 1995; Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010) or new instruments specifically targeted at 
that construct.   
Finally, we found that participants that had greater absolute responding scores 
on the DAS and the ASQ, also selected more absolute positive statements as being 
closer to the way they think (Q2, Table 8.2).  There was no correlation of this kind for 
which they believed was the better way to think (Q1).  This suggests that absolute 
responding reflects actual absolutist thinking, and is not simply a response style.  
 
8.4.1 Limitations and Future Research 
Our study employed a sample of British university students, mostly female and mostly 
young.  It would be interesting to see how results would differ using samples that are 
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predominantly male, older or from different cultures.  It could be hypothesised that 
eastern cultures, which place a greater emphasis on moderation (“the middle way”) 
and less emphasis on positive thinking (Matthews, 2000; Yamazaki and Kayes, 2010), 
may produce fewer absolute positive statement selections for both Q1 and Q2. 
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Chapter 9: Absolute Rigidity – When Greater Discrepancy 
Produces Less Change? 
 
9.1 Chapter overview 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between appraisal extremity and 
appraisal rigidity.  On a visual analog scale, ranging from 0 (absolutely positive) to 100 
(absolutely negative), participants were asked to rate a series of polarizing 
personalities (e.g. Donald Trump).  They then received new information about those 
personalities, which conflicted with their initial rating.  Participants were asked to rate 
the personalities a second time, having considered the new conflicting information.  
Perversely, we found that the conflicting information had the least impact where 
there was the greatest discrepancy between it and the initial rating.  That is, the very 
responses which had the most reason to change, changed the least.  We further found 
that absolute negative responses, were the most rigid of all. 
 
9.2 Introduction 
Thoughts and beliefs which are absolute, have no nuance or ambiguity.  All the 
complexities of a given topic are reduced to the most simple and absolute state (e.g. 
“It will definitely rain today”).  A certain propensity for absolutist thinking resides in 
everyone, to one degree or another.  It pervades every aspect of people’s lives, from 
the personal to the societal; in politics, culture, religion and mental health.  
Surprisingly little research has directly addressed absolutist thinking in these areas.  In 
politics, absolutism has been studied in the context of right-wing authoritarianism.  It 
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has more extensively been studied with respect to certain mental health conditions; 
namely, suicidal ideation, borderline personality disorder and eating disorders (Al-
Mosaiwi and Johnstone, 2018; Neuringer, 1964; Pollock and Williams, 2004; Wedding, 
2000). 
The most convincing explanation for the presence of absolutist thinking is the 
‘cognitive miser’ hypothesis, which argues that individuals will seek simple and less 
effortful answers in place of sophisticated and effortful ones.  In this way, absolutist 
thinking is an attractive heuristic which reduces complexity and computational load 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1984).  The benefits of simplicity however are accompanied by 
inherent costs.  The first, is that absolutist beliefs are fundamentally inaccurate, life is 
rarely so simple.  They are often irrationally extreme in their claims, and this level of 
inaccuracy could reasonably be supposed to lead to negative consequences.  The 
second (and the focus of this study), is that absolutist beliefs may also be the most 
rigid.  One could suppose that given their extreme claims and simplicity, they would 
be quite susceptible to the influence of new information; as opposed to beliefs which 
are already nuanced and moderate.   
There has been relatively little empirical research examining the rigidity of 
absolutist thinking.  Past studies into cognitive rigidity have largely required 
participants to make wholesale changes in attention or ideas, rather than gradual 
adjustments.  These involve executive functioning tests such as task switching or 
cognitive shifting (e.g. Wisconsin card sorting test).  Moreover, many of these 
executive functioning tasks lack ecological validity.  In this study, we ask participants 
to rate well-known and polarizing personalities (e.g. Donald Trump) on a visual analog 
scale with absolute end-points (totally positive – totally negative).  They are then 
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permitted to change their rating, after receiving new information which conflicts with 
their initial response (i.e. positive information about a negatively rated celebrity).  We 
predict that absolute initial responses (i.e. totally positive or totally negative) will be 
the least likely to change in light of new information.  This study is designed to ensure 
that absolute initial responses have the most reason to be amended, as they will 
conflict most with the new information.  Nevertheless, we predict that in spite of this, 
absolute responses will prove to be the most rigid. 
 
9.3 Method 
9.3.1 Participants 
A total of 180 undergraduate students were recruited from the University of Reading 
School of Psychology and Clinical Language Studies in the UK for an online study.  Two 
participants failed to complete any part of the study, and were removed from the 
sample.  Participants were predominantly female (87%) with an age range of 18-40 
(Mean = 20 years, SD = 2.5 years).  All participants were recruited through the SONA 
system, which is an online portal that we used to advertise our study to internal 
students, manage sign-ups and reward participants with course credits.  The study was 
reviewed by the University Research Ethics Committee and has been given a favorable 
ethical opinion for conduct.  All participants read and signed an information sheet and 
consent form prior to participation. 
 
9.3.2 Stimuli 
In this study, we identified 6 well-known personalities that were highly likely to be 
viewed negatively by our cohort of undergraduate students.  These formed the 
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‘negative condition’ and were Nigel Farage, Donald Trump, Katie Hopkins, Chris 
Brown, Katie Price and Kim Kardashian.  We also identified 6 well-known personalities 
that were highly likely to be viewed positively by our cohort of undergraduate 
students.  These formed the ‘positive condition’ and were Ellen DeGeneres, Beyoncé 
Knowles, David Beckham, Will Smith, Adele and Barack Obama.  In the negative 
condition, unflattering pictures of the celebrities were presented along with their 
name, while in the positive condition, we used flattering pictures.  The positive and 
negative personalities were presented sequentially to participants, alternating 
between positive and negative, in a pseudorandomized order.  The study was hosted 
by ‘SurveyMonkey’, an online survey development cloud-based software company.  
Participants were given an online address from which they could access and complete 
the study.   
 
9.3.3 Task 
For each well-known personality, participants were asked if they had heard of them 
previously (“yes”/”no”).  They were then asked to “indicate your view of” that given 
famous personality, on a visual analog scale ranging from totally positive (0) to totally 
negative (100).  Immediately following this rating, participants were presented with a 
short passage of information intended to conflict with their initial rating.  That is, 
positive information was presented for the negative condition (e.g. Donald Trump) 
and negative information was presented for the positive condition (e.g. Beyoncé 
Knowles).  Naturally, some participants may have made positive initial ratings in 
negative conditions (or vis versa), we predicted such responses would be rare 
exceptions.  Participants were next asked whether they had already known the 
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information presented (‘Yes’/’No’), as it was intended to be new.  They were also 
asked whether they believed the information presented, and they responded on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from ‘Definitely true’ to ‘Definitely false’.  The new 
information about a given well-known personality was sourced from newspapers and 
magazine articles.  For the negative condition, we are reasonably confident that the 
positive information provided is indeed true, as it is cited by several reputable outlets.  
This was less the case for the positive condition, where negative information was 
presented, because we mostly resorted to gossip magazines.  After reading the new 
and likely conflicting information about the given well-known personality, participants 
were asked to once again indicate their view of them on the same analog scale.  The 
images used in this study are available in Appendix 22. 
 
9.3.4 Data Analysis 
In this study, we are interested in the difference between those who make absolute 
initial responses and those who make non-absolute initial responses.  A rating of 
either 0 or 100 (i.e. ‘totally positive’ or ‘totally negative’) is classified is absolute, and 
all other ratings are classified as non-absolute.   On our visual analogue scale, we 
found that ratings of 1 and 99, although technically not absolute, were visually 
indistinguishable from ratings of 0 and 100 respectively.  For this reason, we grouped 
responses of 0-1 and 99-100 as absolute.  Additionally, we determined that responses 
from 2-10 and 90-98, would be classed as “extreme”, but not absolute.  The 
“extreme” group occupied the top and bottom 10% of the analog scale, which wasn't 
already assigned as absolute.  All other responses were classified as “moderate” 
except 50 which was classified as “neutral”. 
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The difference between the initial rating of a given famous personality, and the 
second rating after absorbing the new conflicting information about them, was 
defined as the ‘change score’.  A change score was calculated for every personality 
rated by each participant.  Responses were excluded from the analysis if they did not 
fit the condition valence (i.e. positive ratings for negative personalities, or vice versa), 
also if the participant indicated that they did not know the famous personality or 
already knew the conflicting information presented about them.  Responses were also 
excluded if the change score was in opposition to the valence of the new information 
(i.e. the rating becomes more positive after negative information about the 
personality is presented, or vice versa).  To analyze the data, a linear mixed-effects 
modelling approach was adopted (see Appendix 1 for the SPSS syntax script).  This is 
the recommended analysis method for this type of data structure (Baayen, Davidson, 
& Bates, 2008).  Our fixed factor is the initial response group (absolute, extreme or 
moderate), our dependent variable is the change score, and our random factor is the 
participants.  Mixed-effects models consider both fixed and random effects and can be 
used to assess the influence of the fixed effects on the dependent variable after 
accounting for random effects (namely, correlated residuals in responses from the 
same participant).  Analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS software (version 21).  We 
report raw values for descriptive statistics to facilitate a more intuitive understanding. 
 
9.4 Results 
Based on the exclusion criteria outlined in the data analysis section, 746 responses out 
of a total of 2136 (178 participants * 12 celebrities) were removed from the analysis, 
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leaving 1390 responses.  There were no significant differences in age, or the 
proportion of female participants, between the initial ratings groups (all p’s > .05). 
A linear mixed effects model showed that initial ratings had a significant effect 
on the extent to which participants believed new conflicting negative information 
about positively rated celebrities (belief score); F (2, 750) = 27.563, p < .000.  As 
outlined, the belief score ranged from 1 = “Definitely true” to 5 = “Definitely false”.  
Paired comparisons show that the average belief score of absolute initial ratings (M = 
3.25, SD = .87) was significantly greater than for moderate initial ratings (M = 2.74, SD 
= .79, p < .000), but not significantly different from extreme initial ratings (M = 3.08, 
SD = .83, p = .103).  Extreme initial ratings also had a belief score significantly greater 
than moderate initial ratings (p < .000).  Therefore, responses with absolute or 
extreme initial ratings, were more likely to disbelieve conflicting information about 
positively rated celebrities. 
A linear mixed effects model also showed that initial ratings had a significant 
effect on the extent to which participants believed new conflicting positive 
information about negatively rated celebrities; F (2, 494) = 22.817, p < .000.  Paired 
comparisons show that the belief score of absolute initial ratings (M = 2.90, SD = 1.06) 
was significantly greater than for both extreme (M = 2.60, SD = .80, p = .008) and 
moderate initial ratings (M = 2.39, SD = .69, p < .000).  Extreme initial ratings did not 
have a significantly different belief score from moderate initial ratings (p = .118).  
Overall, participants with absolute initial ratings were more likely to disbelieve 
conflicting information.  Because there was a difference in belief scores between 
different initial rating groups, we include belief scores as a covariate in all subsequent 
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analyses.  We also applied a Bonferroni correction throughout, to account for multiple 
comparisons. 
In the positive condition, a linear mixed effects model found that initial ratings 
had a significant effect on ‘change scores’, controlling for belief scores; F(2, 750) = 
11.498, p < .000 (Figure 9.1).  Paired comparisons show that the average change score 
of absolute initial ratings (M = 5.95, SD = 9.61) was significantly lower than for 
moderate initial ratings (M = 9.28, SD = 8.62, p < .000), but not significantly different 
from extreme initial ratings (M = 6.77, SD = 7.65, p = .623).  Extreme initial ratings also 
had a significantly lower change score than moderate initial ratings (p < .010).  Overall, 
for positive ratings about popular celebrities, the new conflicting information, had a 
greater impact on change scores for moderate initial ratings, than extreme or absolute 
initial ratings. 
In the negative condition, a linear mixed effects model found that initial ratings 
had a significant effect on ‘change scores’, controlling for belief scores; F (2, 488) = 
47.458, p < .000 (Figure 9.1).  Paired comparisons show that the average change score 
of absolute initial ratings (M = −1.74, SD = 4.70) was significantly lower than for 
extreme (M = −5.36, SD = 7.62, p = .002) and moderate (M = −8.44, SD = 7.69, p < .000) 
initial ratings.  Extreme initial ratings also had a change score significantly lower than 
moderate initial ratings (p = .001).  Overall, for negative ratings about unpopular 
celebrities, the new conflicting information, had the least impact on change scores for 
absolute initial ratings. 
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Figure 9.1 Average change score for ‘Absolute’, ‘Extreme’ and ‘Moderate’ initial rating 
groups, split by positive and negative conditions.  Error bars indicate ± 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
An independent samples t-test found a significant difference in the average change 
score between absolute positive initial ratings and absolute negative initial ratings 
(t(245) = 5.10, p < .000, d = .65).  Naturally, the negative change scores in the positive 
condition were reversed, so that the magnitude of change could be compared 
between valence.  There was no significant difference in change score between 
extreme positive and extreme negative initial ratings (t(211) = 1.25, p = .213, d = .17).  
There was also no significant difference in change score between moderate positive 
and moderate negative initial ratings (t(713) = 1.31, p = .191, d = .10). 
 
9.5 Discussion 
For both positive and negative conditions, moderate initial ratings were most 
amenable to change after absorbing new conflicting information.  Absolute initial 
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responses were the least amenable to modification by new conflicting information in 
both positive and negative conditions; although in the positive condition, this rigidity 
was not significantly different from extreme initial responses.  Although we had 
hypothesized that absolute responses would be the most rigid, this is nevertheless a 
paradox.  It seems that the new conflicting information, has the least impact, where 
there is the greatest discrepancy between it and the initial rating.  That is, the very 
responses that have the greatest reason to change, changed the least.  This does not 
simply apply to absolute initial responses, as we had suspected, but also to extreme 
initial responses.  While overall, extreme responses were less rigid than absolute 
responses, they were more rigid than moderate responses.  This suggests that the 
rigidity we are highlighting is not categorical, but has at least some continuous quality.   
Our findings also show a marked difference between positive and negative valence 
conditions.  Specifically, negative absolute responses are significantly more rigid than 
positive absolute responses (or indeed anything else).  This is perhaps more surprising, 
given that the positive conflicting information provided in the negative conditions was 
reliably true; whereas the negative conflicting information in positive conditions, was 
mostly just gossip. 
 
9.5.1 Limitations and future directions 
Our sample is disproportionately young and female, it would be interesting to see if 
such an effect could be replicated more generally, in other demographics.  Moreover, 
our data examines rigidity in the subjective appraisal of others (celebrities).  Future 
work could examine a similar effect in other social domains (e.g. political opinions or 
personal values etc.). 
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Chapter 10: General Discussion 
10.1 Aims 
This thesis aimed to address 5 questions outlined in the introduction: 
 
1. To establish a distinction, empirically and theoretically, between the concepts 
of ‘absolute’ and ‘extreme’. 
2. Establishing an ecologically valid method for measuring absolutism. 
3. Investigating the relationship between absolutist thinking and wellbeing. 
4. Comparing the relative impact of absolutist thinking and negative thinking to 
wellbeing. 
5. Empirically demonstrating a link between absolutist thinking and cognitive 
rigidity 
 
10.2 The distinction between ‘absolute’ and ‘extreme’ 
Superficially, the distinction between the concepts of ‘absolute’ and ‘extreme’ seem 
trivial or even arcane.  However, as we will argue here, there are very consequential 
differences between these two concepts, that are both qualitative and quantitative. 
An ‘absolute’, describes a state of totality, either of magnitude or probability.  
They are free from nuance, provisos and limitations.  Conversely, an ‘extreme’, 
describes a state of extremity (not totality), of either magnitude or probability.  They 
are not free from nuance, provisos or limitations.  Extreme thinking, relates to beliefs 
or thoughts that deviate greatly from accepted norms, the more they deviate, the 
more extreme they are.  An extreme therefore exists on a continuum, where 
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something can be more or less extreme.  Absolutes on the other hand, are like the 
proverbial pregnant women, they either are or are not.  Interestingly, absolutes need 
not deviate from the accepted norm, that is, they need not be extreme.  For example, 
a belief that ‘there is never a good Nazi’, is absolutist but not extreme.  As described in 
the introduction, absolutes typically manifest in two forms, categorical imperatives 
and dichotomous thinking.  Absolutist thinking, by virtue of its very simplicity, 
functions as a heuristic that reduces cognitive load.  For example, a belief that ‘all men 
are bachelors’ will simplify the issue of male bachelorhood.  There will be no need to 
consider whether or not any given man is a bachelor, because ‘all men are bachelors’.  
Extreme thoughts are not simple, because they crucially retain some nuance and do 
not describe a state of totality.  The belief that ‘most men are bachelors’ leaves open 
the question of whether any given man is a bachelor.  This means that extreme beliefs 
are more cognitively taxing than absolutes, naturally therefore there will be a great 
incentive to convert extreme beliefs into absolutes.  This will reduce cognitive load 
and is consistent with the cognitive miser hypothesis (Fiske and Taylor, 1983). 
As reviewed in chapter 1, the terms absolute and extreme are currently used 
interchangeably in the literature (e.g. Marin, Gamba & Marin, 1992; Bachman & 
O’malley, 2010; Clarke, 2000; Peterson et al., 2007).  No attempt is made to 
differentiate between these concepts.  As an example, Teasdale et al. (2001) referred 
to choosing 2 or 6 on a 7-point Likert scale as ‘next to extreme’ responses.  This shows 
how researchers view absolute end-points as ‘extreme’, and everything else as ‘next 
to extreme’.  In the clinical literature, there is also no attempt at defining absolute 
thinking as a separate concept to extreme thinking, and the terms are regularly used 
interchangeably (e.g. “Recognising Cognitive Distortions”, 2015) 
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Overall, the differences between absolute and extreme are not recognised by 
the empirical and clinical literature.  This may be because although absolutes need not 
be extreme, they often are, since they usually greatly deviate from accepted norms.   
Note that while absolutist beliefs can be extreme, extreme beliefs are not absolute.  
Given the substantial and consequential differences between absolutes and extremes, 
we propose that the terms should be used more carefully to avoid confounding 
separate concepts. 
 In chapter two, we constructed and validated a 19-word absolutist dictionary.  
We had compiled a list of 66 words, and we believed that 22 were absolute, 21 were 
extreme and the remainder were moderate.  Five independent expert judges (2 
clinical psychologists and 3 linguists) from the University of Reading were asked to 
label the words as either ‘absolute’, ‘extreme’ or ‘moderate’.  Judges were permitted 
to place words into more than one category (i.e. extreme and absolute).  The 
agreement between our original categorization of absolutist words and that of the 
judges ranged between 83-94%, while the inter-judge agreement was 96%.  We found 
that only 25% of absolutist words were also deemed extreme by some of the 
independent expert judges and none of the words we had categorized as extreme 
were deemed absolutist.  Crucially, judges showed almost no agreement on extreme 
words, except for the word ‘huge’ which was deemed extreme by 3 out of the 5 
judges.  This demonstrates that independent expert judges clearly distinguished 
between absolute and extreme words, recognizing them as separate concepts.  
Moreover, we found that while there was a high degree of agreement on absolute 
words, there was no agreement for extreme words.  This may be because absolutist 
words have a categorical nature, thereby removing subjectivity from the judgement 
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process.  Extreme words on the other hand exist on a continuum, therefore what may 
appear extreme to one judge is not deemed so by another.  To confirm the distinction 
between absolute and extreme words we conducted a factor analysis on the 
combined list of 65 absolutist and non-absolutist words.  We found that the highest 
loading words on the first factor were all absolutist except for ‘really’ (which is an 
adverbial intensifier) and ‘anything’ which we had originally categorized as absolutist 
but due to lack of independent expert validation, was moved to the non-absolutist 
dictionary.  The highest loading words on factor 2 were all non-absolutist except for 
the absolutist word ‘definitely’.  Other than ‘definitely’, no absolutist word loaded 
outside of factor one.  As with the independent expert judges, the factor analysis was 
also not able to separate ‘extreme words’ from non-absolutist words. 
In our first behavioral study in Chapter 7, participants were presented with 
various ambiguous situations, accompanied by an absolute positive and extreme 
positive self-talk statement.  They were asked to select which of the statements they 
most prefer for each of the situations shown.  We found that participants selected 
extreme positive statements over absolute positive statements 73% of the time.  Once 
again this marks a clear distinction between these two concepts and identifies 
extreme positivity as preferable to absolute positivity.  This distinction is supported by 
the psychophysiological data where absolute positive conditions had significantly 
lower amplitude (p = .047), greater latency (p = .049) and greater dispersion (p = .003) 
than extreme positive conditions. We have therefore begun to find both subjective 
and physiological differences in participant responding to absolute and extreme 
statements.  While sweeping conclusions should not be made on the basis of early 
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psychophysiology work; we believe the subjective judgement differences are now 
beyond doubt. 
 
10.3 An ecologically valid method for measuring absolutism 
The present research aimed to develop a method for calculating absolutist thinking, 
with high ecological validity, which can be applied to real world data, and recognizes 
implicit markers often missed by human raters.  Prior to this research, absolutism or 
(extreme responding as it is often termed) was estimated using either Likert type 
scales, subjective measures questionnaires or independent raters judging semi-
structured responses.  These methods cannot be applied to observational data, they 
lack ecological validity, and do not recognize many implicit markers often missed by 
human raters. 
 Absolute responding on Likert scales is determined by the number of end-point 
selections (e.g. 1 or 7, on a 7-point scale).  A propensity for absolute responding of this 
kind, has been linked to certain cultures (e.g. Johnson et al., 2005), lower IQ (e.g. 
Meisenberg and Williams, 2008), personality disorders (Hamilton, 1968) and multiple 
mental health conditions (Teasdale et al., 2001).  However, the inferences made from 
absolute responding on Likert type scales are limited by the lack of ecological validity 
in this method. A number of studies have flagged up methodological problems, for 
example, effects often depend on the size of the scale used (e.g. Clarke, 2000; Hui & 
Triandis, 1989).  Crucially, there is currently no evidence that findings generalize 
beyond Likert scales.  That is, it is not clear whether the absolute responding on Likert 
scales of some groups relates to meaningful differences in absolutist thinking, rather 
than being simply an experimental artefact specific to using Likert scales.  Given the 
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incendiary nature of some of the qualities linked to absolute responding, it is 
worthwhile corroborating these findings using a more ecologically valid method.   
Moreover, absolute responding on Likert scales does not take into account the 
interference caused by item content.  With respect to this point, Berg and Rapaport 
(1954) developed the ‘Questionnaire without Questions’ (QwQ); a content-less 
questionnaire designed to measure response tendency without interference from 
item content. Individuals are asked to choose between various answers, purely based 
on the presentation of the options. It is believed that healthy individuals will avoid 
extreme responses.  While the QwQ removes the confounding interference from item 
content, it does not make the estimate of absolutism any more ecologically valid, and 
this perhaps is the main limitation.   
After an extensive search of the literature, the questionnaire which most 
closely measures the construct of absolutist thinking is the ‘Dichotomous thinking 
inventory’ (DTI; Oshio, 2009) which assesses “black and white cognitive thinking 
style”.  It examines three aspects of absolutist thinking, preference for dichotomy, 
dichotomous beliefs and profit and loss thinking.  High scores on the DTI have been 
linked to borderline personality disorder, narcissism, low self-esteem, undervaluing 
others, intolerance for ambiguity, perfectionism and correlated with cluster A, B and C 
personality disorders.  Like many subjective measures instruments, the structured 
response format of the DTI lacks ecological validity.  It also requires that participants 
are explicitly aware of their dichotomous thinking styles, given that cognitive styles 
and biases are very often unconscious (Watkins, Vache, Verney & Mathews, 1996), 
this limits the utility of subjective measures questionnaires in this area.  Moreover, it 
only examines dichotomous thinking, not categorical imperatives. 
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 Absolute responding on Likert scales and subjective measures questionnaires 
are both structured response formats.  Arntz and Veen (2000), conducted studies 
examining a concept related to absolutism, using semi-unstructured response 
formats.  They asked participants with BPD to write down their opinions about 
characters in film clips.  These narratives were then judged by independent raters for 
complexity.  The narratives of BPD participants were judged to have lower complexity 
and more polarized affect.  The semi-structured response format has more ecological 
validity than the structured response format studies, however, participants are still 
restricted to commenting on characters in film clips.  This cannot be applied to 
observational data; and human raters are fallible in their judgements, they are liable 
to miss implicit signs. 
Calculating the percentage prevalence of absolutist words through text 
analysis is the most ecologically valid method for measuring absolutism to date.  This 
method can be applied to in-lab as well as to observational data, and is able to 
recognize implicit markers which are often missed by human raters.  We have shown 
in chapter 2, that the percentage prevalence of absolutist words specifically relates to 
absolutist thinking (elevated in BPD and ED forums) as it was not elevated in a wide 
range of controls.  Importantly, absolutist words are functional and functional words 
are liable to be overlooked.   
In chapter 5, we examine the convergent validity between our absolutist 
dictionary and absolute responding on Likert scales.   We find that elevated use of 
absolute words does correlate with selecting end-points on scales for tourist 
destinations, films and products.  Interestingly, we found a significant drop in 
absolutist words outside the end-points, although there was a trend towards greater 
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absolutism as you moved further from the center of the scale.  Chapter 5, also 
identified moderate words, those elevated in non-endpoint selections compared to 
end-point selections.  The prevalence rates of these words can be considered 
alongside those of absolutist words to refine the measure. 
This natural language text analysis method for measuring absolutism relies on 
unigrams (single words), listed in the 19-word absolutist dictionary (see chapter 2).  
Some might argue that because words are used in context, unigrams cannot be relied 
upon to convey absolutism without the surrounding context being considered.  In our 
research we have considered a limited amount of the surrounding context, by 
compiling a list of absolutist false positives (e.g. “not always”, “hello everyone”).  
These bigrams (two-words) remove false positives by taking into account the 
immediate context.  Automated text analysis struggles to match more than 2-3 words 
as there are too many possible combinations.  While a qualitative analysis of text is 
not possible, the advantage of automation is that enormous data sets can be 
examined and machine learning classifiers can be instituted to automatically classify 
text samples. 
Counting absolutist unigrams without considering the full context in which 
those words appear is justified by the functional nature of the absolutist words.  
Function words have no semantic meaning and relate to the structural/process aspect 
of natural language, not its content.  As they are independent of content, it is less 
important to consider the context in which they appear.  Nevertheless, future work 
could examine whether absolutist words used in certain contexts are more 
detrimental to mental health.  For example, using absolutist words in reference to self 
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may have different emotional consequences compared to using absolutist words with 
reference to others. 
Our approach mirrors that of clinical practice, where therapists will instruct 
patients to avoid using absolutist words without specifying a context in which these 
words should be avoided.  The underlying belief is that they are best avoided in all 
circumstances and non-absolutist alternatives should be used (Williams & Garland, 
2002).   
In chapter 4, we see how ecological validity is crucial to the accuracy and 
construct validity of the text analysis method.  We sought to establish whether 
individuals in a clinically depressed sample would use more absolutist words when 
completing the Ambiguous Scenarios Test for depression (AST-D; Berna et al., 2011).  
Participants were asked to write descriptions of imagined outcomes for 20 different 
situations in a couple of sentences.  This study would have replicated findings from 
chapters 2 and 3, where members in affective disorder forums used more absolutist 
words than members in control forums; however, we failed to replicate the effect.  
Replication with in-lab clinical and community samples failed for two principal 
reasons.  Firstly, participants were not able to express their thoughts and feelings 
freely in their responses as they were obliged to answer specific questions.  When 
natural language is constrained in this manner, linguistic markers of interest may be 
compromised.  This is because participants give narrow and formulaic answers which 
do not allow for more expressive linguistic markers.  Secondly, the text samples 
collected were too small.  For each question, participants typically responded with 
only one or two sentences (30-50 words).  This is not an adequate text sample for 
measuring low frequency words like absolutist words, which have a 1-2% prevalence 
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rate.  We have found that to measure absolutism in the thoughts and feelings of an 
individual; over 1000 words of unconstrained natural language is required. 
 
10.4 Absolutism and Wellbeing 
In chapter two, we demonstrate the ways in which absolutist thinking are linked to 
affective disorder.  We find that the natural language of those with anxiety and 
depression contains more absolutist words than a range of control groups.  Absolutist 
words also increase with the severity of affective disorder, this is shown in the 
significantly greater prevalence of absolutist words in suicidal ideation forums 
compared to anxiety and depression forums.  We begin to show that this relationship 
is not merely correlational, elevated use of absolutist words in recovery forums 
suggests that absolutist thinking may be a cognitive vulnerability factor for depression.  
In chapter three we also find that this phenomenon is not specific to the English 
language or English-speaking cultures, but is also present in at least German, French, 
Russian and Spanish. 
The connection between absolutist thinking with anxiety and depression was 
largely predicated based on clinical observations and anecdotal evidence.  There has 
been very little empirical work specifically examining this relationship.  Empirical 
studies often investigate the impact of CBT or MBCT in general, rather than one 
component of the treatments in particular.  Consequently, it is difficult to determine 
the efficacy of any given component of CBT.  It is worth ascertaining which aspects of 
CBT are more effective than others, this will allow practitioners to focus on the most 
effective practices.  Currently, the degree to which absolutist thinking, or indeed any 
of the cognitive distortions, are addressed depends on the preferences of any given 
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therapist.  It is worth reiterating that almost all of the research examining absolutist 
thinking in relation to anxiety and depression comes from studies into the efficacy of 
cognitive therapies, and not of absolutist thinking specifically. 
 While absolutist thinking is itself a recognized cognitive distortion; we endorse 
the argument made by REBT, which states that absolutist thinking (what they term 
demandingness) underlies many, if not all, of the other cognitive distortions.  That is, 
distortions like ‘overgeneralizing’, ‘jumping to conclusions’, ‘always being right’, 
‘catastrophizing’, ‘should statements’ and many others, cease to be pathological if 
they were in a non-absolutist form.  Indeed, their non-absolutist form, to one degree 
or another, is a part of any healthy individuals thinking.  We argue, along with REBT, 
that they only become pathological when they take on an absolutist or dogmatic 
nature. 
 The causes of affective disorders can be divided into two categories, a process 
category and a content category.  Absolutist thinking (and other cognitive distortions) 
addresses the process category while the theories on negativity and a negative bias 
address the content category.  There has been surprisingly little debate contrasting 
these two perspectives of the problem, largely because CBT combines them and is 
studied holistically, without examining separate components.  If the underlying causes 
of depression are related to process, then therapy should focus on that and not 
interfere with the content of what people think (e.g. negative bias).  There is a second 
practical implication aside from the nature of the treatment.  Process level 
interventions are more generalizable than content based interventions, because they 
apply to all content.  For example, a person who has problems at work, will benefit 
little from treatment targeted at love life issues, and vice versa.  Whereas disputing 
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absolutist thinking would be of benefit at work, home or anywhere else.  The greater 
generalizability, also means that process level interventions could be delivered more 
easily, making use of online methods for instance. 
 Interestingly, in chapter 2-3 we highlight that absolutist words were better 
markers for the natural language of affective disorder than pronouns, negative 
emotions, or indeed any other linguistic dimension.  They outperformed the content-
laden negative emotion words because they distinguished suicidal ideation from 
depression forums, while negative emotion words were paradoxically less prevalent in 
suicidal ideation forums.  This once again demonstrates the capricious nature of the 
content dimension in comparison with the functional absolutist words. 
In chapter 2, we show that an elevated use of absolutist words is specific to 
affective disorder and absolutist thinking, and that it is not simply a reflection of 
psychological distress.  Absolutism may not necessarily be present in mental health 
conditions which are caused by a specific event or topic.  We find that there was no 
elevation in absolutist words for cancer, PTSD and schizophrenia forums.  This may be 
because the distress caused by cancer, PTSD and schizophrenia has a known specific 
cause, namely, having cancer, PTSD or schizophrenia.  One does not have to be 
absolutist, or even disposed to affective disorder, to experience feelings of anxiety or 
depression about a brain tumour, a traumatic event, or hallucinations.  In contrast, 
many anxiety and depression disorders often have multiple vague or even unknown 
causes.  Predisposed individuals are pushed into anxiety and depression by 
circumstances which by necessity would not have the same effect in the general 
population.   
 Because our chapter 2 study had large samples from multiple sources, and a 
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naturalistic observational design, it consequently had low experimental control.  We 
could only infer general demographic characteristics from different forums (e.g. 
women post on Mumsnet and young people post on Student Room etc.).  The 
identities and motivation of users was largely unknowable.   We did check that the 
authors of posts were at least purporting to be a representative of the relevant online 
community, but we had no power to go beyond this basic check.  Follow-up studies 
could use an experimental study design, and perhaps alternative methodologies, to 
replicate and extend the findings initially presented here.  We have been contacted 
by other labs who have expressed an interest in replicating our findings using our 
absolutist dictionary on natural language data collected in their labs from clinically 
diagnosed patients.  This is clearly a welcome extension of our work and we look 
forward to the findings produced from others using our absolutist dictionary. 
 We have not addressed within-person variation in absolutist thinking and how 
that relates to changes in affective symptoms at an individual level (c.f. Molenaar and 
Campbell, 2009). For example, are individual changes in suicidal ideation over time 
reflected in changes in use of absolutist words? Future research could also seek to 
track absolutist thinking (and affective disorder) in individuals over time.  This could 
have even greater utility for clinical practice. 
 Future intervention studies could examine the causal status of absolutist 
thinking further, one possibility would be to use a cognitive bias modification 
paradigm (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011).  The aim would be to introduce some 
manipulation of absolutist thinking in participants and then examine the subsequent 
effects.  Alternatively, a narrow form of CBT which focussed on targeting absolutist 
thinking could be clinically trialled. 
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10.5 Absolutism and Negativity 
Humans are already disposed to attending to content, and negativity is a ubiquitous 
feature in those with depression.  Given this, the belief that negativity may play a 
causal role in depression was almost inevitable.  Many studies often present 
correlational data and the causation is simply implied or generally assumed to be 
supported.  Interpretive bias training, or cognitive bias modification (CBM), is an 
intervention which seeks to demonstrate the causal role for the negativity bias in 
depression.    
CBM aims to modify cognitive biases, by which they mean the negative bias.  
There are now a variety of CBM strategies for modifying negative attentional bias and 
negative interpretive bias.  For the attentional bias, a version of the dot probe task is 
often used, and participants are instructed to attend to positive stimuli.  For the 
interpretive bias, participants are presented with a series of ambiguous incomplete 
statements, participants are asked to complete the statement in a way that 
disambiguates the valence in a positive direction.  Alternatively, participants are asked 
to repeatedly select ‘good’ or positive images, faces and scenarios. 
There have been many studies examining the efficacy of CBM treatment and 
their findings have been mixed.  In a recent meta-analysis, Cristea, Kok and Cuijpers 
(2015) reviewed 49 randomized control studies for depression and anxiety.  Their 
meta-analysis accounted for outliers, the quality of the publishing journal and 
considered both clinical and subclinical levels of depression and anxiety.  They 
employed funnel plots to account for publication bias, finding an asymmetrical 
distribution around the mean effect size.  An unbiased sample should have the more 
 
 
Page 219 of 341 
 
precise estimates clustered around the mean and less precise measurements 
distributed evenly further out.  This meta-analysis concluded that “for clinical samples, 
the effects of CBM interventions on anxiety and depression outcomes were small and 
in most cases non-significant; in the cases where they were significant, such as for 
depression, it seems to have been as a result of the presence of outliers and/or 
publication bias”.  They highlight that for many studies CBM was not accomplished, as 
participants biases were not modified by the intervention.  In an earlier meta-analysis, 
Hallion and Ruscio (2011) included 45 studies (2,591 participants) and found similar 
results.  The conclude that CBM had a small effect on anxiety and depression, the 
effect was only reliable when symptoms were assessed with a stressor.  When anxiety 
and depression were examined separately, CBM significantly modified anxiety but not 
depression.  Overall, these meta-analyses cast serious doubt on the casual nature of 
negative thinking in depression and anxiety. 
In Grafton et al., (2017), the proponents of CBM have responded to these 
findings.  They note that where the CBM intervention fails to bring about bias 
modification, this cannot be considered CBM.  They separate studies into those where 
negative bias modification was achieved and those where it was not.  They find, that 
where bias modification actually occurs, the effect sizes for depression and anxiety 
reduction are more robust.  Fundamentally, they argue that negativity plays a causal 
role in depression, because where negativity can be shown to be reduced (not merely 
attempted), there is a reduced susceptibility to depression after a stressor.  There is 
however a flaw in this reasoning.  They select only studies where negativity is reduced 
(for whatever reason) and find that those participants are correspondingly less 
vulnerable to depression.  They then conclude that it is specifically the reduction in 
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negativity that has reduced the vulnerability.  However, if negativity was a symptom, 
not a cause of depression, then the same pattern of results would be seen where 
participants vulnerability improved for other reasons.  Consider a sports injury that 
produces pain, if you select only the patients whose pain has reduced (for whatever 
reason) after a given period of time and find that those patients are more like to have 
healed their injury, you cannot conclude that pain reduction heals injuries. 
If negativity does not play a causal role in depression, and if absolutism can be 
applied to negative as well as positive content, what then explains the ubiquitous 
presence of negative thinking in those with depression?  If it is merely a symptom of 
depression, why does depression manifest this particular symptom? 
To recognize why negativity would be an inevitable byproduct of absolutist 
thinking we first have to introduce the self-discrepancy theory of Higgins (1987, Figure 
10.1) and the self-regulation theory of Carver and Scheier (2001, Figure 10.1).  Higgins 
(1987), argued that individuals compare their ‘actual’ selves to either their ‘ideal’ self 
or ‘ought’ self.  The discrepancy between the actual self and these internalized 
standards produces various emotions, depending on the nature of the comparison.  
These emotions could be embarrassment, disappointment, anger, humiliation, 
sadness or even depression.  The emotional discomfort motivates individuals to 
reduce the discrepancy to their own various internalized standards.  In this way, the 
theory has an evolutionary foundation. 
 If it was indeed the case, that a discrepancy from our ideal self produces 
unhappiness; this would mandate that people be unhappy almost all of the time.  It is 
worth repeating this point, if it was indeed the case, that a discrepancy from our ideal 
self produces unhappiness; this would mandate that people be unhappy almost all of 
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the time.  This is because the vast majority of people are in a near ubiquitous state of 
deficit with respect to their ideal self.  Yet, most healthy individuals do not manifest 
such perpetual unhappiness, indeed, most people tend to be generally positive.  This 
led Carver and Scheier (2001) to propose a self-regulation theory which refines 
aspects of Higgins (1987) self-discrepancy theory.  They contend, that positive 
emotions are produced when individuals make satisfactory progress towards desired 
goals.  However, where there is no progress towards goals, or where the progress is 
too slow, this will produce negative emotions.  Therefore, it is not the discrepancy 
between actual and goal states that produces emotions (as outlined by Higgins), 
rather, emotions are determined by the rate at which these discrepancies are 
reduced. 
 I argue that if you apply absolutist thinking to the self-regulation model 
outlined by Carver and Scheier, the result will be the persistent negativity implied by 
the Higgins model.  Individuals that view discrepancies in and absolutist way, have a 
black and white view that makes appreciating gradual improvement (required by 
Carver and Scheier) more difficult.  To appreciate gradual improvement, an individual 
requires a more nuanced outlook.  Similarly, if a desired goal is unachievable, or too 
difficult to achieve, a non-absolutist individual will have the flexibility to shift to an 
alternative goal.  This will allow them to continue to produce positive emotions on-
route to a new goal.  Those with an absolutist outlook, are liable to rigidly insist on the 
original goal and suffer from making little (or no) progress.  An absolutist view of a 
discrepancy, also makes the very discrepancy less tolerable. Overall, an absolutist view 
of a discrepancy makes it more difficult to appreciate piecemeal progress, less likely to 
adaptively change goals and a greater intolerance of the discrepancy itself.  As noted 
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from the Higgins (1987) model, discrepancies are ubiquitous, and an inability to deal 
effectively with them (due to absolutism) will result in a state of unhappiness and 
negativity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1 Dipiction of the self-dicrepancy (Higgins, 18987) and self-regulation 
(Carver and Scheier, 2001) models. 
 
In this thesis we began to examine how a community sample felt about 
absolutist thinking and negative thinking under various conditions.  Additionally, we 
investigated whether those who preferred positive or non-absolutist appraisals, had 
fewer symptoms of depression.  Generally, we found that participants preferred 
positivity and non-absolutism.  When forced to choose, there was a high degree of 
variation in the sample between those that preferred positivity at the cost of 
absolutism (absolutely positive appraisals) and others who preferred non-absolutism 
at the cost of negativity (moderately negative appraisals).  There was no correlation 
Current state Goal state 
Positive affect produced when 
goal state is reached, and the 
discrepancy is removed 
Positive affect produced at each 
incremental step towards a goal, 
as the discrepancy is reduced 
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between these preferences and symptoms of depression.  This means that those who 
preferred positivity at the cost of absolutism did not have higher levels of depression 
symptoms.  Similarly, those who preferred non-absolutism at the cost of negativity 
also did not have higher levels of depression symptoms.  Future work in this area 
should investigate the topic in a more ecologically valid manner.  Moreover, our study 
employed a sample of British university students, mostly female and mostly young.  It 
would be interesting to see how results would differ using samples that are 
predominantly male, older or from different cultures.  It could be hypothesised that 
eastern cultures, which place a greater emphasis on moderation (“the middle way”) 
and less emphasis on positive thinking (Matthews, 2000; Yamazaki and Kayes, 2010), 
may select negative non-absolutist statements more than western community 
samples. 
 
10.6 Absolutism and Cognitive Rigidity 
Absolutist thinking (either categorical imperatives or dichotomous thinking) has 
previously been linked to cognitive rigidity (Teasdale et al., 2001).  While there are 
good intuitive reasons to assume that absolutist thoughts are more cognitively rigid, in 
this research, we set out to empirically demonstrate the connection.  In theory, 
change is much easier on a continuum as the gap between one position and the next 
is relatively small (depending on the scale).  Those that have a dichotomous outlook 
will find change more difficult because changing a dichotomous belief requires 
adopting its polar opposite.  The size of the change required makes it more difficult 
and less likely to occur.  Alternatively, an individual can bring about change by 
abandoning the dichotomous perspective and instituting a more nuanced outlook, but 
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this also requires more effort.  It is simply easiest for those that already have a non-
absolute perspective to change their beliefs. 
We found that this was indeed the case, appraisals of well-known celebrities 
that were absolute, were correspondingly more rigid.  The responses were recorded 
on analog scales for both positively and negatively valenced celebrities.  It should be 
noted that the absolute appraisals had the most reason to change as they had the 
largest discrepancy with the new information presented.  Once again our sample was 
disproportionately young and female, it would be interesting to see if such an effect 
could be replicated more generally, in other demographics.  Moreover, our data 
examines rigidity in the subjective appraisal of others (celebrities).  Future work could 
examine a similar effect in other social domains (e.g. political opinions or personal 
values etc.). 
 
10.7 Limitations and Future directions 
The research presented here was intentionally limited to only five aims; (1) 
establishing a distinction between ‘absolute’ and ‘extreme’; (2) pioneering an 
ecologically valid method for measuring absolutism; (3) investigating the relationship 
between absolutism and wellbeing; (4) comparing absolutism with negativity in 
relation to their impact on wellbeing; and finally (5) empirically demonstrating that 
absolute beliefs are more cognitively rigid.  All but the first aim would benefit from yet 
more research.   
 Our absolutist dictionary, which is used to calculate the percentage prevalence 
of absolutism in natural language, could be expanded and/or refined, based on 
greater validation of absolutist words.  Moreover, in the observational study outlined 
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in chapter 2, there was very little experimental control.  We could only infer general 
demographic characteristics about users based on the forums they wrote on.  Their 
identities, motivations, clinical status etc., is largely unknowable.  Follow-up studies 
should take a more experimental design; perhaps setting up a controlled ‘mock’ 
internet forum, where known participants (for whom there are descriptive statistics 
and diagnoses) could post in a similar fashion to public internet forums.  An additional 
advantage in such an experimental design is that experimenters could track a given 
individual over time, perhaps months.  They would have a record of both traditional 
subjective measures, and their natural language text analysis statistics, which they 
could examine for correlations over time.  In chapter 2, we also suggested, based on 
tentative empirical data, that absolutist thinking may be a cognitive vulnerability for 
depression, anxiety and suicidal ideation.  To examine this further, future studies 
would need to develop an intervention for disputing absolutist thinking specifically in 
those with certain mental health disorders, and then demonstrate that their 
intervention reduces vulnerability after exposure to a stressor.  This could be an 
adapted version of the cognitive bias modification exercises used to remove negative 
thinking biases.   
In determining the convergent validity for the measurement of absolutism in 
natural language with that for absolute responding on Likert scales, we examined the 
natural language in various online review websites (TripAdvisor, IMDB and Amazon).  
Future studies should seek to examine absolute responding on Likert scales for more 
personal beliefs with the absolutist word prevalence in natural language about those 
same personal beliefs.  In addition, future research could work to develop a subjective 
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measures absolutist thinking scale.  There is currently only one such scale (Oshio, 
2009) which examines the related topic of dichotomous thinking. 
In chapter 7-8, we conducted a series of behavioral studies to examine 
whether participants preferred moderate negative statements or absolute positive 
statements.  We found that participants preferred absolute positive statements more 
when they were primed to focus on themselves.  This study was conducted using a 
sample of psychology student at the University of Reading.  The sample was 
overwhelmingly young and female, there may well be differences in response for 
different demographics, therefore any replication study should recruit a broader 
sample.  We had predicted but did not find, that those placed under a time pressure 
would also select more absolute positive statements as it is the more superficially 
positive option.  Future studies may want to replicate this attempt, by instituting a 
better time pressure manipulation.  We also predicted but found no relationship 
between a preference for absolute positive statements and depression.  It may be that 
examining the connection between depression with absolutism and valence 
simultaneously, leads to inevitable confounds that obscure the results.   
In chapter 9, we begin to demonstrate empirically that absolute beliefs are 
more cognitively rigid.  As with our behavioral work, this study had a narrow sample of 
predominantly young and female psychology student at the University of Reading.  
Future research should aim to broaden this to include a more representative sample 
of the population.   Secondly, we focused on obtaining absolute/non-absolute beliefs 
about well-known celebrities.  To make this research more relevant to those with 
depression and other mental health disorders, future work should focus on capturing 
absolute beliefs relevant to mental health.  Finally, future studies examining the 
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cognitive rigidity associated with absolutism may also seek to be more ecologically 
valid than that outlines in chapter 9. 
To make the scope of the research manageable, we set out 5 specific questions 
to address in this thesis.  This however is only a small fraction of what could be 
studied and understood with respect to absolutism more generally.  More work needs 
to be done establishing the mechanism by which absolutist thinking brings about 
various mental health disorders.  In this discussion, we have laid out the theory (self-
discrepancy/regulation theory), but collecting empirical data to support this theory is 
beyond the scope of the present thesis.  While have presented data linking absolutist 
thinking with some mental health conditions, more work needs to be done detailing 
which conditions are and are not related to absolutist thinking (e.g. addiction, 
obsessive compulsive-disorder, phobias etc.).  These could also be subclinical general 
unhappiness and lack of thriving or more serious personality disorders.  The impact of 
absolutist thinking also extends beyond mental health, the concept of absolutist 
pervades throughout politics, religion, society and culture.  The methodologies, and 
even some of the insights, derived from mental health research focused on absolutism 
could be beneficial to these other fields (and vice versa). 
Finally, there have been a great number of studies examining various forms for 
reappraisal using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  These have often 
centered on positive reappraisal, where participants are asked to appraise a given 
ambiguous situation in a more positive way.  It would be quite simple to adapt these 
same paradigms to conduct cognitive reappraisal studies targeted at disputing 
absolutism and instructing participants to appraise a stimulus in a non-absolute way, 
while in the fMRI scanner.  This would highlight regions in the brain which are 
 
 
Page 228 of 341 
 
important in moving away from the heuristic of absolutist thinking and towards a 
more nuanced and sophisticated non-absolutist perspective. 
 
10.8 Conclusion 
This research set out to address five questions laid out in the introduction.  In 
addressing these questions, we have (1) established that the concept of absolutism is 
theoretically and empirical distinct from extremism.  This qualitative and quantitative 
difference has consequential implications in specifying the type of cognitive distortion 
that correlates and begets anxiety, depression and suicidal ideation.  We have (2) 
developed a new method for measuring absolutist thinking, using text analysis and 
natural language.  This method is drastically more ecologically valid then the few 
previous attempts at estimating this construct.  Moreover, we have established 
convergent validity between our method of measuring absolutist thinking in natural 
language and the more traditional method of counting absolute responses on Likert 
scales.  We find (3) strong correlations between absolutist thinking and a range of 
affective disorders.  We show that an elevated use of absolutist words is a marker for 
absolutist thinking and not psychological distress per se.  Also, we present data that 
suggests absolutist thinking is a cognitive vulnerability for depression and suicidal 
ideation, not merely a correlate.  We show (4) that absolutism is a better marker for 
the natural language of affective disorder than negativity.  Moreover, we present 
behavioral data that reveals most individuals prefer moderate negativity over absolute 
positivity, although this is liable to manipulation when priming people to focus on 
themselves as opposed to others.  Finally (5), we empirically demonstrate that 
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absolute thoughts are more cognitively rigid than non-absolute thoughts, even when 
they have more reason to be changed. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
 
SPSS SYNTAX 
BOOTSTRAP 
  /SAMPLING METHOD=STRATIFIED(STRATA=Forum )   
  /VARIABLES TARGET=AbsolutistLog10 INPUT=Condition Forum  WC  
  /CRITERIA CILEVEL=95 CITYPE=BCA  NSAMPLES=1000 
  /MISSING USERMISSING=EXCLUDE. 
MIXED AbsolutistLog10 BY Forum Condition 
  /CRITERIA=CIN(95) MXITER(150) MXSTEP(10) SCORING(1) 
SINGULAR(0.000000000001) HCONVERGE(0,  
    ABSOLUTE) LCONVERGE(0, ABSOLUTE) PCONVERGE(0.000001, ABSOLUTE) 
  /FIXED=Condition | SSTYPE(3) 
  /METHOD=REML 
  /REGWGT=WC 
  /PRINT=  SOLUTION TESTCOV 
  /RANDOM=Forum(Condition) | SUBJECT(Forum) COVTYPE(VC). 
 
Appendix 2 
In-House Text Analysis Python Code 
 
In house Python Script for Word Level Analysis: 
 
# script to assess absolutism/reletivism 
 
from __future__ import division 
import nltk 
import nltk, re, pprint 
import numpy 
import matplotlib 
import re 
import xlsxwriter 
import string 
import codecs 
from nltk.stem.porter import PorterStemmer 
porter_stemmer = PorterStemmer() 
 
workbook = xlsxwriter.Workbook('absolutist001.xlsx') #creating a workbook 
worksheet = workbook.add_worksheet() #creating a worksheet 
number_list = [] 
 
file = open('absol19.txt') # This is the dictionary in use - change as appropriate 
t = file.read(); #reading file 
t.lower() # Normalising 
u_t = unicode(t, errors='ignore') #converting string into Unicode 
absol = nltk.word_tokenize(u_t) #tokenize the 'string' -> absol 
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text = nltk.Text(absol) #converts to nltk? 
sorted(set(absol)) #sorts into alphabetical order and removes repeats 
file = open('suic.txt') #This is the file you want to test 
raw = file.read(); #Reading above text 
u_raw = unicode(raw, errors='ignore') #Converting to Unicode 
u_raw.lower() #Normalising 
Ellis = nltk.word_tokenize(u_raw) #Tokenising text 
text = nltk.Text(Ellis) #converts to nltk 
 
for item in absol: #for each item in absol list 
    fdist = nltk.FreqDist(Ellis) #calculates frequency distribution for all words in 
Ellis 
    numbers = str(fdist.freq(item)) #Convert dictionary item frequencies to string 
format 
    re.split(r'\s+', numbers) # convert frequency string to list 
    number_list.append(numbers) #add those numbers to a numbers list 
 
row = 0 
col = 0 
for item in number_list:  
    worksheet.write(row, col,     item) 
    row += 1 
 
worksheet.write(row, 1, 'Total') 
worksheet.write(row, 0, '=SUM(A1:A431)') 
 
workbook.close() 
#below code prints out concordance 
def get_all_phrases_containing_tar_wrd(target_word, tar_passage, left_margin 
= 10, right_margin = 10): 
    Ellis = nltk.word_tokenize(tar_passage) 
    text = nltk.Text(Ellis) 
    c = nltk.ConcordanceIndex(text.Ellis, key = lambda s: s.lower()) 
    concordance_txt = ([text.Ellis[map(lambda x: x-5 if (x-left_margin)&gt[0] else 
0, [offset])[0]:offset+right_margin] 
                        for offset in c.offsets(target_word)]) 
    return [''.join([x+' ' for x in con_sub]) for con_sub in concordance_txt] 
  
Ellis = nltk.word_tokenize(u_raw)# This section prints out only matched words 
ci = nltk.ConcordanceIndex(Ellis) 
for t_word in absol: 
    if ci.offsets(t_word): 
        ci.print_concordance(t_word) 
print 
print 'Results from function' 
results = get_all_phrases_containing_tar_wrd(absol, u_raw) 
for result in results: 
Appendix 3 
 
Table S1.  Characteristics of Test and Control Internet Forums. 
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Category Forum source Word Countb No. of postsc Avg. post lengthd 
  
  
  
S
tu
d
y
 1
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 .
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
G
r
o
u
p
s 
General Forumsa 
Mumsnet.com 36617 157 210 
Boards.ie/TheLadiesLounge 31420 131 221 
Boards.ie/TheGentlemensClub 26419 121 173 
Askmen.com 37222 141 258 
PensionersForum.co.uk 30102 126 154 
TheStudentRoom.co.uk 31175 142 221 
Boards.ie/WorkandJobs 32254 109 258 
Asthma Forums 
HealthUnlocked.com 33675 122 272 
Patient.info/Asthma 19010 95 211 
Dailystrength.org 34627 90 253 
Healthboards.com 32500 111 248 
Diabetes Forums 
Diabetes.co.uk 34963 152 211 
Patient.info/Diabetes 32885 139 267 
Diabetessupport.co.uk 38347 174 198 
Diabetes-support.org.uk 31453 122 242 
Cancer Forums 
Beatingbowelcancer.org 35940 95 259 
Macmillan.org.uk 33042 141 203 
Cancerforums.net 33007 122 225 
ProstateCancerUK.org 33438 93 241 
T
e
st
 G
r
o
u
p
s 
General Anxiety 
Disorder Forums 
Patient.info/Anxiety 42078 152 240 
Anxietyforum.net 38962 85 371 
Anxietyzone.com 43817 115 332 
Nomorepanic.co.uk 32723 90 266 
Mentalhealthforum.net 36387 96 334 
Psychforums.com 35432 76 449 
Depression 
Forums 
Patient.info/Depression 34616 103 304 
Mentalhealthforum.net 33167 69 357 
Depressionforums.org 36504 83 341 
Dealingwithdepression.co.uk 30465 65 317 
Psychcentral.com/Depression 40147 107 309 
Beyondblue.org.au 35586 127 256 
Suicidal Ideation 
Forums 
Suicideforum.com 42339 112 359 
Takethislife.com 43611 98 383 
Suicidemethods.net 39447 104 355 
Experienceproject.com 38542 59 290 
S
tu
d
y
 2
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
G
r
o
u
p
 
Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder 
Forums 
Myptsd.com 40511 112 362 
Psychforums.com/PTSD 38577 90 433 
Psychcentral.com/PTSD 34852 88 387 
Patient.info/PTSD 20659 42 492 
Mentalhealthforum.net 40435 96 400 
Ehealthforum.com 34731 107 302 
Schizophrenia 
Forums 
Psychforums.com 38924 77 512 
Schizophrenia.com 33460 106 216 
Mentalhealthforum.net 32687 104 314 
Psychcentral.com 40187 137 277 
eHealthforum.com 36745 75  477 
Healthboards.com 31430 94 314 
T
e
st
 G
r
o
u
p
 
Borderline 
Personality 
Disorder Forums 
Psychforums.com 35472 98 362 
Mentalhealthforum.net 33589 86 377 
Psychcentral.com 32717 100 312 
Experienceproject.com 15058 42 350 
Eating Disorder 
Forums 
Patient.info/Eating-disorders 37018 134 270 
Nationaleatingdisorders.org 35733 126 267 
Mentalhealthforum.net 33433 117 283 
Psychcentral.com 12379 44 281 
Recoveryourlife.com 34152 126 269 
S
tu
d
y
 3
 
T
e
st
 G
r
o
u
p
 
Recovery Forums 
Depressionforums.org 45054 112 302 
Psychcentral.com 13612 25 378 
Dealingwithdepression.co.uk 12325 24 342 
Takethislife.com/Success Stories 35061 68 455 
Takethislife.com/GettingBetter 36792 94 287 
Beyondblue.org.au/StayingWell 42731 104 375 
Suicideforum.com/PositiveFeelings 48436 131 327 
Note.  GAD = Generalized anxiety disorder; PTSD = Post traumatic stress disorder; BPD = Borderline personality 
disorder; ED = Eating disorder. 
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a General Forums = ‘Mumsnet’ (Women), ‘The Ladies Lounge’ (Women), ‘The Gentlemen’s Club’ (Men), ‘Ask 
Men’ (Men), ‘Pensioners Forum’ (Elderly), ‘Student Room’ (Young), ‘Work Problems’. 
b Word count for each forum, only ‘first posts’ collected.   
c Number of ‘first posts’ which comprise the forums corpus.   
d Average number of words in each forum post 
 
 
Appendix 4 
Word ratings 
Please decide whether the adjacent 66 words are absolute, relative and/or extreme 
You may select more than one option 
 
Absolute words are associated with ‘black and white thinking’ 
Absolute words have no nuance 
 
Relative words have some nuance 
 
Extreme words denote a high deviation from a neutral position 
 
Words Absolute Relative Extreme 
100%       
about       
absolutely       
all       
almost       
always       
anything       
around       
complete       
completely       
consider       
considered       
considering       
constant       
constantly       
could       
definitely       
doubt       
entire       
especially       
ever       
every       
everyone       
everything       
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expect       
extremely       
fair       
fairly       
full       
general       
generally       
huge       
likely       
may       
maybe       
might       
mostly       
must       
nearly       
need       
needed       
never       
normally       
nothing       
often       
perhaps       
possibility       
possible       
possibly       
pretty       
probably       
rather       
really       
relatively       
seriously       
slight       
slightly       
some       
somewhat       
suppose       
thought       
totally       
unsure       
usually       
very       
whole       
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Appendix 5 
Removing False Positives 
 
not absolute* 441 
almost absolute* 441 
hi all 441 
hello all 441 
thanks all 441 
not all 441 
almost all 441 
dear all 441 
all in all 441 
not always 441 
almost always 441 
not complete 441 
almost complete 441 
not completely 441 
almost completely 441 
not constant 441 
almost constant 441 
not constantly 441 
almost constantly 441 
not definite* 441 
almost definite* 441 
not entire* 441 
almost entire* 441 
not every 441 
almost every 441 
every 1 441 
every 2 441 
every 3 441 
every 4 441 
every 5 441 
every 6 441 
every 7 441 
every 8 441 
every 9 441 
every 10 441 
every few 441 
every two 441 
every three 441 
every four 441 
every five 441 
every six 441 
every seven 441 
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every eight 441 
every nine 441 
every ten 441 
not everyone 441 
hi everyone 441 
hello everyone 441 
thanks everyone 441 
almost everyone 441 
not everything 441 
almost everything 441 
not full* 441 
almost full* 441 
full time 441 
not never 441 
almost never 441 
not nothing 441 
probably nothing 441 
almost nothing 441 
not total* 441 
almost total* 441 
not whole 441 
almost whole 441 
 
 
Appendix 6 
 
RussGen6 
http://www.brik.org/forum.php 
RussGen5 
http://forum.vega-int.ru/ 
RussGen4 
http://mospens.ru/ 
RussGen3 
http://www.studforum.ru/viewforum.php?f=36&sid=a917abf857ebd836154248002ac8
0f94 
RussGen2 
http://kiev.com.ua/forum/forumdisplay.php?f=115 
RussGen1 
http://www.u-mama.ru/forum/ 
RussDep6 
http://www.psygorodok.ru/forum/viewforum.php?f=172 
RussDep5 
http://neuroleptic.ru/forum/forum/30-
%D0%B0%D1%84%D1%84%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%
BD % D1% 8B% D0% B5-% D1% 80% D0% B0% D1% 81% 81%% the D1 the D1% 
82% 80% the D1% D0% BE% D0% B9% D1% 81% the D1% 82% D0% B2% D0% 
B0 / 
RussDep4 
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http://www.palata6.net/forum/index.php?s=63cfaaa85b7b4c89e68da1fdd5e70528&sho
wforum=84 
RussDep3 
https://www.b17.ru/forum/?f=4 
RussDep2 
http://mneploho.net/forum/thread61.html 
RussDep1 
http://psycheforum.ru/forum98.html 
FrenchGen5 
https://www.entrepatients.net/fr/communautes/groupes/asthme 
FrenchGen4 
http://www.boursorama.com/forum-retraite-1 
FrenchGen3 
http://forum.doctissimo.fr/viepratique/travail/liste_sujet-1.htm 
FrenchGen2 
http://forums.studyrama.com/index.php?showforum=18 
FrenchGen1 
http://forum.magicmaman.com/showthread.php?701564-Presentation_question_APE 
FrenchDep5 
http://revivre.org/forum/viewforum.php?f=33 
FrenchDep4 
https://www.entrepatients.net/fr/communautes/groupes/depression 
FrenchDep3 
http://www.onmeda.fr/forum/d%C3%A9pression-et-mal-%C3%AAtre 
FrenchDep2 
http://forum.doctissimo.fr/psychologie/depression-deprime-stress/liste_sujet-5.htm 
FrenchDep1 
http://forum.psychologies.com/psychologiescom/deprime-depression/liste_sujet-1.htm 
GermGen6 
http://www.beobachter.ch/foren/uebersicht/foren/list_topic/politik/ 
GermGen5 
http://www.beobachter.ch/foren/uebersicht/foren/list_topic/arbeitsforum/ 
GermGen4 
http://www.beobachter.ch/foren/uebersicht/foren/list_topic/gesundheitsforum/ 
GermGen3 
https://www.ihre-vorsorge.de/forum.html 
GermGen2 
http://www.studentenseite.de/forums/allgemeines-zum-studentenleben.8/ 
GermGen1 
http://www.babyclub.de/mybabyclub/community/foren/11530539.kleinkind-
forum.html 
GermDep6 
http://f3.webmart.de/f.cfm?id=888031&sr=1 
GermDep5 
https://www.depri.ch/f9/ 
GermDep3 
http://bfriends.brigitte.de/foren/depressionen/ 
GermDep2 
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http://www.nur-
ruhe.de/smf/index.php?PHPSESSID=g0al9k41jg0dl29la8k8dp78hfo3jmm2c565vq4r4a
1d073n9n51&board=12.0 
GermDep1 
http://www.psychologieforum.de/psychologie-was-menschen-belastet-12/depression-
15/ 
SpanGen5 
http://www.mediavida.com/foro/estudios-trabajo 
SpanGen3 
http://foros.monografias.com/forumdisplay.php/45-Foro-Masculino 
SpanGen2 
http://www.enfemenino.com/world/communaute/forum/forum0.asp 
SpanGen1 
https://www.crianzanatural.com/forum/forum_posts.asp?TID=200377 
SpanDep6 
http://www.forumclinic.org/foros/depresi%C3%B3n 
SpanDep4 
http://www.foros24h.com/242/depresion/ 
SpanDep3 
http://www.fobiasocial.net/porque-el-antioqueno-es-tan-engreido-80581/ 
SpanDep1 
http://www.psicologia-
online.com/foros/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=67486&sid=c4e48f4f990866f8de4d8e96d6152
6fa 
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French Absolutist Dictionary 
absolument 402 
tout 402 
toujours 402 
complet 402 
complètement 402 
constante 402 
constamment 402 
certainement 402 
entière 402 
tous 402 
tout le monde 402 
sans cesse 402 
plein 402 
doit 402 
jamais 402 
rien 402 
total 402 
entier 402 
toute 402 
tout à fait 402 
 
Appendix 8 
 
German Absolutist Dictionary 
absolut 406 
alle 406 
immer 406 
komplett 406 
vollständig 406 
Konstante 406 
ständig 406 
bestimmt 406 
ganz 406 
jemals 406 
jeder 406 
jedermann 406 
alles 406 
voll 406 
nie 406 
nichts 406 
völlig 406 
ganze 406 
stets 406 
komplettes 406 
völlig 406 
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konstant 406 
definitiv 406 
ganzen 406 
jeden 406 
voller 406 
müssen 406 
niemals 406 
total 406 
ganzes 406 
ganzer 406 
ganze 406 
jedem 406 
vollen  406 
muss 406 
jede 406 
volle 406 
 
 
Appendix 9 
 
Russian Absolutist Dictionary 
% 
100 405 
Абсолютно 405 
Все 405 
весь 405 
Всегда 405 
Полностью 405 
постоянная 405 
Постоянно 405 
полный 405 
Когда-либо 405 
каждый 405 
Должен 405 
Ничего 405 
определенно 405 
 
Appendix 10 
 
Spanish Absolutist Dictionary 
100 403 
absolutamente 403 
todas 403 
siempre 403 
completamente 403 
constante 403 
constantemente 403 
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nunca 403 
cada 403 
todo 403 
completo 403 
debe 403 
nunca 403 
nada 403 
totalmente 403 
completar 403 
seguro 403 
 
 
 
Appendix 11 
 
Naive Bayes Machine Learning R Script 
 
############ THINGS TO INSTALL ############# 
############ THINGS TO INSTALL ############# 
############ THINGS TO INSTALL ############# 
install.packages("Matrix") 
install.packages("quanteda") 
install.packages("devtools") 
install_github("kbenoit/quantedaData") 
 
devtools::install_github('kbenoit/quantedaData') 
install.packages("tm")  # for text mining 
install.packages("SnowballC") # for text stemming 
install.packages("wordcloud") # word-cloud generator  
install.packages("RColorBrewer") # color palettes 
install.packages('caret', dependencies = TRUE) 
install.packages("readtext") 
 
library("devtools") 
library(quanteda) 
library(quantedaData) 
library(readtext) 
library(quanteda) 
library(quantedaData) 
library("quanteda", quietly = TRUE, warn.conflicts = FALSE) 
library(caret) 
library("tm") 
library("SnowballC") 
library("wordcloud") 
library("RColorBrewer") 
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##### PREPROCESSING AMAZON DATA ############ 
##### PREPROCESSING AMAZON DATA ############ 
##### PREPROCESSING AMAZON DATA ############ 
 
 
AbsolDict <- dictionary(list(absolutes = c("absolutely", "absolute", "all", "always", "complete", 
                             "completely", "constant", "constantly",  
                             "definitely", "definite", "entire", "entirely", "ever", 
                             "everyone", "everything", "full", "fully", "must", 
                             "never", "every", "nothing", "totally", "total", 
                             "whole"))) 
 
require(quanteda) 
require(readtext) 
Amazonfiles <- readtext("/Users/mohammedalmosaiwi/Documents/Uni/Pythonwork/Valence/Text 
Documents_Temp/*.txt") 
LIWC_Amazon = 
read.csv("/Users/mohammedalmosaiwi/Documents/Uni/Pythonwork/Valence/LIWC_VALENCE2.csv", header = 
TRUE) 
 
Amazonfiles["RatingsAbsol"] = (rep(c(1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2), len = nrow(Amazonfiles))) 
Amazonfiles["Group"] = rep(1:3, each = 162, 90, 90, len = nrow(Amazonfiles)) 
Amazonfiles["Ratings"] = (rep(c(1, 10, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9), len = nrow(Amazonfiles))) 
Amazonfiles["Valence"] = (rep(c(1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 3, 2, 2, 2), len = nrow(Amazonfiles))) 
Amazonfiles[253:342, 4] = rep(3) 
Amazonfiles[163:342, 3] = (rep(c(1, 2, 2, 2, 1), 36)) 
Amazonfiles[163:342, 5] = (rep(c(1, 2, 3, 4, 5), 36)) 
Amazonfiles[163:342, 6] = (rep(c(1, 1, 3, 2, 2), 36)) 
 
# head(Amazonfiles) 
# View(Amazonfiles) 
 
# RENAME headings in data.frame 
names(Amazonfiles) <- c("Filename", "text", "RatingsAbsol", "Groups") 
 
# FACTORIZE (ratings), create new binary variable 
Amazonfiles$RatingsAbsol <- as.factor(Amazonfiles$RatingsAbsol) 
Amazonfiles$Groups <- as.factor(Amazonfiles$Groups) 
 
# MISSING DATA check 
length(which(!complete.cases(Amazonfiles))) 
 
# DISTRIBUTION of groups check 
prop.table(table(Amazonfiles$RatingsAbsol)) 
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prop.table(table(Amazonfiles$Groups)) 
 
# FORMATTING - convert text to utf8 
Amazonfiles$text = iconv(enc2utf8(Amazonfiles$text),sub="byte") 
 
###FIND AND REPLACE within a data frame - cleaning data 
Amazonfiles$text = gsub("\n", " ", Amazonfiles$text) 
Amazonfiles$text = gsub("/", " ", Amazonfiles$text) 
Amazonfiles$text = gsub("&", "and", Amazonfiles$text) 
 
library(caret) 
set.seed(32984) 
Amazon.indexes <- createDataPartition(Amazonfiles$RatingsAbsol, times = 1, 
                                      p = 0.7, list = FALSE) 
 
 
trainAmazon <- Amazonfiles[Amazon.indexes,] 
testAmazon <- Amazonfiles[-Amazon.indexes,] 
trainLIWC = LIWC_Amazon[Amazon.indexes,] 
testLIWC = LIWC_Amazon[-Amazon.indexes,] 
 
prop.table(table(trainAmazon$RatingsAbsol)) 
prop.table(table(testAmazon$RatingsAbsol)) 
prop.table(table(trainAmazon$Groups)) 
prop.table(table(testAmazon$Groups)) 
 
AmazonCorpus <- corpus(trainAmazon) 
colnames(trainAmazon) 
colnames(testAmazon) 
colnames(trainLIWC) 
colnames(testLIWC) 
 
 
# TOKENIZE 
trainAmazon.tokens = tokens(trainAmazon$text, what = "word",  
                            remove_numbers = TRUE, remove_punct = TRUE, 
                            remove_symbols = TRUE, remove_hyphens = TRUE) 
 
 
# LOWER CASE the tokens. 
trainAmazon.tokens = tokens_tolower(trainAmazon.tokens) 
 
# STOP WORDS 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION <- tokens_select(trainAmazon.tokens, AbsolDict) 
# STEMMING 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION <- tokens_wordstem(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION, language = "english") 
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# DFM <- Preprosessed data 
trainAmazon.tokens.dfm <- dfm(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION, tolower = FALSE) 
dim(trainAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
 
# LEXICAL DIVERSITY - trainAmazon_LexDiv 
trainAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS = dfm(trainAmazon.tokens, tolower = FALSE) 
dim(trainAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS) 
trainAmazon_LexDiv = textstat_lexdiv(trainAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS, measure = c("all")) 
 
# MATRIX <- DFM 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.matrix <- as.matrix(trainAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
 
# TERM FREQUENCY FUNCTION <- create fucntion 
term.frequency <- function(row) { 
  row / sum(row) 
} 
 
# NORMALIZE all documents with TF  # we lose the RatingsAbsol column 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm <- apply(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.matrix, 1, term.frequency) 
dim(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm) 
 
# TRANSPOSE the matrix 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm <- t(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm) 
dim(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm) 
 
# DF <- DFM+RatingsAbsol 
# trainAmazon is a df and provides the RatingsAbsol vector 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df <- cbind(RatingsAbsol = trainAmazon$RatingsAbsol, 
as.data.frame(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm)) 
 
# COLNAMES <- make names 
names(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) <- make.names(names(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df)) 
 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
############################### TEST DATA PREPROCESSING 
####################################### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
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#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
 
# Tokenization. 
testAmazon.tok <- tokens(testAmazon$text, what = "word",  
                         remove_numbers = TRUE, remove_punct = TRUE, 
                         remove_symbols = TRUE, remove_hyphens = TRUE) 
 
# Lower case the tokens. 
testAmazon.tok <- tokens_tolower(testAmazon.tok) 
 
# Stopword removal. 
testAmazon.tokens <- tokens_select(testAmazon.tok, AbsolDict) 
 
# Stemming. 
testAmazon.tokens <- tokens_wordstem(testAmazon.tokens, language = "english") 
 
# Lexival Diversity 
testAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS = dfm(testAmazon.tok, tolower = FALSE) 
dim(testAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS) 
testAmazon_LexDiv = textstat_lexdiv(testAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS, measure = c("all")) 
 
# Convert n-grams to quanteda DOCUMENT-TERM FREQUENCY MATRIX matrix. 
testAmazon.tokens.dfm <- dfm(testAmazon.tokens, tolower = FALSE) 
 
# MATCH TEST WITH TRAIN 
testAmazon.tokens.dfm <- dfm_select(testAmazon.tokens.dfm, pattern = trainAmazon.tokens.dfm, 
                                    selection = "keep") 
 
 
dim(testAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
 
# Ensure the test dfm has the same n-grams as the training dfm. 
# 
# NOTE - In production we should expect that new text messages will  
#        contain n-grams that did not exist in the original training 
#        data. As such, we need to strip those n-grams out. 
# 
 
# MATRIX <- DFM 
testAmazon.tokens.matrix <- as.matrix(testAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
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# NORMALIZE all documents with TF  # we lose the RatingsAbsol column 
testAmazon.tokens.dfm <- apply(testAmazon.tokens.matrix, 1, term.frequency) 
dim(testAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
 
# TRANSPOSE the matrix 
testAmazon.tokens.dfm <- t(testAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
dim(testAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
 
# DF <- DFM+RatingsAbsol 
# trainAmazon is a df and provides the RatingsAbsol vector 
testAmazon.tokens.df <- cbind(RatingsAbsol = testAmazon$RatingsAbsol, 
as.data.frame(testAmazon.tokens.dfm)) 
 
# COLNAMES <- make names 
names(testAmazon.tokens.df) <- make.names(names(testAmazon.tokens.df)) 
 
# Fix incomplete cases 
summary(testAmazon.tokens.df[1,]) 
testAmazon.tokens.df[is.na(testAmazon.tokens.df)] <- 0.0 
summary(testAmazon.tokens.df[1,]) 
 
#  ADD EXTRA FEATURES - LIWC and TTR 
 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Exclam) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Apostro) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$WPS) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Parenth) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Comma) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Dash) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Sixltr) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Exclam) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Apostro) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$WPS) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Parenth) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Comma) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Dash) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Sixltr) 
 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainAmazon_LexDiv$CTTR) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testAmazon_LexDiv$CTTR) 
 
 
##### MOVEME FUNCTION #########   
moveme <- function (invec, movecommand) { 
  movecommand <- lapply(strsplit(strsplit(movecommand, ";")[[1]],  
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                                 ",|\\s+"), function(x) x[x != ""]) 
  movelist <- lapply(movecommand, function(x) { 
    Where <- x[which(x %in% c("before", "after", "first",  
                              "last")):length(x)] 
    ToMove <- setdiff(x, Where) 
    list(ToMove, Where) 
  }) 
  myVec <- invec 
  for (i in seq_along(movelist)) { 
    temp <- setdiff(myVec, movelist[[i]][[1]]) 
    A <- movelist[[i]][[2]][1] 
    if (A %in% c("before", "after")) { 
      ba <- movelist[[i]][[2]][2] 
      if (A == "before") { 
        after <- match(ba, temp) - 1 
      } 
      else if (A == "after") { 
        after <- match(ba, temp) 
      } 
    } 
    else if (A == "first") { 
      after <- 0 
    } 
    else if (A == "last") { 
      after <- length(myVec) 
    } 
    myVec <- append(temp, values = movelist[[i]][[1]], after = after) 
  } 
  myVec 
} 
 
##### MOVE RATINGS ABSOL LAST #########   
colnames(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df[moveme(names(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df), "RatingsAbsol last")] 
testAmazon.tokens.df = testAmazon.tokens.df[moveme(names(testAmazon.tokens.df), "RatingsAbsol last")] 
 
# transform outcome variable to text as this is required in caret for classification  
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df$RatingsAbsol <- 
ifelse(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df$RatingsAbsol==1,'Absolute','Moderate') 
testAmazon.tokens.df$RatingsAbsol <- ifelse(testAmazon.tokens.df$RatingsAbsol==1,'Absolute','Moderate') 
 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df$RatingsAbsol = as.factor(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df$RatingsAbsol) 
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testAmazon.tokens.df$RatingsAbsol = as.factor(testAmazon.tokens.df$RatingsAbsol) 
 
dim(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
dim(testAmazon.tokens.df) 
 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
############################### NAIVE BAYES 1 
################################################# 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
 
######## RUN NIAVE BAYES CLASSIFIER ######### 
library(e1071) 
library(caret) 
NiBayes_Amazon = naiveBayes(RatingsAbsol ~ ., data = trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
NiBayes_Amazon 
 
PredictNiBayes = predict(NiBayes_Amazon, testAmazon.tokens.df, type="class") 
confusionMatrix(table(PredictNiBayes, testAmazon.tokens.df$RatingsAbsol)) 
 
 
######  MOST IMPORTANT FEATURES ########## 
roc_imp <- filterVarImp(x = trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df[, -ncol(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df)], y = 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df$RatingsAbsol) 
roc_imp2 = roc_imp[order("Absolute")]  
View(roc_imp2) 
 
###### EXPORT AND IMPORT FILES ###### 
sink("/Users/mohammedalmosaiwi/Documents/Uni/Pythonwork/Valence/New_LSE_Updated/Niave_Bayes50.cs
v") 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df 
sink(NULL) 
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HF_Amazon = 
read.csv("/Users/mohammedalmosaiwi/Documents/Uni/Pythonwork/Valence/New_LSE_Updated/HF_Moder.csv
", header = TRUE) 
 
#####  WORDCLOUD  ####### 
library(tm) 
library(SnowballC) 
library(wordcloud) 
 
set.seed(1234) 
wordcloud(words = HF_Amazon[,1], freq = HF_Amazon[,2], min.freq = 1, scale = c(3, 0.2), 
          max.words=100, random.order=FALSE, rot.per=0.35,  
          colors=brewer.pal(8, "Dark2")) 
####### IMPORTANT FEATURES ONLY CLASSIFIER ######## 
library(e1071) 
library(caret) 
 
NiBayes_Amazon = train(RatingsAbsol ~  but           + 
                         seem          + 
                         though        + 
                         ever          + 
                         howev         + 
                         much          + 
                         more          + 
                         your          + 
                         cant          + 
                         somewhat      + 
                         thank         + 
                         rather        + 
                         my            + 
                         never         + 
                         some          + 
                         you           + 
                         overal        + 
                         will          + 
                         too           + 
                         `Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm.VAL$CTTR` + 
                         anyon         + 
                         certain        , data = trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
 
PredictNiBayes = predict(NiBayes_Amazon, testAmazon.tokens.df, type="raw") 
confusionMatrix(table(PredictNiBayes, testAmazon.tokens.df$RatingsAbsol)) 
NiBayes_Amazon 
 
 
 
Page 291 of 341 
 
colnames(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
############################### CROSS VALIDATION 
############################################## 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
 
# TOKENIZE 
Amazonfiles.tokens = tokens(Amazonfiles$text, what = "word",  
                            remove_numbers = TRUE, remove_punct = TRUE, 
                            remove_symbols = TRUE, remove_hyphens = TRUE) 
 
# LOWER CASE the tokens. 
Amazonfiles.tokens = tokens_tolower(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
# STOP WORDS 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- tokens_select(Amazonfiles.tokens, stopwords(kind = "SMART"),  
                                    selection = "keep") 
# STEMMING 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- tokens_wordstem(Amazonfiles.tokens, language = "english") 
 
# DFM <- Preprosessed data 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- dfm(Amazonfiles.tokens, tolower = FALSE) 
dim(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
# MATRIX <- DFM 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- as.matrix(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
# TERM FREQUENCY FUNCTION <- create fucntion 
term.frequency <- function(row) { 
  row / sum(row) 
} 
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# NORMALIZE all documents with TF  # we lose the RatingsAbsol column 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- apply(Amazonfiles.tokens, 1, term.frequency) 
dim(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
# TRANSPOSE the matrix 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- t(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
dim(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
# DF <- DFM+RatingsAbsol 
# trainAmazon is a df and provides the RatingsAbsol vector 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- cbind(RatingsAbsol = Amazonfiles$RatingsAbsol, as.data.frame(Amazonfiles.tokens)) 
 
# COLNAMES <- make names 
names(Amazonfiles.tokens) <- make.names(names(Amazonfiles.tokens)) 
library("dplyr") 
 
Amazonfiles.tokens$RatingsAbsol <- as.factor(Amazonfiles.tokens$RatingsAbsol) 
Amazonfiles.tokens$RatingsAbsol <- ifelse(Amazonfiles.tokens$RatingsAbsol==1,'Absolute','Moderate') 
 
 
 
# TOKENIZE - LEXICAL DIVERSITY = Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm.VAL 
Amazonfiles_ALL = tokens(Amazonfiles$text, what = "word",  
                         remove_numbers = TRUE, remove_punct = TRUE, 
                         remove_symbols = TRUE, remove_hyphens = TRUE) 
Amazonfiles_ALL = tokens_tolower(Amazonfiles_ALL) 
Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm <- dfm(Amazonfiles_ALL, tolower = FALSE) 
Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm.VAL = textstat_lexdiv(Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm, measure = c("all")) 
 
 
 
# ADD EXTRA FEATURES 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Exclam) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Apostro) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$WPS) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Parenth) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Comma) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Dash) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Sixltr) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm.VAL$CTTR) 
 
dim(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
colnames(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
################### BOOTSTRAPPING ##################### 
# load the library 
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library(caret) 
 
# define training control 
train_control <- trainControl(method="boot", number=100) 
# train the model 
 
NiBayes_Amazon_boot = train(RatingsAbsol ~  but           + 
                              seem          + 
                              though        + 
                              ever          + 
                              howev         + 
                              much          + 
                              more          + 
                              your          + 
                              cant          + 
                              somewhat      + 
                              thank         + 
                              rather        + 
                              my            + 
                              never         + 
                              some          + 
                              you           + 
                              overal        + 
                              `Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm.VAL$CTTR` + 
                              anyon         + 
                              certain       + 
                              `LIWC_Amazon$Exclam` ,data = Amazonfiles.tokens, 
                            trControl=train_control, method="nb") 
 
# summarize results 
print(NiBayes_Amazon_boot) 
 
########### K FOLD CROSS VALIDATION ######### 
# load the library 
library(caret) 
 
# define training control 
train_control <- trainControl(method="repeatedcv", number=10, repeats=3) 
 
# train the model 
NiBayes_Amazon_cv = train(RatingsAbsol ~  but           + 
                            seem          + 
                            though        + 
                            ever          + 
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                            howev         + 
                            much          + 
                            more          + 
                            your          + 
                            cant          + 
                            somewhat      + 
                            thank         + 
                            rather        + 
                            my            + 
                            never         + 
                            some          + 
                            you           + 
                            overal        + 
                            anyon         + 
                            `Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm.VAL$CTTR` + 
                            certain       + 
                            `LIWC_Amazon$Exclam` ,data = Amazonfiles.tokens, 
                          trControl=train_control, method="nb") 
# summarize results 
print(NiBayes_Amazon_cv) 
 
 
########## LOOCV ############### 
 
# load the library 
library(caret) 
 
# define training control 
train_control <- trainControl(method="LOOCV") 
# train the model 
NiBayes_Amazon_loocv = train(RatingsAbsol ~ but           + 
                               seem          + 
                               though        + 
                               ever          + 
                               howev         + 
                               much          + 
                               more          + 
                               your          + 
                               cant          + 
                               somewhat      + 
                               thank         + 
                               rather        + 
                               my            + 
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                               never         + 
                               some          + 
                               you           + 
                               overal        + 
                               anyon         + 
                               certain       + 
                               `LIWC_Amazon$Exclam` ,data = Amazonfiles.tokens, 
                             trControl=train_control, method="nb") 
# summarize results 
print(NiBayes_Amazon_loocv) 
 
 
Amazonfiles.tokens$RatingsAbsol <- ifelse(Amazonfiles.tokens$RatingsAbsol=="Absolute",'1','2') 
 
Amazonfiles.tokens = na.omit(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
roc_imp <- filterVarImp(x = Amazonfiles.tokens[, -ncol(Amazonfiles.tokens)], y = 
Amazonfiles.tokens$RatingsAbsol) 
roc_imp2 = roc_imp[order("Absolute")]  
View(roc_imp2) 
head(roc_imp2, n = 50) 
 
is.nan(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
is.infinite(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
View(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
 
 
Appendix 12 
 
Naïve Bayes Valence R Script 
 
############ THINGS TO INSTALL ############# 
############ THINGS TO INSTALL ############# 
############ THINGS TO INSTALL ############# 
install.packages("Matrix") 
install.packages("quanteda") 
install.packages("devtools") 
install_github("kbenoit/quantedaData") 
 
devtools::install_github('kbenoit/quantedaData') 
install.packages("tm")  # for text mining 
install.packages("SnowballC") # for text stemming 
install.packages("wordcloud") # word-cloud generator  
install.packages("RColorBrewer") # color palettes 
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install.packages('caret', dependencies = TRUE) 
install.packages("readtext") 
 
library("devtools") 
library(quanteda) 
library(quantedaData) 
library(readtext) 
library(quanteda) 
library(quantedaData) 
library("quanteda", quietly = TRUE, warn.conflicts = FALSE) 
library(caret) 
library("tm") 
library("SnowballC") 
library("wordcloud") 
library("RColorBrewer") 
 
 
##### PREPROCESSING AMAZON DATA ############ 
##### PREPROCESSING AMAZON DATA ############ 
##### PREPROCESSING AMAZON DATA ############ 
require(quanteda) 
require(readtext) 
Amazonfiles <- readtext("/Users/mohammedalmosaiwi/Documents/Uni/Pythonwork/Valence/Text 
Documents_Temp/*.txt") 
LIWC_Amazon = 
read.csv("/Users/mohammedalmosaiwi/Documents/Uni/Pythonwork/Valence/LIWC_VALENCE2.csv", header = 
TRUE) 
 
Amazonfiles["RatingsAbsol"] = (rep(c(1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2), len = nrow(Amazonfiles))) 
Amazonfiles["Group"] = rep(1:3, each = 162, 90, 90, len = nrow(Amazonfiles)) 
Amazonfiles["Ratings"] = (rep(c(1, 10, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9), len = nrow(Amazonfiles))) 
Amazonfiles["Valence"] = (rep(c(1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 3, 2, 2, 2), len = nrow(Amazonfiles))) 
Amazonfiles[253:342, 4] = rep(3) 
Amazonfiles[163:342, 3] = (rep(c(1, 2, 2, 2, 1), 36)) 
Amazonfiles[163:342, 5] = (rep(c(1, 2, 3, 4, 5), 36)) 
Amazonfiles[163:342, 6] = (rep(c(1, 1, 3, 2, 2), 36)) 
 
# head(Amazonfiles) 
# View(Amazonfiles) 
 
# RENAME headings in data.frame 
names(Amazonfiles) <- c("Filename", "text", "RatingsAbsol", "Groups", "Ratings", "Valence") 
 
# FACTORIZE (ratings), create new binary variable 
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Amazonfiles$RatingsAbsol <- as.factor(Amazonfiles$RatingsAbsol) 
Amazonfiles$Groups <- as.factor(Amazonfiles$Groups) 
Amazonfiles$Ratings <- as.factor(Amazonfiles$Ratings) 
Amazonfiles$Valence <- as.factor(Amazonfiles$Valence) 
 
# MISSING DATA check 
length(which(!complete.cases(Amazonfiles))) 
 
# DISTRIBUTION of groups check 
prop.table(table(Amazonfiles$RatingsAbsol)) 
prop.table(table(Amazonfiles$Valence)) 
 
# FORMATTING - convert text to utf8 
Amazonfiles$text = iconv(enc2utf8(Amazonfiles$text),sub="byte") 
 
###FIND AND REPLACE within a data frame - cleaning data 
Amazonfiles$text = gsub("\n", " ", Amazonfiles$text) 
Amazonfiles$text = gsub("/", " ", Amazonfiles$text) 
Amazonfiles$text = gsub("&", "and", Amazonfiles$text) 
 
library(caret) 
set.seed(32984) 
Amazon.indexes <- createDataPartition(Amazonfiles$Valence, times = 1, 
                                      p = 0.7, list = FALSE) 
 
 
trainAmazon <- Amazonfiles[Amazon.indexes,] 
testAmazon <- Amazonfiles[-Amazon.indexes,] 
trainLIWC = LIWC_Amazon[Amazon.indexes,] 
testLIWC = LIWC_Amazon[-Amazon.indexes,] 
 
prop.table(table(trainAmazon$RatingsAbsol)) 
prop.table(table(testAmazon$RatingsAbsol)) 
prop.table(table(trainAmazon$Groups)) 
prop.table(table(testAmazon$Groups)) 
 
AmazonCorpus <- corpus(trainAmazon) 
colnames(trainAmazon) 
colnames(testAmazon) 
colnames(trainLIWC) 
colnames(testLIWC) 
 
 
# TOKENIZE 
trainAmazon.tokens = tokens(trainAmazon$text, what = "word",  
                            remove_numbers = TRUE, remove_punct = TRUE, 
 
 
Page 298 of 341 
 
                            remove_symbols = TRUE, remove_hyphens = TRUE) 
 
 
# LOWER CASE the tokens. 
trainAmazon.tokens = tokens_tolower(trainAmazon.tokens) 
 
# STOP WORDS 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION <- tokens_select(trainAmazon.tokens, stopwords(kind = "SMART"),  
                                             selection = "keep") 
# STEMMING 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION <- tokens_wordstem(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION, language = "english") 
 
# DFM <- Preprosessed data 
trainAmazon.tokens.dfm <- dfm(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION, tolower = FALSE) 
dim(trainAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
 
# LEXICAL DIVERSITY - trainAmazon_LexDiv 
trainAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS = dfm(trainAmazon.tokens, tolower = FALSE) 
dim(trainAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS) 
trainAmazon_LexDiv = textstat_lexdiv(trainAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS, measure = c("all")) 
 
# MATRIX <- DFM 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.matrix <- as.matrix(trainAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
 
# TERM FREQUENCY FUNCTION <- create fucntion 
term.frequency <- function(row) { 
  row / sum(row) 
} 
 
# NORMALIZE all documents with TF  # we lose the RatingsAbsol column 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm <- apply(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.matrix, 1, term.frequency) 
dim(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm) 
 
# TRANSPOSE the matrix 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm <- t(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm) 
dim(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm) 
 
# DF <- DFM+RatingsAbsol 
# trainAmazon is a df and provides the RatingsAbsol vector 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df <- cbind(Valence = trainAmazon$Valence, 
as.data.frame(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.dfm)) 
 
# COLNAMES <- make names 
names(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) <- make.names(names(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df)) 
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#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
############################### TEST DATA PREPROCESSING 
####################################### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
 
# Tokenization. 
testAmazon.tok <- tokens(testAmazon$text, what = "word",  
                         remove_numbers = TRUE, remove_punct = TRUE, 
                         remove_symbols = TRUE, remove_hyphens = TRUE) 
 
# Lower case the tokens. 
testAmazon.tok <- tokens_tolower(testAmazon.tok) 
 
# Stopword removal. 
testAmazon.tokens <- tokens_select(testAmazon.tok, stopwords(kind = "SMART"),  
                                   selection = "keep") 
 
# Stemming. 
testAmazon.tokens <- tokens_wordstem(testAmazon.tokens, language = "english") 
 
# Lexival Diversity 
testAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS = dfm(testAmazon.tok, tolower = FALSE) 
dim(testAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS) 
testAmazon_LexDiv = textstat_lexdiv(testAmazon.tokens.ALLWORDS, measure = c("all")) 
 
# Convert n-grams to quanteda DOCUMENT-TERM FREQUENCY MATRIX matrix. 
testAmazon.tokens.dfm <- dfm(testAmazon.tokens, tolower = FALSE) 
 
# MATCH TEST WITH TRAIN 
testAmazon.tokens.dfm <- dfm_select(testAmazon.tokens.dfm, pattern = trainAmazon.tokens.dfm, 
                                    selection = "keep") 
dim(testAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
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# Ensure the test dfm has the same n-grams as the training dfm. 
# 
# NOTE - In production we should expect that new text messages will  
#        contain n-grams that did not exist in the original training 
#        data. As such, we need to strip those n-grams out. 
# 
 
# MATRIX <- DFM 
testAmazon.tokens.matrix <- as.matrix(testAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
 
# NORMALIZE all documents with TF  # we lose the RatingsAbsol column 
testAmazon.tokens.dfm <- apply(testAmazon.tokens.matrix, 1, term.frequency) 
dim(testAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
 
# TRANSPOSE the matrix 
testAmazon.tokens.dfm <- t(testAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
dim(testAmazon.tokens.dfm) 
 
# DF <- DFM+RatingsAbsol 
# trainAmazon is a df and provides the RatingsAbsol vector 
testAmazon.tokens.df <- cbind(Valence = testAmazon$Valence, as.data.frame(testAmazon.tokens.dfm)) 
 
# COLNAMES <- make names 
names(testAmazon.tokens.df) <- make.names(names(testAmazon.tokens.df)) 
 
# Fix incomplete cases 
summary(testAmazon.tokens.df[1,]) 
testAmazon.tokens.df[is.na(testAmazon.tokens.df)] <- 0.0 
summary(testAmazon.tokens.df[1,]) 
 
#  ADD EXTRA FEATURES - LIWC and TTR 
 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Exclam) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Apostro) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$WPS) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Parenth) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Comma) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Dash) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainLIWC$Sixltr) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Exclam) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Apostro) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$WPS) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Parenth) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Comma) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Dash) 
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testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testLIWC$Sixltr) 
 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = cbind(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df, trainAmazon_LexDiv$CTTR) 
testAmazon.tokens.df = cbind(testAmazon.tokens.df, testAmazon_LexDiv$CTTR) 
 
##### MOVEME FUNCTION #########   
moveme <- function (invec, movecommand) { 
  movecommand <- lapply(strsplit(strsplit(movecommand, ";")[[1]],  
                                 ",|\\s+"), function(x) x[x != ""]) 
  movelist <- lapply(movecommand, function(x) { 
    Where <- x[which(x %in% c("before", "after", "first",  
                              "last")):length(x)] 
    ToMove <- setdiff(x, Where) 
    list(ToMove, Where) 
  }) 
  myVec <- invec 
  for (i in seq_along(movelist)) { 
    temp <- setdiff(myVec, movelist[[i]][[1]]) 
    A <- movelist[[i]][[2]][1] 
    if (A %in% c("before", "after")) { 
      ba <- movelist[[i]][[2]][2] 
      if (A == "before") { 
        after <- match(ba, temp) - 1 
      } 
      else if (A == "after") { 
        after <- match(ba, temp) 
      } 
    } 
    else if (A == "first") { 
      after <- 0 
    } 
    else if (A == "last") { 
      after <- length(myVec) 
    } 
    myVec <- append(temp, values = movelist[[i]][[1]], after = after) 
  } 
  myVec 
} 
 
##### MOVE RATINGS ABSOL LAST #########   
colnames(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df = 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df[moveme(names(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df), "Valence last")] 
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testAmazon.tokens.df = testAmazon.tokens.df[moveme(names(testAmazon.tokens.df), "Valence last")] 
 
# transform outcome variable to text as this is required in caret for classification  
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df$Valence <- 
ifelse(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df$Valence==1,'Negative','Positive') 
testAmazon.tokens.df$Valence <- ifelse(testAmazon.tokens.df$Valence==1,'Negative','Positive') 
 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df$Valence = as.factor(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df$Valence) 
testAmazon.tokens.df$Valence = as.factor(testAmazon.tokens.df$Valence) 
 
dim(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
dim(testAmazon.tokens.df) 
 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
############################### NAIVE BAYES 1 
################################################# 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
 
######## RUN NIAVE BAYES CLASSIFIER ######### 
library(e1071) 
library(caret) 
NiBayes_Amazon = naiveBayes(Valence ~ ., data = trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
NiBayes_Amazon 
 
PredictNiBayes = predict(NiBayes_Amazon, testAmazon.tokens.df, type="class") 
confusionMatrix(table(PredictNiBayes, testAmazon.tokens.df$Valence)) 
 
 
######  MOST IMPORTANT FEATURES ########## 
roc_imp <- filterVarImp(x = trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df[, -ncol(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df)], y = 
trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df$Valence) 
roc_imp2 = roc_imp[order("Absolute")]  
View(roc_imp2) 
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###### EXPORT AND IMPORT FILES ###### 
sink("/Users/mohammedalmosaiwi/Documents/Uni/Pythonwork/Valence/New_LSE_Updated/Niave_Bayes50.cs
v") 
colnames(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
sink(NULL) 
 
HF_Amazon = 
read.csv("/Users/mohammedalmosaiwi/Documents/Uni/Pythonwork/Valence/New_LSE_Updated/HF_Moder.csv
", header = TRUE) 
 
#####  WORDCLOUD  ####### 
library(tm) 
library(SnowballC) 
library(wordcloud) 
 
set.seed(1234) 
wordcloud(words = HF_Amazon[,1], freq = HF_Amazon[,2], min.freq = 1, scale = c(3, 0.2), 
          max.words=100, random.order=FALSE, rot.per=0.35,  
          colors=brewer.pal(8, "Dark2")) 
####### IMPORTANT FEATURES ONLY CLASSIFIER ######## 
library(e1071) 
library(caret) 
 
NiBayes_Amazon = train(Valence ~ no + also + definit + sorri + noth + well +  
                         even + ani + not + overal + as + whi + oh + quit +  
                         pleas + ok + cannot + instead + never + littl + best +  
                         someon + though + mayb + especi, data = trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
 
PredictNiBayes = predict(NiBayes_Amazon, testAmazon.tokens.df, type="raw") 
confusionMatrix(table(PredictNiBayes, testAmazon.tokens.df$Valence)) 
NiBayes_Amazon 
 
colnames(trainAmazon.tokens.FUNCTION.df) 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
############################### CROSS VALIDATION 
############################################## 
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#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
#########################################################################################
###### 
 
# TOKENIZE 
Amazonfiles.tokens = tokens(Amazonfiles$text, what = "word",  
                            remove_numbers = TRUE, remove_punct = TRUE, 
                            remove_symbols = TRUE, remove_hyphens = TRUE) 
 
# LOWER CASE the tokens. 
Amazonfiles.tokens = tokens_tolower(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
# STOP WORDS 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- tokens_select(Amazonfiles.tokens, stopwords(kind = "SMART"),  
                                    selection = "keep") 
# STEMMING 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- tokens_wordstem(Amazonfiles.tokens, language = "english") 
 
# DFM <- Preprosessed data 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- dfm(Amazonfiles.tokens, tolower = FALSE) 
dim(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
# MATRIX <- DFM 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- as.matrix(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
# TERM FREQUENCY FUNCTION <- create fucntion 
term.frequency <- function(row) { 
  row / sum(row) 
} 
 
# NORMALIZE all documents with TF  # we lose the RatingsAbsol column 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- apply(Amazonfiles.tokens, 1, term.frequency) 
dim(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
# TRANSPOSE the matrix 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- t(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
dim(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
# DF <- DFM+RatingsAbsol 
# trainAmazon is a df and provides the RatingsAbsol vector 
Amazonfiles.tokens <- cbind(Valence = Amazonfiles$Valence , as.data.frame(Amazonfiles.tokens)) 
 
# COLNAMES <- make names 
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names(Amazonfiles.tokens) <- make.names(names(Amazonfiles.tokens)) 
library("dplyr") 
 
Amazonfiles.tokens$Valence <- as.factor(Amazonfiles.tokens$Valence) 
Amazonfiles.tokens$Valence <- ifelse(Amazonfiles.tokens$Valence==1,'Negative','Positive') 
 
 
 
# TOKENIZE - LEXICAL DIVERSITY = Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm.VAL 
Amazonfiles_ALL = tokens(Amazonfiles$text, what = "word",  
                         remove_numbers = TRUE, remove_punct = TRUE, 
                         remove_symbols = TRUE, remove_hyphens = TRUE) 
Amazonfiles_ALL = tokens_tolower(Amazonfiles_ALL) 
Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm <- dfm(Amazonfiles_ALL, tolower = FALSE) 
Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm.VAL = textstat_lexdiv(Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm, measure = c("all")) 
 
 
 
# ADD EXTRA FEATURES 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Exclam) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Apostro) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$WPS) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Parenth) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Comma) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Dash) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, LIWC_Amazon$Sixltr) 
Amazonfiles.tokens = cbind(Amazonfiles.tokens, Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm.VAL$CTTR) 
 
dim(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
colnames(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
################### BOOTSTRAPPING ##################### 
# load the library 
library(caret) 
 
# define training control 
train_control <- trainControl(method="boot", number=100) 
# train the model 
 
 
 
NiBayes_Amazon_boot = train(Valence ~ no + also + definit + sorri + noth + well +  
        even + ani + not + overal + as + whi + oh + quit +  
        pleas + ok + cannot + instead + never + littl + best +  
        someon + though + mayb + especi + `Amazonfiles_Diversity.dfm.VAL$CTTR`, data = Amazonfiles.tokens, 
                          trControl=train_control, method="nb") 
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# summarize results 
print(NiBayes_Amazon_boot) 
 
########### K FOLD CROSS VALIDATION ######### 
# load the library 
library(caret) 
 
# define training control 
train_control <- trainControl(method="repeatedcv", number=10, repeats=3) 
 
# train the model 
NiBayes_Amazon_cv = train(Valence ~ no + also + definit + sorri + noth + well +  
                              even + ani + not + overal + as + whi + oh + quit +  
                              pleas + ok + cannot + instead + never + littl + best +  
                              someon + though + mayb + especi,data = Amazonfiles.tokens, 
                            trControl=train_control, method="nb") 
# summarize results 
print(NiBayes_Amazon_cv) 
 
 
########## LOOCV ############### 
 
# load the library 
library(caret) 
 
# define training control 
train_control <- trainControl(method="LOOCV") 
# train the model 
NiBayes_Amazon_loocv = train(Valence ~ no + also + definit + sorri + noth + well +  
                            even + ani + not + overal + as + whi + oh + quit +  
                            pleas + ok + cannot + instead + never + littl + best +  
                            someon + though + mayb + especi,data = Amazonfiles.tokens, 
                          trControl=train_control, method="nb") 
 
# summarize results 
print(NiBayes_Amazon_loocv) 
 
 
Amazonfiles.tokens$Valence <- ifelse(Amazonfiles.tokens$Valence=="Absolute",'1','2') 
 
Amazonfiles.tokens = na.omit(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
roc_imp <- filterVarImp(x = Amazonfiles.tokens[, -ncol(Amazonfiles.tokens)], y = Amazonfiles.tokens$Valence) 
roc_imp2 = roc_imp[order("Absolute")]  
View(roc_imp2) 
head(roc_imp2, n = 50) 
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is.nan(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
is.infinite(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
View(Amazonfiles.tokens) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 13 
 
Our Predictions 
 
Independent variables and hypotheses 
 
Behavioural 
 
DV = Participants responses - select the statement they most/least prefer 
 
IV 1 = Absolutist/Non absolutist 
IV 2 = Valence (Positive, Negative) 
IV 3 = Situation category - Social (i.e. party), Achievement (i.e. exam), Core needs 
(Safety) 
IV 4 = Statement structure - Probability/Magnitude 
 
Key hypothesis 
• Absolutist negative statements will be the least preferred 
• Non-absolutist positive statements will be the most preferred 
• “Core needs” more prone to absolutist responses than social and achievement 
situations 
 
Exploratory 
• Probability/magnitude 
 
Physiology 
 
DV = SCR, frequency N-SCR and SCL 
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• Absolutist statements will induce more SCR’s and higher frequency of NSCR’s. 
• Absolutist statements will have higher SCL 
 
DV = HRV 
• Exploratory 
 
Subjective questionnaires 
 
Depression Anxiety Scale (DAS) 
• Higher scores will correlate with greater endorsement of positive absolutist 
appraisal. 
 
Attribution Style Questionnaire (ASQ) 
• Largely exploratory 
• Extreme responses may correlate with more positive absolutist endorsing and 
higher DAS. 
  
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DASS) 
• Largely exploratory 
• Extreme responses may correlate with more positive absolutist endorsing and 
higher DAS. 
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Investigating maladaptive processes of appraisal generation  
 
 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
1. I have read and had explained to me by ……………………………………… 
 
the accompanying Information Sheet relating to the project on:   
Investigating maladaptive processes of appraisal generation 
 
 
2. I have had explained to me the purposes of the project and what will be required of 
me, and any questions I have had have been answered to my satisfaction.  I agree to 
the arrangements described in the Information Sheet in so far as they relate to my 
participation. 
 
 
3. I understand that participation is entirely voluntary and that I have the right to 
withdraw from the project any time, and that this will be without detriment. 
 
 
4. I understand that all personal information will remain confidential to the Investigator 
and arrangements for the storage and eventual disposal of any identifiable material 
have been made clear to me 
 
 
5. This application has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics Committee and 
has been given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct. 
 
 
6. I have received a copy of this Consent Form and of the accompanying Information 
Sheet.  
 
 
Name: ……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Signed: ……………………………………………...……………………………… 
 
Date: ………………………………………………………...……………………… 
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Appendix 15 
 
Title of Study: Investigating maladaptive processes of appraisal generation 
 
Information Sheet 
 
Supervisor:   Email:      Phone: 
Dr T Johnstone     
 
Experimenters:    
Mr M Al-Mosaiwi (PhD student)  m.a.a.almosaiwi@pgr.reading.ac.uk     
 
You are being asked to take part in a research study that investigates a particular aspect 
of ordinary emotion regulation.  You have been selected on basis that you are over 18 
and have no history of neuropsychological illness. I am a first year PhD student and this 
experiment will constitute a part of my PhD degree.   It is affiliated with the Reading 
School of Psychology and Clinical Language Studies and is supervised by prof. 
Johnstone.  Before you decide to participate, please read the following information 
detailing practical aspects of the study. 
You will be asked to complete an experimental task followed by a number of short 
questionnaires.  During the task you will be presented with a number of different 
scenarios with accompanying statements.  These scenarios will depict commonly 
encountered situations (i.e. job interview) and the accompanying statements should be 
treated as examples of possible ‘self-talk’ (things you say to yourself).  The self-talk 
statements will relate to the depicted scenario and will be more or less positive or 
negative.  You will be asked to rank these statements according to your personal 
preference.  Later you will be asked to read the same statements out loud with a sensor 
attached to your finger.  Finally you will be asked to complete some short 
questionnaires regarding your mood and process of thinking.  The total experimental 
time might range from approximately 40 - 60 minutes to complete. 
You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time, without explanation or 
detriment.  Your data can also be withdrawn from the study, at any time before the 
point of any publication.  The UK Data Protection Act 1998 will apply to all 
information gathered.  This will either be held on password-locked computer files or 
locked cabinets within the School of Psychology and Clinical Language Studies.  In 
many instances your identity will be anonymised, and this will certainly be the case if 
any of your data is disseminated in any way. At all times there will be no possibility of 
you as an individual being linked with the data.  This study will not have access to any 
of your medical records.  Personally identifiable information will be held for 5 years 
before secure disposal.  Anonymised data from this study might be made available to 
other researchers, in line with current Research council guidelines for data sharing.  
Please feel free to ask any questions that you may have about this study at any point, 
your results can be supplied to you at the end if requested.  Expenses are not expected 
and are not covered. 
 
This application has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics Committee and 
has been given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct.  Thank you for your help. 
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Appendix 16 
ASQ 
 
ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE QUESTIONNAIRE 
NAME: ____________________________________________  
COURSE/YEAR: _____________________ 
DIRECTIONS 
1) Read each situation carefully and imagine it happening to you. 
2) Decide what you believe would be the major cause of the situation if it happened to you. 
3) Write this cause in the blank provided. 
4) Answer three questions about the cause by circling one number per question. Do not circle the words. 
5) Go on to the next situation. 
YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO COMPLIMENTS YOU ON YOUR APPEARANCE 
1) Write down the major cause: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________
___ 
2) Is the cause of your friend's compliment due to something about you or something about other people 
or circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
3) In the future when you are with your friend, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
4) Is the cause something that just affects interacting with friends or does it also influence other areas of 
your life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
YOU HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR A JOB UNSUCCESSFULLY FOR SOME TIME 
5) Write down the major cause: ___________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
6) Is the cause of your unsuccessful job search due to something about you or something about other 
people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
7) In the future when you look for a job, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
8) Is the cause something that just influences looking for a job or does it also influence other areas of your 
life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
YOU BECOME VERY RICH. 
9) Write down the major cause: ________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
10) Is the cause of your becoming rich due to something about you or something about other people or 
circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
11) In your financial future, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
12) Is the cause something that just affects obtaining money, or does it also influence other areas of your 
life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
A FRIEND COMES TO YOU WITH A PROBLEM AND YOU DONT TRY TO HELP HIM/HER. 
13) Write down the major cause: 
___________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
14) Is the cause of your not helping your friend due to something about you or something about other 
people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
15) In the future when a friend comes to you with a problem, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
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16) Is the cause something that just affects what happens when a friend comes to you with a problem, or 
does it 
also influence other areas of your life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
YOU GIVE AN IMPORTANT TALK IN FRONT OF A GROUP AND THE AUDIENCE REACTS 
NEGATIVELY 
17) Write down the major cause: 
____________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
18) Is the cause of the audience's negative reaction due to something about you or something about other 
people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
19) In the future when you give talks, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
20) Is the cause something that just influences giving talks, or does it also influence other areas of your 
life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
YOU DO A PROJECT WHICH IS HIGHLY PRAISED. 
21) Write down the major cause: 
____________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
22) Is the cause of your being praised due to something about you or something about other people or 
circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
 
23) In the future when you do a project, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
 
24) Is the cause something that just affects doing projects, or does it also influence other areas of your 
life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
YOU MEET A FRIEND WHO ACTS HOSTILELY TOWARDS YOU 
25) Write down one major cause. 
___________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
26) Is the cause of your friend acting hostile due to something about you or something about other people 
or circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
 
27) In the future when interacting with friends, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
28) Is the cause something that just affects interacting with friends, or does it also influence other areas of 
your 
life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
YOU CAN'T GET ALL THE WORK DONE THAT OTHERS EXPECT OF YOU. 
29) Write down the major cause: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________
___ 
30) Is the cause of your not getting the work done due to something about you or something about other 
people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
 
31) In the future when doing work that others expect. will this cause again be present? 
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Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
32) Is the cause something that just affects doing work that others expect of you, or does it also influence 
other areas of your life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
YOUR SPOUSE (BOYFREND/GIRLFRIEND) HAS BEEN TREATING YOU MORE LOVINGLY. 
33) Write down the major cause: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________
___ 
34) Is the cause of your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) treating you more lovingly due to something about 
you or something about other people or circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
 
35) In future interactions with your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
36) Is the cause something that just affects how your spouse (boyfriend/girlfriend) treats you, or does it 
also influence other areas of your life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
YOU APPLY FOR A POSITION THAT YOU WANT VERY BADLY (E.G., IMPORTANT JOB, 
GRADUATE SCHOOL ADMISSION. ETC.) AND YOU GET IT 
37) Write down the one major cause: 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
38) Is the cause of your getting the position due to something about you or something about other people 
or circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
 
39) In the future when you apply for a position, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
40) Is the cause something that just influences applying for a position or does it also influence other areas 
of your life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
YOU GO OUT ON A DATE AND IT GOES BADLY. 
41) Write down the one major cause: 
____________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________ 
42) Is the cause of the date going badly due to something about you or something about other people or 
circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
 
 
43) In the future when you are dating, will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
44) Is the cause something that just influences dating, or does it also influence other areas of your 1ife? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
 
 
 
YOU GET A RAISE. 
45) Write down the major cause: 
_______________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________
___ 
46) Is the cause of your getting a raise due to something about you or something about other people or 
circumstances? 
Totally due to other people or circumstance      1 2 3 4 5 6 7      Totally due to me 
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47) In the future on your job will this cause again be present? 
Will never again be present    1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Will always be present 
 
48) Is this cause something that just affects getting a raise. or does it also influence other areas of your 
life? 
Influences just this particular situation      1 2 3 4 5 6 7       Influences all situations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 17 
 
Dysfunctional attitudes scale 
 
This questionnaire lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes hold. 
Read each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with the 
statement. 
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For each of the attitudes, indicate to the left of the item the number that best describes 
how you think. Be sure to choose only one answer for each attitude. Because people are 
different, there is no right answer or wrong answer to these statements.  
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of looking at things, simply 
keep in mind what you are like most of the time. 
1 = Totally agree 
2 = Agree very much 
3 = Agree slightly 
4 = Neutral 
5 = Disagree slightly 
6 = Disagree very much 
7 = Totally disagree 
 
_____ 1. It is difficult to be happy unless one is good looking, intelligent, rich, 
and creative. 
_____ 2. Happiness is more a matter of my attitude towards myself than the way 
other people feel about me. 
_____ 3. People will probably think less of me if I make a mistake. 
_____ 4. If I do not do well all the time, people will not respect me. 
_____ 5. Taking even a small risk is foolish because the loss is likely to be a 
disaster. 
_____ 6. It is possible to gain another person's respect without being especially 
talented at anything. 
_____ 7. I cannot be happy unless most people I know admire me. 
_____ 8. If a person asks for help, it is a sign of weakness. 
_____ 9. If I do not do as well as other people, it means I am a weak person. 
_____ 10. If I fail at my work, then I am a failure as a person. 
_____ 11. If you cannot do something well, there is little point in doing it at all. 
_____ 12. Making mistakes is fine because I can learn from them. 
_____ 13. If someone disagrees with me, it probably indicates he does not like me. 
_____ 14. If I fail partly, it is as bad as being a complete failure. 
_____ 15. If other people know what you are really like, they will think less of 
you. 
_____ 16. I am nothing if a person I love doesn't love me. 
_____ 17. One can get pleasure from an activity regardless of the end result 
_____ 18. People should have a chance to succeed before doing anything. 
Revised date (4 October 2006) 
56 
_____ 19. My value as a person depends greatly on what others think of me. 
_____ 20. If I don't set the highest standards for myself, I am likely to end up a 
second-rate person. 
_____ 21. If I am to be a worthwhile person, I must be the best in at least one 
way. 
_____ 22. People who have good ideas are better than those who do not. 
_____ 23. I should be upset if I make a mistake. 
_____ 24. My own opinions of myself are more important than others' opinions of 
me. 
_____ 25. To be a good, moral, worthwhile person I must help everyone who 
needs it. 
_____ 26. If I ask a question, it makes me look stupid. 
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_____ 27. It is awful to be put down by people important to you. 
_____ 28. If you don't have other people to lean on, you are going to be sad. 
_____ 29. I can reach important goals without pushing myself. 
_____ 30. It is possible for a person to be scolded and not get upset. 
_____ 31. I cannot trust other people because they might be cruel to me. 
_____ 32. If others dislike you, you cannot be happy. 
_____ 33. It is best to give up your own interests in order to please other people. 
_____ 34. My happiness depends more on other people than it does on me. 
_____ 35. I do not need the approval of other people in order to be happy. 
_____ 36. If a person avoids problems, the problems tend to go away. 
_____ 37. I can be happy even if I miss out on many of the good things in life. 
_____ 38. What other people think about me is very important. 
_____ 39. Being alone leads to unhappiness. 
_____ 40. I can find happiness without being loved by another person. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 18 
 
Dichotomous Thinking Inventory 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? For each statement, please 
circle one of the points on the scales from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree. 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = slightly disagree, 
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4 = slightly agree, 5 = agree, 6 = strongly agree 
 
A. All things work out better when likes and dislikes are clear. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
B. There are only “winners” and “losers” in this world. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
C. I want to clearly distinguish what is safe and what is dangerous. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
D. It works out best when even ambiguous things are made clear-cut. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
E. I think all people can be divided into “winners” and “losers.” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
F. Information should be defined as either true or false. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
G. I dislike ambiguous attitudes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
H. People can clearly be distinguished as being “good” or “bad.” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
I. I want to clarify whether things are beneficial to me or not. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
J. I want to clarify whether things are “good” or “bad.” 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
K. All questions have either a right answer or a wrong answer. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
L. I prefer to classify information as being useful or useless for me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
M. It feels good when boundaries are clear for all things. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
N. I think of everyone as being either my friend or my enemy. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
O. It is best when competitions have clear outcomes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Psychological Flexibility Questionnaire (PFQ) 
Rate from: 1 = not at all - 6 = very much 
1. Reality is never absolute  
- 
2.In situations of changeable reality I am able to initiate the required changes 
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- 
3. When times are hard, even very hard, I am able to remember that there are 
better times ahead 
- 
4. Concepts may possess different meanings when perceived in different contexts 
- 
5. There are usually many possible ways to do things 
- 
6.  I am open to experiencing the different and the exceptional 
- 
7.In a disagreement there are always numerous possible solutions - you just have 
to find them 
- 
8. I am an open person in comparison with others  
- 
9. Reality has many different aspects 
- 
10. I often find a change to be a challenge  
- 
11. I think of myself as a person who is attentive to a variety of different messages 
and ideas 
- 
12. I find it easy to acknowledge reality's multiversity of manifestations, 
manifestations that may often be significantly divergent, or even conflict with one 
another 
- 
13. It is important to me to learn from each and every person 
- 
14. I recognize myself as someone who is able to change his/her position and 
modify him/herself accordingly 
- 
15. I feel ready to accept future changes  
- 
16. At times I can make significant decisions, based on my need to change 
- 
17. When I encounter difficulties in achieving a goal, I am able to try numerous 
different solutions 
- 
18. It is easy for me to think of ways of conduct that are very unconventional 
- 
19. I feel open to changes  
- 
20. When given an assignment I am able to come up with original ways of 
completing it, in comparison with how I used to approach it before 
 
Appendix 20 
 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) 
You will find below a series of statements which describe how people may react to the 
uncertainties of life. 
Please use the scale below to describe to what extent each item is characteristic of you. 
Please circle a number 
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(1 to 5) that describes you best. 
 
Not at all characteristic of me (1) 
Somewhat characteristic of me (3) 
Entirely characteristic of me (5) 
 
1. Uncertainty stops me from having a firm opinion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
2. Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
3. Uncertainty makes life intolerable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
4. It's unfair not having any guarantees in life (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
5. My mind can't be relaxed if I don't know what will happen tomorrow (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(5) 
 
6. Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
7. Unforeseen events upset me greatly (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
8. It frustrates me not having all the information I need (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
9. Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
10. One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
11. A small unforeseen event can spoil everything, even with the best of planning (1) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
12. When it's time to act, uncertainty paralyses me (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
13. Being uncertain means that I am not first rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
14. When I am uncertain, I can't go forward (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
15. When I am uncertain I can't function very well (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
16. Unlike me, others always seem to know where they are going with their lives (1) (2) 
(3) (4) (5) 
 
17. Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
18. I always want to know what the future has in store for me (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
19. I can't stand being taken by surprise (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
20. The smallest doubt can stop me from acting (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
21. I should be able to organize everything in advance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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22. Being uncertain means that I lack confidence (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
23. I think it's unfair that other people seem sure about their future (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
24. Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
25. I must get away from all uncertain situations (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
26. The ambiguities in life stress me (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
27. I can't stand being undecided about my future (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
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DAS S Name: Date: 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the statement applied to 
you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
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The rating scale is as follows: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time  
1 I found myself getting upset by quite trivial things 0      1      2      3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0      1      2      3 
4 
I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I just couldn't seem to get going 0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3 
7 I had a feeling of shakiness (eg, legs going to give way) 0      1      2      3 
8 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3 
9 
I found myself in situations that made me so anxious I was most 
relieved when they ended 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting upset rather easily 0      1      2      3 
12 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3 
13 I felt sad and depressed 0      1      2      3 
14 
I found myself getting impatient when I was delayed in any way 
(eg, lifts, traffic lights, being kept waiting) 
0      1      2      3 
15 I had a feeling of faintness 0      1      2      3 
16 I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything 0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3 
19 
I perspired noticeably (eg, hands sweaty) in the absence of high 
temperatures or physical exertion 
0      1      2      3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life wasn't worthwhile 0      1      2      3 
  
Please turn the page  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reminder of rating scale: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time  
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22 I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3 
23 I had difficulty in swallowing 0      1      2      3 
24 I couldn't seem to get any enjoyment out of the things I did 0      1      2      3 
25 
I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (eg, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 
0      1      2      3 
26 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3 
27 I found that I was very irritable 0      1      2      3 
28 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3 
29 I found it hard to calm down after something upset me 0      1      2      3 
30 
I feared that I would be "thrown" by some trivial but 
unfamiliar task 
0      1      2      3 
31 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3 
32 I found it difficult to tolerate interruptions to what I was doing 0      1      2      3 
33 I was in a state of nervous tension 0      1      2      3 
34 I felt I was pretty worthless 0      1      2      3 
35 
I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing 
0      1      2      3 
36 I felt terrified 0      1      2      3 
37 I could see nothing in the future to be hopeful about 0      1      2      3 
38 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3 
39 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3 
40 
I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 
a fool of myself 
0      1      2      3 
41 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0      1      2      3 
42 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0      1      2      3 
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Study Debriefing 
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Thank you for taking part in this study. 
 
This study was designed to compare “absolutist thinking” with “extreme thinking”.  I define 
absolutist thinking as all-or-nothing  assessments which are binary in nature and extreme to the 
point of totality.  Extreme thinking is the endorsement of an extreme position along a 
continuum, but not absolutist. 
 
It is hoped that this comparison will reveal the unique effect of absolutist thinking independent 
of extreme thinking.  I predict that absolutist appraisals are more rigid and irrational, leading to 
poorer emotion regulation.  More sophisticated non-absolutist appraisals consider the many 
nuances in a given situation and allow individuals more adaptive responding to continually 
changing environments. 
 
How was this tested? 
You will have seen a number of different depicted scenarios.  These were accompanied by a 
number of statements.  The statements varied either in valence (positive/negative) or their 
absolutist nature (absolutist or non-absolutist).   You were then asked to select the statement 
most/least preferred. 
 
In section two, you were presented with statement fragments which either pertained to the 
probability of an outcome (I am certain…) or the magnitude of an outcome (…is perfect).  
They were in absolutist and non-absolutist versions and you were asked to construct an 
appraisal statement from these elements.  The aim of these tasks was to study your preference 
for absolutist over extreme assessments (or vise versa).  You also read the statements while 
skin conductance response (sweat response) was measured.  Here I wanted to see if you reacted 
more emotionally to absolutist statements than extreme statements.  Finally you completed a 
battery of questionaries’ designed to test psychological factors pertaining to irrationality, 
absolutism and style of thinking.  I will compare the results of these to your answers in the 
experimental task and see if there are any links. 
 
Background Theory 
Being positive is important in order for a person to achieve their various goals, however I 
predict that being absolutely positive is damaging.  The same way that pressing the accelerator 
in a car is important to getting home, but dogmatically only pressing the accelerator will lead to 
a crash.  Similarly, being positive will aid goal achievement, however absolute positivity will 
likely hamper goal achievement.  I therefore predicted that participants will prefer the 
extremely positive non-absolutist appraisals over extremely positive absolutist appraisals.  
In the second part of the study, I aimed to deduce whether people have a preference for 
absolutist thinking in the magnitude of an outcome or its certainty.  If a significantly larger 
number of participants chose absolutist versions of statement fragments denoting certainty or 
magnitude, this will reveal a bias for absolutism in that appraisal component.  
 
Why is this important to study? 
It is hoped that this project could be the first in a series of experiments along the same lines.  In 
building a picture of the impact of absolutism on emotion regulation, I aim to inform clinical 
practitioners dealing with a variety of emotional disturbances.  Empirical validation of this 
approach is needed before a greater emphasis on its implementation in the clinical setting takes 
effect.  I respectfully ask that you do not reveal the contents of this study to other students or 
colleagues as this will compromise the validity of data collected in the future 
 
What if I want to know more? 
If you are interested in the subject of the study or have any questions regarding it, please 
contact: 
Mohammed Al-Mosaiwi 
 
School of Psychology and Clinical Language 
Sciences 
Whitenights 
Reading  RG6 6AL 
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Debrief Questions 
 
1. What were the two main independent variables in this experiment? 
2. What can ‘skin conductance response” reveal?  
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Celebrity Rating Images 
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